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Abstract
In this thesis I examine, through three papers, the links between international
trade and productivity. Two of these papers examine the impact of international
trade on productivity and the final paper examines the impact of productivity on
the patterns of international trade.
The first paper investigates the extent to which changes in the origin of a
country’s imports impact productivity, once changes in the overall volume of
trade are accounted for, through an examination of the impact of the shift in UK
imports away from the EU and towards Non-EU countries around the time of
the Great Recession on UK productivity. The second paper analyses the impact
of the endogenous response of less productive non-trading domestic firms on the
behaviour of labour productivity in response to macroeconomic shocks, through
the development of a new DSGE model of trade and productivity. The third paper
explores the extent to which the relative bilateral flows of international trade are
explained by relative productivity differences, i.e. the extent to which these flows
are driven by Ricardian Comparative Advantage.
The key findings of this thesis are: first, changes in the origin of a country’s
imports can significantly impact its productivity, even once changes in the
overall volume of trade are accounted for. Second, the endogenous response of less
productive non-trading domestic firms is a key driver of the response of productivity
to macroeconomic shocks. Third, although Ricardian Trade Theory holds across a
wide range of countries and industries, consistent with the existing literature, only
a very small percentage of the relative bilateral flows of international trade can be
explained by differences in relative productivities.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis seeks to contribute to the understanding of the links between trade
and productivity. The existing literature has shown that trade and productivity
are linked in both directions: the level of productivity and changes in productivity
impact the flows of international trade, and the flows of international trade impact
productivity at both the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. To motivate the
research to be undertaken for the purpose of this thesis a comprehensive review of the
existing literature examining the links between trade and productivity is presented,
as well as a review of the current explanations for the slowdown in UK productivity
after the Great Recession, known as the UK Productivity Puzzle, in order to further
motivate the analysis in the first paper of the thesis, as well as the application at
the end of the second paper. Several key results and notable gaps stand out from
the analysis of the existing literature:
1. Although existing research has thoroughly investigated the impact of import
volumes on productivity (see for example Hung et al. (2004), Amiti and
Konings (2007) and Bloom et al. (2016)) and this impact is well understood,
the role of the origin of a country’s imports on productivity has not been
previously examined. In Chapter 3 of this thesis I examine whether changes
in average per-unit barriers to imports resulting from shifts in the origin
of a country’s imports can result in changes in productivity even when
trade volumes are constant. Given that changes in barriers to imports can
have significant effects on productivity, understanding the impact of changes
1
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in trade barriers due to shifts in import origin is necessary to accurately
predict the impact of changes in the patterns of international trade on the
importing country’s economy. Despite the many explanations for the UK
Productivity Puzzle that have been put forward, so far, no analysis of the
impact of changes in international trade has been conducted. Given that
the persistent weakness in UK productivity growth is of key concern to both
fiscal and monetary policymakers, understanding the drivers of this weakness,
including the potential impact of trade changes, is of vital importance for the
development of future policy and therefore the strength of an economy.
2. While the impact of international trade on domestic trading firms has been
extensively investigated, in both the empirical literature (see for example
Aw et al. (2000), De Loecker (2007) and Bernard, Redding and Schott
(2007)) and the theoretical literature (see for example Ghironi and Melitz
(2005), Cacciatore (2014), and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014)), the impact of
international trade on non-trading firms is not yet well understood. Given
that such firms make up the majority of the firms in all economies, for
example in the UK they make up 88% of firms, the entry and exit of the
non-trading firms from the domestic market can have significant effects on
the behaviour of productivity and other macroeconomic variables. Theoretical
models which do not allow for the endogenous entry and exit of less productive
non-trading firms, such as those of Ghironi and Melitz (2005) or Fattel Jaef
and Lopez (2014), are not able to account for the observed significant increase
in productivity that results from increases in imports, examined in papers
such as Hung et al. (2004) and Bloom et al. (2016). In such models, although
productivity does vary in response to changes in barriers to imports, barriers to
exports have a much larger impact, contrary to empirical observations. Thus,
accurately modelling the endogenous behaviour of less productive firms is vital
when assessing both the impact of changes in barriers to trade, as well as the
response of productivity to various domestic macroeconomic shocks.
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3. Third, none of the previous empirical tests of Ricardian Trade Theory (see for
example MacDougall (1951), Bhagwati (1964) and Costinot et al. (2012)) can
determine the extent to which relative bilateral flows of international trade
can be explained by differences in relative productivity levels. Although this
literature can analyse whether or not Ricardian Comparative Advantage drives
a proportion of the relative bilateral flows of international trade, they cannot
determine how large this proportion is. In order to assess the gains from
trading according to Ricardian Trade Theory it is necessary to assess the
extent to which trade follows Ricardian Comparative Advantage, rather than
an analysis of only whether the theory holds. Assessing the gains from trade
is of key concern to academics as well as fiscal and monetary policymakers.
In this thesis, the three gaps presented above, are addressed as follows: In Chapter
3 of this thesis the circumstances in which changes in the origin of a country’s
imports will impact that country’s productivity are established. The specific case of
the decrease in the proportion of UK imports that originated in the EU around the
time of the Great Recession is then examined, and the extent to which this import
origin shift impacted UK productivity and thus can contribute to our understanding
of the slowdown in UK productivity after the Great Recession, known as the UK
Productivity Puzzle is estimated.
In Chapter 4 of this thesis a new theoretical Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model, building on Ghironi and Melitz (2005) is developed
to incorporate an endogenous response of less productive non-trading domestic
firms to macroeconomic shocks. This model is then used to examine the response
of labour productivity to various macroeconomic shocks, including a comparison
of the relative impact of changes in barriers to imports compared to the impact
of changes in barriers to exports. As highlighted above, the previous theoretical
literature was unable to match the observed large increases in productivity in
response to reductions in barriers to imports seen in the empirical literature such
as Bloom et al. (2016) which is captured in this model through the endogenous
response of less productive non-trading firms.
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In Chapter 5 of this thesis I adopt the innovative theoretical framework developed
by Costinot et al. (2012) to present the first empirical test of the extent to which
Ricardian Comparative Advantage drives the relative bilateral flows of international
trade. I conduct this analysis across a wide range of countries and industries,
including both goods and services industries. I then re-run the analysis across
various sub-samples of industries and countries, and then conduct a meta-analysis
on the results from these sub-samples in order to explore the driving factors behind
deviations from Ricardian Trade Theory.
Three key results stand out from my analysis: First, the decrease in the
proportion of UK services imports originating in the EU around the time of the
Great Recession was exogenously driven by changes in tastes, and caused around a
1.7% decrease in UK productivity, but the decrease in the proportion of UK goods
imports originating in the EU at the same time had no effect on UK productivity.
Second, the entry and exit of less productive non-trading firms into the domestic
market means that barriers to imports cause larger changes in productivity than
changes in barriers to exports, and can also drive an endogenous persistence
in labour productivity in response to macroeconomic shocks. Third, although
Ricardian Comparative Advantage does drive trade across a wide range of countries
and industries, it can only explain a very small percentage of the relative bilateral
flows of international trade.
The outline of the remainder of the thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 presents
a comprehensive review of the existing literature examining the links between trade
and productivity, and a review of the current explanations for the slowdown in
UK productivity after the Great Recession, known as the UK Productivity Puzzle.
Chapter 3 examines the extent to which a change in the origin of UK imports,
around the time of the Great Recession, from the EU to Non-EU countries may
have caused decreases in UK productivity. Chapter 4 presents a new theoretical
model, building on Ghironi and Melitz (2005), that seeks to examine the impact
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of the entry and exit of less productive non-trading domestic firms on labour
productivity and its persistence in response to macroeconomic shocks. Chapter 5
examines the extent to which relative bilateral flows of international trade can be
explained by differences in relative productivities, and thus to what extent these
flows are driven by Ricardian Comparative Advantage. Chapter 6 concludes.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
There has been an extensive literature that has analysed the interactions between
flows of international trade and labour productivity. This literature can be
broken down into three groups: first, a literature than examines how the level of
productivity and changes in productivity impact both the composition and volumes
of international trade. Second, a literature that examines how flows of international
trade affect labour productivity at both an aggregate and firm level. Third,
theoretical models of international trade and productivity that seek to incorporate
key findings from both of the first two literature groupings. In this chapter I present
a comprehensive review of these groups of literature, as well as a review of the
literature on the causes of the persistent weakness in UK productivity growth since
the Great Recession, known as the UK Productivity Puzzle, in order to offer further
motivation to Chapter 3 and the application in Chapter 4.
2.2 The Impact of Productivity on Trade
2.2.1 Introduction
In this section, I will present a review of the literature that examines the impact of
the level of productivity and changes in productivity on international trade. The
6
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first examination of the impact of productivity on international trade was put forth
by David Ricardo in his 1817 work ‘On the Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation.’ (See Ricardo (1817).). There has subsequently been much theoretical and
empirical examination of this theory, which links differences in relative productivities
to the flows of international trade. In addition to this wide literature, there is
also a significant body of both empirical and theoretical literature that examines
the impact of a firm’s productivity level on its propensity to ‘Self-Select’ into
international trade. In this section I will provide an overview of both of these
bodies of literature.
2.2.2 Ricardian Trade Theory
David Ricardo in his 1817 work ‘On the Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation.’ put forward what has come to be know as Ricardian Trade Theory, or
trade according to Ricardian Comparative Advantage, (See Ricardo (1817).). The
original theory consists of a two country two good numerical example, using the
example of the UK and Portugal, and the production of wool/cloth and wine. In
this theory, countries should trade on the basis of their relative productivities, that
is their productivities in one industry relative to another. To maximise welfare,
countries completely specialise in the good in which they have a comparative
advantage i.e. the good that they can produce at a lower opportunity cost relative
to another country, even if they do not have an absolute advantage in either good.
If countries specialise according to their comparative advantage and then trade for
the other good, then both countries are able to have higher levels of consumption
post-trade than pre-trade.
Although Ricardian Trade Theory was outlined in 1817, given the lack of
clear empirical predictions, and the shortages of reliable data on trade and
productivity, the first empirical test of Ricardian Trade Theory was not conducted
until 1951. MacDougall (1951) conducted the first empirical test of the theory using
what was subsequently known as the ‘Third-Country Method’. In this method,
relative productivities in different industries in two countries are compared to the
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relative exports of those two countries to a ‘third country’, usually the rest of
the world. In MacDougall (1951), relative exports in 25 manufacturing industries
from the US and UK to the rest of the world are compared. In 20 out of 25
industries, once relative wage rates are adjusted for, relative exports match the
relative productivity levels, thus leading to the conclusion that Ricardian Trade
Theory was empirically valid.
The empirical validity of Ricardian Trade Theory was also supported by
subsequent empirical testing of the theory, such as MacDougall (1952), Balassa
(1963), Stern (1962) and MacDougall et al. (1962). All of these studies utilised
the ‘Third-Country Method’ with US data and different years of observation,
correcting for further cross country variation. Balassa (1963) updated the data
source used in MacDougall (1951) to 1950 data, Stern (1962) offered improvements
in relative productivity measurement and MacDougall et al. (1962) corrected for
relative tariff differentials. In all of the papers, even once the data was updated,
and the empirical methodology improved, they still concluded that their analysis
provided empirical evidence in favour of Ricardian Trade Theory. The analysis of
Balassa (1963) was re-run, using more modern econometric techniques by Yoon
(2011), who concluded that the result still offered empirical support for Ricardian
Trade Theory. The ‘Third-Country Method’ was also used by Kreinin (1969),
however, utilising different country pairs, specifically Canada/UK, Canada/US and
Canada/Australia. Unlike the earlier studies, none of the three pairings provided
statistically significant evidence in favour of Ricardian Trade Theory.
One of the main drawbacks of the earlier empirical testing of Ricardian Trade
Theory was the reliance on the ‘Third-Country Method’, which as Bhagwati (1964)
highlighted, lacked strong theoretical underpinnings. Bhagwati (1964) stated that
“It is difficult to see, for instance, the theoretical reason why the ratio of the
two rival’s third-market exports should, in a cross-section analysis, turn out to
increase as the corresponding price ratio falls.” p.11. Given the inability of the
‘Third-Country Method’ to account for differences in elasticities of substitution
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and different demand levels, this criticism represents a major failing of the earlier
empirical literature, and calls into question all results based on the ‘Third-Country
Method’.
The empirical validity of Ricardian Trade Theory was also called into question
by other later studies, including Sailors and Bronson (1970) and McGilvray and
Simpson (1973). Sailors and Bronson (1970) analysed 13 industries in 19 countries,
giving 342 country pairs for both logarithmic and non-logarithmic correlations.
When Ricardian Trade Theory was tested for each of these country pairs 196 out
of 342 non-logarithmic correlations and 188 out of 342 logarithmic correlations
have the incorrect sign. They therefore concluded that there was no evidence in
favour of Ricardian Trade Theory. McGilvray and Simpson (1973) examined 34
sectors in the UK and Ireland in 1963 using Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient.
Using this method 10 out of 12 correlations had the incorrect sign and none were
statistically significant They therefore concluded that there was no evidence in
favour of Ricardian Trade Theory.
More recently, several papers have found qualified evidence in favour of Ricardian
Trade Theory. Golub and Hsieh (2000) and Altzinger and Damijan (2009) both
conducted empirical tests of Ricardian Trade Theory and concluded that there was
statistically significant evidence in favour of the theory. Golub and Hsieh (2000)
examined Ricardian Trade Theory using data on total export ratios, bilateral trade,
labour productivity and unit labour costs. Across their different specifications all of
the empirical analyses gave statistically significant evidence in favour of Ricardian
Trade Theory. Altzinger and Damijan (2009) examined the extent to which
Ricardian Trade Theory was able to explain the patterns of intra-EU trade, and
found that, once capital to labour ratios were accounted for, the short run patterns
of intra-EU trade could be explained by Ricardian Trade Theory. However, the
long-run patterns of trade appeared to be driven by other structural determinants,
rather than by labour productivity.
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However, both of these more recent studies, as well as the earlier work, building
on MacDougall (1951), as well as both Sailors and Bronson (1970) and McGilvray
and Simpson (1973), suffered from a lack of strong theoretical foundations for
their empirical analysis, which limited the extent to which their analysis can be
said to be an accurate evaluation of Ricardian Trade Theory. The lack of strong
theoretical foundations for empirical tests of Ricardian Trade Theory was addressed
by Costinot et al. (2012). In their paper Costinot et al. (2012) develop a theoretical
framework that allows for intra-industry heterogeneity as in Eaton and Kortum
(2002), and outline theoretically consistent empirical tests of Ricardian Trade
Theory. Conducting these empirical tests they conclude that there is significant
evidence that Ricardian Trade Theory holds in the patterns of international
trade. However, the significant limitation of their analysis is that, although they
can conclude whether or not Ricardian Trade Theory holds in the patterns of
international trade, the methodology they adopt means that they can draw no
quantitative conclusions on the proportion of relative bilateral trade flows that are
driven by relative productivity differences i.e. Ricardian Comparative Advantage.
2.2.3 Self-Selection Hypothesis
One of the most empirically supported hypotheses in the international trade
literature is the self-selection hypothesis, which states that firms that trade
internationally are more productive upon entry to international markets than those
that do not. The first empirical testing of this hypothesis was presented by Bernard
et al. (1995), who examined US plants, and found that those plants that exported
were on average more productive than equivalent plants that did not export. In
order to determine the causal relationship from higher productivity to self-selection
into exporting, Bernard and Jensen (1999) replicate the initial analysis of Bernard
et al. (1995), confirming their original findings, before extending the analysis by
comparing firms that moved from producing only domestically to exporting over
the period of their sample, with otherwise equivalent firms that produced only
domestically over the entire sample period. They found that those firms that moved
into exporting were indeed more productive than those firms that remained only in
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domestic markets, and thus concluded that there was strong causal support for the
self-selection hypothesis.
This strong relationship between the productivity of firms and the propensity of the
firms to engage in international trade has been subsequently confirmed by many
other empirical analyses. Delgado et al. (2002) examine a panel of Spanish firms
from 1991-1996, and find strong evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis,
in both labour productivity and TFP. Arnold and Hussinger (2010) and Andersson
et al. (2008) analysed firms in Germany and Sweden respectively. Both, again, find
significant evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis. Sharma and Mishra
(2015) conduct a micro-level analysis of Indian firms for 1994-2006 and found
statistically significant evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis.
These country level studies were supported by the comprehensive literature
reviews conducted by Wagner (2007, 2012). In these reviews all of the examined
studies, including Kimura and Kioyota (2004) and Damijan et al. (2004) find
statistically significant evidence in favour of the self-selection hypothesis. The
overwhelming evidence in the literature is for a causal relationship from higher
firm level productivity to participation in exporting activities. There is also
evidence, albeit more limited, that this relationship extends to importing firms as
well. Muuls and Pisu (2009) examine data from Belgium, and Vogel and Wagner
(2011) examine data from Germany, and find that both importers and exporters
are more productive than non-trading firms, and that those firms that engage in
both importing and exporting are more productive than both sole importers and
exporters. Wales et al. (2018) support these findings, using data from HMRC and
find that exporting firms are again more productive than non-trading firms, but
less productive than importing firms, who are in turn less productive than firms
that both import and export.
In contrast to the vast majority of the literature, there are a small number
of studies, such as Bernard and Wagner (1997) and Aw et al. (1997) that do
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not find statistically significant evidence in favour of self-selection. In both these
papers firms that export have higher initial productivities, but not to a statistically
significant degree. However, these studies suffer from data limitations, in particular
more limited sample sizes than many of the later analyses. Therefore, the overall
conclusion of the literature is that the self-selection effect is both accurate and key
to any examination of trade and productivity.
The reviews by Wagner (2007, 2012) also found that studies on the relative
impact of the self-selection hypothesis have focused on ‘single-country’ analysis,
mainly due to difficulties with the compatibility of differing national data sources.
This causes issues with making broad claims about the validity of self-selection.
However, given the wide range of countries examined within the literature this
criticism is less applicable, and thus the conclusion remains that the self-selection
hypothesis is empirically supported.
2.2.4 Conclusion
To summarise, in this section, I have reviewed the literature that examines the
impact of the level of productivity and changes in productivity on international
trade. I have shown that this literature can be divided into two groups, first,
theoretical and empirical examinations of Ricardian Trade Theory, and second,
empirical examinations of the impact of firm level productivity on trade. The first
group showed that Ricardian Trade Theory does hold, when tested in a theoretically
consistent framework. The second group predominantly focuses on the self-selection
hypothesis, where firms that are relatively more productive self-select into exporting
and importing. The self-selection hypothesis is overwhelmingly supported. However,
significant gaps remain in both of these groups, including, specifically, a lack of
examination of the extent to which international trade flows are driven by Ricardian
Comparative Advantage.
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2.3 The Impact of Trade on Productivity
2.3.1 Introduction
In this section I present a review of the existing literature that analyses the impact of
international trade on productivity. A wide body of literature sought to determine
the impact of a country’s openness on the speed of their development at the
macroeconomic level for policy purposes. Due to the limitations of these studies
in identifying causal relationships from trade to productivity a wide literature then
emerged looking at the microeconomic, firm level impact of trade on productivity in
order to explore the drivers of the link between openness and productivity. In this
section I present a review of both the macroeconomic and microeconomic studies of
the impact of international trade on productivity.
2.3.2 Macroeconomic Empirical Studies
The initial motivation of studies on trade and productivity was to determine
whether openness to trade was a necessary condition for long term economic
growth. The policy implications from these studies were on the impact of national
trade policies, rather than policies targeted at specific firms or industries, due to a
lack of firm level analysis.
In the pre-2000 studies the main methodology adopted was cross country
analysis, rather than time series analysis. Although this enabled conclusions to
be drawn about the impact of differences in openness it meant that other country
specific factors were ignored, which may have led to bias in these results. There
was some debate whether the increases in productivity associated with openness
to international trade operated via changes in TFP, as was claimed by Edwards
(1998), or via changes in inputs, as in Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995).
However, the results of these studies were all similar in that they found that
openness to trade was statistically significantly correlated with higher productivity
levels, and productivity growth rates. This result is robust, for TFP, across time
periods, functional form and estimation technique, as shown in Edwards (1998) and
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for other productivity forms across different time periods, as shown in Sachs and
Warner (1995).
However, there are many drawbacks to the pre-2000 studies, most notably
issues of: (1) endogeneity, (2) omitted variables such as institutional quality
or geographic factors and (3) the direction of causation, for example in Lopez
(2005). More recent studies sought to correct for these problems to obtain more
accurate estimations for the trade-productivity effect. The impact of both the
originally omitted variables of geography and institutional quality were accounted
for by Noguer and Siscart (2005), and even once these had been factored into the
calculations, openness was still significantly correlated to productivity growth.
Similarly, Alcala and Ciccone (2004) find that even when institutional quality
is accounted for, for the countries in their study the correlation between trade
openness and productivity is both positive and statistically significant. The results
in Alcala and Ciccone (2004) are robust to several different regression specifications,
and point to the link between productivity and trade operating via TFP, rather
than through increased inputs.
The drawbacks with the direction of causation and endogeneity were addressed in
Frankel and Romer (1999). They used a measure of geographic characteristics of a
country’s trade to proxy for the trade levels of the country. Such characteristics are
unrelated to income, and so, when used to obtain instrumental variable estimates of
the impact of trade on productivity, remove the issues of endogeneity. Once these
issues are accounted for the correlation between openness to trade and productivity
growth remains, albeit with a reduced, but still high, level of statistical significance.
One method of correcting for the issue of causation identification is to use
cointegration and Granger-causality techniques as in Marin (1992). Adopting
this method enables the causal link to be identified, in addition to the level of
correlation. Adopting this approach, she shows that the benefits to productivity
growth of an ‘outward looking’ regime are large and statistically significant.
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Although there are several drawbacks to the pre-2000 studies, these have
been addressed in the more recent literature, with the correlation between greater
openness to trade and greater productivity growth remaining. Feyrer (2009) uses
a time-varying geographic instrument to estimate the elasticity of income to trade,
and find that this elasticity is between 0.5 and 0.75, meaning that a 1% increase
in trade leads to between a 0.5% and 0.75% increase in GDP per capita. Feyrer
(2011) uses the closing of the Suez Canal as a natural experiment to estimate the
elasticity of income to trade in goods, and finds that this elasticity is between
approximately 0.15 and 0.25. The estimates from these two papers have been used
extensively to model the potential impact of increased trade barriers that result
from the UK’s exit from the EU on UK productivity, see for example HM Treasury
(2016), Sampson (2017) and Dhingra et al. (2017).
The extent to which this correlation holds for developing countries is an issue
that has received specific attention in the literature. If the correlation holds for
developing nations then the potential exists for using increased openness as a
driver of economic growth for policy-makers in the developing world. The extent to
which the correlation between openness and economic growth holds for developing
countries was analysed in the review of the early literature by Havrylyshyn (1990).
Much of the early literature, such as Kim and Park (1985) and Clague (1970),
was qualitative in nature, comparing periods of high productivity growth to those
periods in which governments were generally adopting outward orientated policies
for their nations, and finding a general correlation between the two. Although this
approach may have been necessary due to the unavailability of data on the degree
of openness, and other measures of trade, the accuracy of the results is questionable
at best.
This issue of the qualitative nature of the early literature was addressed by
Harrison (1996), with a combination of cross-country and panel data regressions.
Although the cross-country regressions did support the link between openness
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and productivity, this was not true for the panel-data regressions that included
elements of time series analysis. The main cause of this difference highlighted was
the significant fluctuations in trade regimes causing an issue of establishing any
longer-run effect of trade on productivity. Although trade is likely to be correlated
with higher productivity in the longer run, this is unlikely to be the case in the
short run. Therefore, rapid fluctuations in trade regime may cancel out any positive
effects and lead to insignificant correlations. However the long term correlation
remains significant, and so in the long term policy-makers can increase the openness
of their country’s trade to promote productivity growth.
A more recent literature has sought to examine the specific impact of import
volume changes on productivity. Hung et al. (2004) identify four channels through
which imports could impact domestic productivity: economies of scale, competition
effects, reallocation effects and spillover effects. They then conduct a panel analysis
to determine first whether imports do impact on domestic productivity, and then
second which of the channels is the most important in driving this effect. In their
analysis they find that imports are indeed an important driver of productivity
growth, and that it is the final three channels that drive this effect, rather than
any changes in economies of scale. Bloom et al. (2016) conducted an analysis of
the impact of the rise of imports into Europe from China after China’s accession
to the WTO on European productivity growth. They find that increased imports
from China after the lowering of barriers to trade significantly increased the impact
of import volumes on European productivity, and resulted in large increases in
European productivity, that varied country by country dependent on the extent of
the increase in trade between China and that individual country.
However, all of these macroeconomic studies fail to examine the impact of
the origin and destination of a country’s trade on the link between trade and
productivity. Changes in the destination of exports and the origin of imports
will impact the opportunities for information and knowledge spillovers, and could
impact the extent to which competition from trade affects productivity, even if trade
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volumes are held constant. These studies also fail to examine the compositional
effects of trade as well. Does trade in goods have the same impact on productivity
as trade in services, and within these, does trade in certain industries result in
larger knowledge and information spillovers than others?
2.3.3 Micro-Level Empirical Studies
Given the previously identified limitations of macroeconomic studies in identifying
causal relationships from trade to productivity a literature emerged analysing the
impact of trade on productivity at the microeconomic, firm level. There are
four main strands of this microeconomic literature. The first strand of literature
explores the learning-by-trading hypothesis, investigating whether firms that trade
internationally have higher productivity growth rates than comparable non-trading
firms. The second strand explores the effects of trade liberalisation on the relative
impact of different links between trade and productivity. The last strand explores
the impact of research and development on productivity growth via trade, and the
mechanisms by which this occurs.
Learning-by-Trading Hypothesis
The first mechanism by which trade and productivity can be linked is the
learning-by-trading hypothesis. By engaging in international trade firms have
higher productivity growth rates, via some combination of learning from experiences
in the foreign markets and better utilisation of foreign inputs and opportunities.
Firms that do not engage internationally at all, or firms that cease to trade lose
access to these benefits and so experience lower productivity growth rates. The
literature is divided as to whether the hypothesis is accurate.
Of the papers that found significant evidence in favour of learning-by-trading
some of the most supportive results are found in Hahn (2004), Kimura and Kioyota
(2004) and De Loecker (2007). In their analysis of respectively Japanese, Korean
and Slovenian firms they all found statistically significant evidence in favour of the
learning-by-exporting hypothesis. This was supported by the reviews carried out
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by Wagner (2007, 2012), who highlighted the support for the learning-by-doing
hypothesis for developed countries.
However, a large proportion of papers did not find significant evidence in
favour of learning-by-trading. Several different countries have been analysed, to
determine the extent to which learning-by-exporting can apply to different markets
and levels of openness. Wagner (2007, 2012) conducts a review of the literature
and highlights the analysis of Mexican firms from 1986-1990 by Bernard (1995),
the analysis of Mexican firms from 1986-1990 by Clerides et al. (1998), and the
analysis of Chinese firms from 1988-1992 by Kraay (2002), amongst others, as
papers that find no evidence in favour of learning-by-exporting. Overall Wagner
(2007, 2012) concludes that the evidence in favour of learning-by-exporting is
mixed, and that no clear conclusions can be drawn about its validity. The analysis
of learning-by-trading is extended to examine the impact of FDI on the validity of
the hypothesis by Keller and Yeaple (2009). Once the flows of FDI are accounted
for, which are positively correlated with increased productivity growth, there is no
statistically significant link between a firm trading and increases in productivity
growth for firms in the US between 1987 and 1996.
It is possible that firms that experience productivity gains after entering
international markets may simply be experiencing an initial boost due to the
economies of scale of larger markets, rather than any longer term benefits to
productivity growth, according to Kostevc (2005). A heterogeneous firm model of
trade and productivity is developed and then calibrated using Slovenian data from
1994-2002. Although firms do experience a boost to productivity in the years after
they enter international markets this tails off rapidly, and is similar in behaviour
to the boost experienced upon market expansion. Therefore it is likely that the
boosts to productivity experienced by firms are as a result of increasing economies
of scale, rather than any learning-by-exporting effect.
Crespi et al. (2008) examine a sample of UK firms taken from the Community
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Innovation Survey. Although their results are supportive of the hypothesis that
exporters learn from their customers and thus experience higher productivity
growth rates, the results are only significant for certain specifications, specifically
for those specifications with no control variables, suggesting a large degree of
omitted variable bias. However, their results, which show that exporters have
higher productivity growth rates and higher productivity levels, are significant
for all specifications. This suggests that, overall, the higher productivity levels
and higher growth rates observed for exporting firms are likely to be based on
self-selection, where those firms with naturally high productivity levels are more
likely to begin exporting, as Melitz (2003) predicts.
The result from Crespi et al. (2008) that the impact of self-selection on productivity
is likely to be significantly higher than the impact of learning-by-trading is
consistent with the findings of Greenaway and Kneller (2004), Harris and Li (2008)
and Harris and Moffat (2015b). The exact extent to which learning-by-trading
is significant varies among these studies, and for the various industries within
these studies. However, they are all conclusive that the productivity differentials
between exporters and non-exporters pre-date their entry into exporting markets.
This provides further evidence in favour of the prominence of self-selection, in
determining the impact of trade upon productivity, as Melitz (2003) predicts. The
main changes in productivity as a result of changes in trade, are derived from
movements in the distribution of firm productivity levels between firms, rather than
movements in the productivity within firms.
To determine the extent to which the learning-by-trading hypothesis is valid
for countries with different characteristics Martins and Yang (2009) conduct a
meta-analysis of previous academic examinations of the topic. 33 studies (27
published and 6 working papers) which examine the learning-by-trading hypothesis
are identified. The extent to which learning-by-trading is valid is extremely
dependent on external factors. The hypothesis is supported to a much greater
degree for developed countries, and for the first few years a firm exports, supporting
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the view of Kostevc (2005) that productivity growth benefits for exporters
predominantly derive from market expansion effects.
These findings also go some way towards explaining the discrepancies between the
results of the previously mentioned studies, as well as the discrepancies explored
in Wagner (2007, 2012). Those studies that found little evidence in favour were
indeed, in most cases (with the exception of Keller and Yeaple (2009)), those
examining developing countries, or countries that straddled the threshold over the
years of analysis and vice versa for studies analysing countries in the developed
world.
Impact of Trade Liberalisation
The impact of changes in tariffs on the extent to which both the self-selection
and learning-by-trading hypotheses are valid has been explored empirically. Trade
barriers can cause the benefits from trade to be lost, and reduce the levels of
learning-by-exporting that firms in those economies benefit from. The extent to
which this is the case was examined for Canadian firms by Baldwin and Gu (2004).
The analysis of the fall in both tariff and non-tariff barriers allowed the impact on
productivity growth to be examined on a time series basis. As barriers to trade fell
more firms started to export, and the benefits to the productivity growth of trading
for existing trading firms increased. Firms also started to invest more in R&D to
fully realise the benefits from this.
The changes from tariff reductions are analysed separately for output tariffs
and input tariffs for Indonesian firms by Amiti and Konings (2007). The gains from
the reductions in output tariffs mainly focus around increased import competition
and economies of scale from access to wider markets. Gains from reductions in
input tariffs are much more focussed on increased learning-by-exporting benefits,
as well as variety and quality improvements for inputs. The relative gains from the
two different types of tariff reductions are estimated, with the gains from a 10%
fall in input tariffs estimated at around a 12% gain in productivity, approximately
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double the gains from a fall in output tariffs. The gains from the fall in input tariffs
are derived from increased quality of imported intermediate inputs, which has more
of an effect than learning-by-exporting.
The empirical methodology used in Amiti and Konings (2007) is modified to
utilise changes in effective rather than nominal tariffs by Eslava et al. (2013). The
analysis of Colombian trade reform for the years 1982-1998 finds that a reduction
in effective tariffs has much more of an impact than a reduction in nominal tariffs.
The reduction in the rate of tariff actually faced by firms causes the productivity
growth benefits from learning-by-exporting to increase. Additionally after the tariff
reductions firms’ survival depends more closely upon a firm’s intrinsic productivity
level. Thus tariff reductions cause the average productivity level in an economy to
increase.
All three papers have analysed the impact of falls in tariff and non-tariff barriers
to trade, finding that reducing these barriers increases the learning-from-trading
productivity growth benefits, and causes more firms to enter export markets. One
interesting expansion would be an exploration of the impact of trade restrictions.
Do trade restrictions simply work in the directly opposite way to trade liberalisation,
or do other factors come into play to lessen the impact. The rise of non-tariff
barriers since the financial crisis gives an opportunity to examine this, and can
determine whether models should include any additional provisions above and
beyond allowing shocks to the cost of trade in both directions.
Impact of Technology, Research and Development
International trade is also linked to productivity via Research and Development.
There are two main mechanisms by which this occurs: firstly there is the theory
that the levels of learning-by-trading benefits that a firm experiences is tied to their
levels of research and development. Firms require a certain level of R&D in order
to take advantage of the positive effects of trading on productivity growth, and
the greater a firm’s R&D the more it benefits from the learning-by-trading effect.
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Secondly there is the spillover effects of foreign R&D on domestic productivity
growth, via international trade. The rate of foreign R&D is tied to the rate of
domestic productivity growth via an index of the productivity levels, firms that
have higher levels of trade benefit more from foreign R&D.
The first mechanism, where the levels of learning-by-trading benefit are tied
to a firm’s level of R&D was examined by Aw et al. (2005). For Taiwanese firms it
was found that firms that engaged in exporting had higher productivity growth rates
than firms that did not, as learning-by trading would predict. However, of these
firms, those that invest in R&D have substantially higher growth rates, suggesting
that a level of R&D investment is necessary to fully realise the productivity growth
benefits of trading.
The link between learning-by-trading benefits and R&D was then examined
in direct comparison with the extent to which learning-by-trading is valid by
Sharma and Mishra (2015). Although it is the case that more productive firms
self-select, and that firms experience learning-by-trading, R&D offers a boost to
productivity growth, above and beyond those experienced by firms that just trade.
The increase in productivity from R&D is also higher for firms that trade compared
to those that do not, suggesting that R&D offers a boost to the benefits from
international spillovers.
The second mechanism by which R&D and trade interact is the impact of
foreign R&D on domestic productivity growth via the spillovers from international
trade. A proportion of the learning-by-trading benefits to productivity growth
are derived from these spillovers which have been analysed in the literature. A
theoretical model of these trade based R&D spillovers was developed by Coe and
Helpman (1995). The model is then calibrated and tested using a cross section of
data from OECD countries. The model shows that the rate at which a country’s
productivity growth rate is impacted by foreign investment in R&D is directly tied
to the openness and rates of trade of that country.
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The Coe and Helpman (1995) model was extended to correct for potential
aggregation bias and indexation bias by Lichtenberg and Van Pottelsberghe de
la Potterie (1998). An alternative weighting scheme is used, which both removes
the potential bias and improves the empirical results. This is combined with a
generalisation of the empirical framework that compares the output elasticity of
foreign R&D to a country’s openness to trade. These modifications improve the
accuracy of the empirical testing, but do not change the outcome, it is still the case
that countries with increased openness to trade experience greater foreign R&D
spillovers.
The theoretical link was then tested empirically with UK industry level data
for manufacturing firms from 1970 by Cameron et al. (2005). There is a statistically
significant link between the domestic R&D levels and productivity, however, there
is also a significant link between domestic productivity and foreign R&D. This
link is tied to the levels of a firm’s trading activities, suggesting increased spillover
effects for firms the more they trade internationally.
In order for a model of international trade and productivity to have an accurate
process for both of these mechanisms it is necessary to have a linkage between
domestic productivity growth and the foreign rates of R&D/technology growth
which is then indexed to the rate at which a firm trades internationally, in order to
incorporate knowledge spillovers. This allows both the R&D impact on productivity
to be affected by the rate of trade and allows the trade impact on productivity to
be affected by the rate of R&D.
2.3.4 Conclusion
In this section I presented a review of the literature examining the impact of
international trade on productivity at both the aggregate and firm level. Although
the macro-level literature is conclusive that countries that engage in international
trade have higher productivity levels than those that do not, there are a number
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of explanations as to why this is, such as the benefits of specialisation in Alcala
and Ciccone (2004), increased economies of scale as in Caves (1980), increased
competition from imports as in Bloom et al. (2016) and learning-from-trading as in
Lopez (2005). However, the determination of the relative weight of each of these
explanations, and the extent to which higher productivity levels represent a long
term benefit from openness required a more micro/firm level analysis.
In section 2.3.3 we saw that, for developed countries, firms that engage
internationally have higher rates of productivity growth, in addition to the
higher initial productivity levels emerging from the self-selection effect examined in
section 2.2.3. We also saw that trade liberalisation increases the magnitude of both
of these effects, as does increased investment in R&D.
However, significant gaps remain in both the macroeconomic and micreconomic
analyses of the impact of international trade on productivity, including an
examination of the impact of changes in the origin/destination and industry
composition of international trade at an aggregate level, and the channels through
which learning-by-exporting could affect productivity, to determine whether this
is through technology and knowledge spillovers, or simply through increased
economies of scale.
2.4 Theoretical Models of International Trade
and Productivity
2.4.1 Introduction
The section will critically analyse the theoretical models that explore the links
between international trade and productivity. First, Krugman (1980) will be
critically analysed, then the extensions to Krugman (1980), including Krugman
(1990) and Ethier (1982). Second, the model in Melitz (2003) will be critically
examined. This will be followed by the extensions to Melitz (2003), each of which
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addresses one of the limitations of the model in Melitz (2003). The limitations of
Melitz (2003) can be broadly grouped into: 1) limitations regarding the modelling
of the intensive and extensive margins of trade (Chaney (2008), Arkolakis et al.
(2008), Hanson and Xiang (2008), Bernard et al. (2006a) and Mayer et al. (2014));
2) the limited levels of firm level heterogeneity (Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
Melitz and Redding (2014)); 3) the limitation of the particular static equilibrium
framework used in Melitz (2003) (Helpman et al. (2004), Bernard, Jensen, Redding
and Schott (2007), Matsushima and Zhao (2015) and Cherkashin et al. (2015)) and
4) the fact that the model in Melitz (2003) is in a static environment, and so would
need to be extended to a dynamic framework to analyse changes over time(Ghironi
and Melitz (2005)).
The baseline models in international trade focussed predominately on the impact
productivity has on trade rather than the reverse. In Ricardian Trade Theory
trade flows between countries on the basis of comparative labour productivity
levels. Countries export those goods in which they have the greatest comparative
advantage. In the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory countries trade according to their
relative factor abundances. However, although the Ricardian and H-O theories
were able to explain a large proportion of the flows of international trade they were
unable to account for intra-industry trade, or firm level differences.
2.4.2 Introduction of Intra-Industry Trade
Intra-industry trade, where firms trade with each other within industries, was
extensively studied empirically by Grubel and Lloyd (1975). However, the earlier
models of international trade could not account for this phenomenon. Krugman
(1980) sought to explain this with the introduction of monopolistic competition,
economies of scale and product differentiation. The presence of large quantities
of intra-industry trade was confirmed by papers such as Davis and Haltiwanger
(1991) and Dunne et al. (1989). In the model in Krugman (1980) firms produce
differentiated products in a static general equilibrium framework with monopolistic
competition. Consumers demand the varieties of goods produced by each firm,
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and economies of scale are introduced by a fixed cost of production which results
in an average total cost that decreases as production increases, although average
variable costs remain constant. The introduction of this product differentiation and
economies of scale meant that a proportion of the international trade predicted by
the model will be intra-industry trade.
However, the model in Krugman (1980) did have several limitations. In Krugman
(1980) it is recognised that although the volume of trade can be predicted, the
direction of trade remains to be determined. There are also limitations that
were addressed in subsequent papers: Firstly, although the model predicts that
due to product differentiation and economies of scale firms will trade on an
intra-industry level, it does not predict the impact this will have on the wider
economy. Krugman (1980) addresses the mechanisms of intra-industry trade, rather
that the applications of this trade in a wider economy. Secondly, although the
model helps to explain the impact of product differentiation, it does not examine
the causes of this differentiation, for example this differentiation could be caused
by productivity differences as in Ricardian Trade theory, or factor endowments as
in H-O theory. Thirdly, although the firms in the model sell differentiated products
they are homogeneous in other ways, particularly with regards to productivities,
with all goods being produced with the same cost function, with equal marginal
costs.
The model in Krugman (1980) was extended to address these limitations.
Krugman (1990) extended the model in Krugman (1980) to address the first
limitation, and explain the patterns of economic geography that emerge in
developed nations, with manufacturing firms tending to focus into one location,
resulting in a core-periphery pattern. This pattern appears when manufacturing
firms become bunched together, but the primary goods firms remain dispersed due
to the locations of resources. This results from a combination of transport costs
and the economies of scale benefits from combining firms into one location. The
model predicts that the extent to which the core-periphery pattern emerges is
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dependent on the levels of transportation costs, the proportion of national income
from manufacturing and the extent of the economies of scale. The larger these
factors are the greater the levels of manufacturing concentration, and so the larger
the core-periphery pattern that emerges.
The second limitation was addressed in Ethier (1982). He combined the
model from Krugman (1980) with factor endowment theories similar to H-O theory
to develop a model to predict the relative impacts of product differentiation and
scale economies vs. factor endowments in predicting the levels of intra-industry
trade. The model simulates the interactions between the economies of scale internal
to firms, and those that are derived internationally with the factor endowments
in different economies and firms. Although economies of scale play some role in
the determination of intra-industry trade the main determinant is the relative
factor endowments of firms and countries. The model also predicts that changes to
production as a result of interaction between national and international economies
of scale will be predominately displayed via changes in the number of units of
production, rather than the size of each individual unit.
Although firms are differentiated by the product they produce in Krugman
(1980), they are not heterogeneous in productivity. Papers such as Bernard
and Jensen (1999) and Aw et al. (2000) show that firms are, in fact, extremely
heterogeneous with regards to productivity. This limitation of Krugman (1980)
was addressed by Melitz (2003) who combined the model in Krugman (1980) with
the heterogeneous firm model in Jovanovic (1982). The model in Melitz (2003)
features firms that have heterogeneous productivity levels in a monopolistically
competitive environment. Firms pay a fixed cost to begin production and then draw
a productivity level from a distribution. Firms then make two decisions: firstly,
whether or not to produce, and then whether or not to engage in international
markets. They will produce if the productivity level they draw is above the
cutoff level for production, and similarly with exporting and the cutoff level for
engaging in international markets. The model predicts that those firms that are
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the most productive will self-select into the export markets, and those firms that
are not productive enough to export, but are above the production cutoff level
will just serve the domestic market. Exposure to international trade increases the
average productivity level in a country, as it causes the production cutoff level of
productivity to increase. However, there are no increases in the productivity of
individual firms when a country becomes open to trade, only the average level of
productivity. Alongside this limitation are several others that have been addressed
in the literature.
2.4.3 Extension of Firm Level Heterogeneity
The first major limitation addressed was the reduced ability of the model in Melitz
(2003) to examine the intensive and extensive margins of trade. These studies
sought to determine the relative impact of international trade and productivity on
both the quantity of goods that firms produced (intensive margin), as well as the
number of different varieties of good produced by each firm (extensive margin).
Chaney (2008) introduced both the intensive and extensive margins of trade and
then focussed on the extensive margin of trade, introducing fixed export costs and
adjustments solely to the extensive margin. They found that the impact of trade
barriers is dampened by the elasticity of substitution. However, a high elasticity
of substitution causes the initial productivity differences in Melitz (2003) to be
translated into large differences in firm sizes.
Although Chaney (2008) modelled the extensive and intensive margins of
trade, in their paper they did not then apply this to any specific economy. This
application was done by Arkolakis et al. (2008), who applied the analysis to the
consumer welfare problem. Data on Costa Rica was used to analyse the welfare
changes from increased variety available to consumers as a result of decreased trade
barriers. It was found that, although trade liberalisation did result in increased
welfare as a result of increased variety, this increase was smaller than expected
on the basis of the model in Chaney (2008) alone. This was explained via the
reduced number of varieties produced by domestic firms after liberalisation, as the
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less productive domestic firms exited the market. They concluded that although
the gains from a reduction in trade barriers are lower as a result of these domestic
variety losses they are always compensated by increased variety from abroad.
Both Chaney (2008) and Arkolakis et al. (2008) focussed on the theoretical
modelling of the intensive and extensive margins of trade, rather than examining
them empirically. An empirical examination of these margins was carried out by
Hanson and Xiang (2008). They examined the relative extent to which adjustments
to trade occurred on the intensive margin vs. the extensive margin. It was found
that, at least for US motion picture exports the adjustments occur more frequently
along the intensive margin. Thus the model in Melitz (2003) has been modified
to incorporate trade costs that were fixed worldwide, rather than fixed bilaterally.
Fixing them in this manner allowed trade adjustments to occur more often on the
intensive margin, and so improved the performance of the model when taken to data.
The model in Melitz (2003) has also been extended to allow for firms that
produce multiple products to allow a more accurate analysis of the impact of
productivity on the relative impact of the intensive and extensive margins of
trade. Bernard et al. (2006a) develop a general equilibrium framework with firms
that produced multiple products for a more accurate analysis. They then apply
this model to an analysis of the impact of trade liberalisation on the intensive
and extensive margins. Their model predicts that although larger firms do not
produce as many varieties after liberalisation, they have a higher market share in
the varieties that they do produce. The impact of these multi-product firms on a
country’s average productivity levels was analysed by Mayer et al. (2014). They
introduced multi-product firms in a similar way to Bernard et al. (2006a), and then
compared the productivity levels in autarky to the free trade equilibrium. They
found that exposure to trade, when firms produce multiple products, causes similar
effects to those in Melitz (2003), in that the least productive firms exit. However,
the exposure also causes firms to concentrate on their most productive products
and so causes firm average productivity to increase, thus amplifying the effect in
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Melitz (2003).
The second major limitation of Melitz (2003) was the low levels of heterogeneity
at firm level and at country level in the model as, although firms are differentiated
by productivity in the model, in the real world firms have much higher levels of
differentiation. Countries meanwhile in Melitz (2003) are assumed to be broadly
homogeneous, with identical sizes and productivity distributions, which is again
unrealistic in the real world.
The increased firm level heterogeneity was introduced by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008) via endogenously determined mark-ups between firms. They also endogenise
the ‘toughness’ of competition across different markets. This ‘toughness’ is
impacted by market size and the degree of openness to trade, and then feeds
into the responses of firms in different markets to incremental increases in trade
liberalisation. They then extend their initial model to a static general equilibrium
framework with multiple asymmetric countries with asymmetric trade costs. This
extension proves to be highly tractable and the authors conclude that the modelling
framework they set out provides a suitable framework for any analysis of the impact
of differing degrees of regional integration policy.
The country level heterogeneity was introduced by Melitz and Redding (2014).
They allowed countries to vary in size, trade barriers, and productivity distribution.
The addition of these elements allows reallocation between firms after trade
liberalisation, which raises welfare above the basic reallocation in the model in
Melitz (2003). These elements also allow further differentiation in the behaviour
of exporters when compared to non exporters. All of these improvements improve
the analytical applicability of the model and gives a better representation of the data.
The third major limitation consists of the manner in which firm modelling
has been adopted in the static framework used by Melitz (2003), particularly the
lack of intermediate good firms and FDI. Flows of FDI, in addition to the flows of
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goods were introduced by Helpman et al. (2004) to allow a mechanism of financial
transfer. These FDI flows represented an alternate mechanism for firms to interact
with foreign markets. This differentiates firms and adds a new layer to the base
model in Melitz (2003). In the new form the most productive firms engage in
international markets via FDI, rather than exporting, with firms that are less
productive choosing to export. It also forces more firms to exit the market than
the base model in Melitz (2003), providing a further boost to average productivity
upon exposure to trade.
The static framework in Melitz (2003) was extended by its combination with
the integrated equilibrium framework in Helpman and Krugman (1985) by Bernard,
Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007). The resultant general equilibrium framework
with asymmetric factor abundance between countries results in enhanced reactions
to changes to trade barriers than in the model in Melitz (2003). In the extended
version trade liberalisation causes enhanced creative destruction, and so enhanced
increases in average productivity in those industries in which a country has the
comparative advantage. This enhanced increase in average productivity raises the
overall welfare gains from trade, although due to the increased job turnover rates
these gains are not evenly distributed across all workers.
Although the model in Melitz (2003) performs relatively well when taken to
data, papers such as Ghemawat et al. (2010) show that for relative export
performance there is substantial room for improvement. Matsushima and Zhao
(2015) sought to improve the performance of the model in this area by introducing
intermediate retailers into the base model. When these retailers are introduced,
and interact with both the consumer and the goods producer via simultaneous price
negotiations, the performance of the model is substantially improved. Matsushima
and Zhao (2015) test the predictions of their extended model compared to the
model in Melitz (2003) and find statistically significant improvements in predictive
power.
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Cherkashin et al. (2015) endogenise the probability of firm death and introduce
trade preference policies like subsidisation to improve the accuracy of the model
to a static environment. They test the relative predictive power of their model
compared to the base model in Melitz (2003) on Bangladeshi trade data. They
conclude that their modifications result in a statistically significant improvement in
the predictive power of the model.
The fourth limitation of the model in Melitz (2003) is its static framework.
In this static framework the model cannot be used to model changes in firm
and country behaviour over time. This limitation was addressed in Ghironi and
Melitz (2005), who adapted the model in Melitz (2003) to a DSGE framework.
They introduce an exogenous country level productivity factor that works in
conjunction with the firm level productivity measure. In the dynamic framework
firms behave as in the original model in Melitz (2003), however, they now maximise
their profits over their expected lifetime. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) then analyse
the impact of permanent increases in one country’s productivity, and introduce
international financial trading to analyse the impact of firm level heterogeneity on
the Harrod-Ballassa-Samuelson effect. However, the model in Ghironi and Melitz
(2005) does have several limitations: firstly, the model does not have endogenised
productivity and therefore, although the model can predict the impact of changes
in productivity on the wider economy, the converse is not true. Secondly, although
the model can explain the changes in the flows of goods between two countries in
response to productivity changes this is merely the volume of trade between the two
countries. In order to model the changes in the destination of trade after a change
in productivity a three country model would be needed. Thirdly, although firms
and the countries are modelled as heterogeneous the consumers are unrealistically
assumed to be homogeneous.
2.4.4 Conclusion
In this section I presented a review of the existing literature that developed
theoretical models of international trade and productivity. These theoretical
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models have tried to incorporate stylised facts from the literatures examining the
impact of trade on productivity and productivity on trade, such as the self-selection
of more productive firms into international trade. The foundation of these models
of trade and productivity was Melitz (2003), which has then been extended in
many directions to try to account for different characteristics of international trade
and the firms that engage in international trade. The most relevant extension for
the purpose of this thesis is the extension by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) of the
model in Melitz (2003) to a DSGE framework, to enable an examination of the
dynamic behaviour of the economy to changes in international trade barriers and
other macroeconomic shocks.
However, as with the previous empirical literature, significant gaps remain
in this theoretical literature. There are significant limitations of the current
theoretical models, including the unrealistic assumptions of consumer homogeneity
and exogenously determined non-trading firm productivity. The second assumption
in particular causes the models to be unable to match the significant response of
productivity to increased volumes of imports, observable in studies such as Bloom
et al. (2016).
2.5 The UK Productivity Puzzle
2.5.1 Introduction
Since the Great Recession (2008-2009) there has been a large shortfall between the
measured level of UK productivity and the level that a continuation of the pre-crisis
trend would predict. This type of shortfall between actual productivity and an
extrapolation based on the pre-crisis trend productivity growth levels is referred
to in ONS releases as the ’productivity gap.’ (See ONS (2015).). In 2015 this
productivity gap was around 13% (ONS (2015)), and as of 2017 Q3 had widened
to 16%, according to the ONS. The unusual and increasing size of this productivity
gap has subsequently come to be known in the literature as the UK Productivity
Puzzle (Barnett et al. (2014) and Bryson and Forth (2015)). Barnett et al. (2014)
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argues that this large productivity gap has been caused by two main factors, firstly
the larger than expected initial fall in the productivity growth rate, and secondly
the length of time for which productivity growth rates were below pre-crisis trend.
The Productivity Puzzle is especially unusual when the performance of the UK is
compared to similar countries over the same time period (Weale (2014)). In 2014
the UK had a productivity gap of roughly 14% compared to a G7 average of around
7% (ONS (2016a)).
In this section I will provide a review of the literature on the UK Productivity
Puzzle, in order to provide further motivation for Chapter 3, as well as the
application in Chapter 4. Two main explanations have been put forward for the
size and increasing nature of the UK productivity shortfall: First, Disney et al.
(2013) and others argue that the Productivity Puzzle is not in fact as severe as it
initially appears and the explanation for this is based upon possible measurement
errors in the calculation of GDP/ output, examined in Section 2.5.2. Second,
Barnett et al. (2014) and others highlight the importance of non-cyclical factors
specific to the UK and to the Great Recession, causing a prolonged stagnation in
UK productivity, examined in Section 2.5.3. Section 2.5.4 summarises the literature
on the Productivity Puzzle, and highlights areas for future research. Note that
there is also a branch of literature that examined the unusually large size of the
initial fall in UK productivity, explaining this fall through a combination of labour
hoarding (see Patterson (2012), Miles (2012), Crawford et al. (2013), Martin and
Rowthorn (2012) and Martin and Rowthorn (2013)) and ’thin market externalities’
(see Goodridge et al. (2013a), Goodridge et al. (2013b), King and Millard (2014)
and McCafferty (2013)). However, the unusually large size of the initial fall in UK
productivity has been fully explained through these two branches of literature,
and cannot contribute to our understanding of the longer term stagnation in
UK productivity, therefore a more comprehensive review of this literature is not
presented.
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2.5.2 Impact of Measurement Errors
The first possible explanation for the UK Productivity Puzzle is that GDP/output
and the labour supply in the UK may have been inaccurately measured either
prior to or after the Great Recession. These inaccuracies in the measurement of
productivity could have caused the Productivity Puzzle to appear more severe than
it actually was. Patterson (2012) estimates the upper limit of 1% on revisions to
GDP, supported by the evidence of Grice (2012), who highlighted two studies by the
ONS (Brown et al. (2009) and Walker et al. (2012)), which have found no evidence
of significant bias in GDP figures, and no evidence that readjustments are likely
to have any significant impact on the Productivity Puzzle. Disney et al. (2013)
examined the difficulties arising from the measurement of online trade and spending
on new business acquisition, and conclude that measurement errors in these sectors
caused a substantial proportion of the productivity gap in the early stages of the
recession. Barnett et al. (2014) examine the measurement error associated with
intangible investments as well as the impact of upwards revisions to GDP figures.
They conclude that these, when combined with inaccuracies in the measurement of
labour supply can account for up to 4% of the productivity gap. Finally, Bryson and
Forth (2015) examined the impact of declining output in the North Sea Oil and Gas
sector since 2000. They claim that although the output of the North Sea Oil and
Gas sector has been declining since approximately 2000 the extent of this fall has not
been accurately measured in official GDP figures. They conclude that the figures
overstate the pre-crisis GDP growth trend, and so the pre-crisis productivity growth
trend, although not to a significant degree. Therefore, even once measurement errors
have been accounted for, a substantial portion of the shortfall in UK productivity
remains to be explained, through non-cyclical UK/Great Recession specific factors.
2.5.3 Non-Cyclical Factors
Even after measurement errors are accounted for in explaining the UK Productivity
Puzzle a substantial portion of the productivity gap remains to be explained.
The explanations for the Productivity Puzzle based on non-cyclical factors are all
2.5. The UK Productivity Puzzle 36
focussed on features that are particular to either the Great Recession, the UK or
a combination of the two. These explanations can be divided into several main
categories: First, studies that examine the behaviour of the UK labour market,
second, studies that examine impact of the fall in credit supply and other financial
factors, third, studies that examine the interactions between the labour market and
financial factor, fourth, studies that examine the impact of increased firm survival,
and finally other non-cyclical explanations.
The first non-cyclical explanation for the UK Productivity Puzzle examined
the impact of changes in the labour supply in the UK after the Great Recession.
Blundell et al. (2014) analysed the impact of government policy changes and
reductions in the average wealth of households, and showed that both of these led
to increases in the labour supply during and after the Great Recession. Pessoa
and Van Reenen (2014) showed that increased labour flexibility enabled firms to
decrease their variable cost of labour. This allowed firms to increase their levels of
labour at constant cost, which caused the productivity level to fall. Gregg et al.
(2014) expanded this analysis to examine the impact of increased wage flexibility,
and showed that the increased wage flexibility allowed firms to decrease their cost
of labour, and so, to increase their labour supply relative to their supply of capital,
which in turn reduced their productivity. The labour supply also increased as a
result of increased migration, as shown by Bell and Eiser (2015). The increased
labour supply was also combined with decreases in the efficiency of the allocation
of labour after the Great Recession. Patterson et al. (2016) showed that impaired
reallocation of labour after the Great Recession contributed significantly to the
stagnation in UK productivity.
The second non-cyclical explanation for the UK Productivity Puzzle examined
the impact of falls in the supply of credit and other financial factors. Oulton
and Sebastia-Barriel (2013) examined the combination of reduced credit supplies
and impaired capital reallocation and estimated that between them they caused
a permanent fall in productivity growth of between 0.84% and 1.1%. Corry et al.
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(2011) examined the decrease in the supply of credit in the context of increased
bank capital requirements and also concluded that the decreased credit supply had
impaired productivity growth in the UK. The increased formal capital requirements
were exacerbated by decreased appetites for risk in financial institutions, according
to Broadbent (2012). The formal increased credit requirements and decreased risk
appetites were brought together by Franklin et al. (2015), who concluded that
falls in the credit supply can account for between 5-8% of the UK productivity
gap. The credit supply channel was extended further by Riley et al. (2014) and
Riley et al. (2015), who examined the impact of impaired credit reallocation and
bank dependency on the credit supply effect. They found that both impaired
credit reallocation and increased bank dependency significantly decreased UK
productivity growth.
The third non-cyclical explanation for the UK Productivity puzzle examines
the interactions between the previous two explanations, i.e. the interactions
between the labour market and the supply of credit. Sargent (2013) show that
changes in the capital to labour ratio account for a significant proportion of the
UK productivity puzzle, supported by Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014). Pessoa
and Van Reenen (2014) examined the impact of increased uncertainty on the
relative costs and benefits of capital and labour, and showed that the increased
uncertainty resulting from the Great Recession led to falls in the capital to labour
ratio, and thus productivity. The changes in factor utilisation were also observed
by Goodridge et al. (2018), who conclude that such changes in factor utilisation
could account for around 17% of the UK Productivity Puzzle.
The fourth non-cyclical explanation for the UK Productivity Puzzle is an
increase in firm survival rates among less productive firms. Arrowsmith et al.
(2013) examined bank forbearance after the Great Recession and found that this
forbearance had a small but significant effect on productivity, due to increased
firm survival among less productive firms. The increased firm survival among less
productive firms was also observed by Barnett et al. (2014), Ellman (2015) and
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Harris and Moffat (2016). Barnett et al. (2014) explain this survival through a
combination of reductions in debt servicing costs, and increased HMRC forbearance
while Ellman (2015) examined the impact of decreases in wage costs. Harris and
Moffat (2016) show that, after the Great Recession, the empirical link between
firm level productivity and firm survival weakened considerably, although they put
forward no direct explanations in their paper.
The final non-cyclical explanations for the productivity puzzle examine the
sector specific nature of the puzzle, and the impact of reduced investment in R&D.
McCafferty (2014) claim that the Oil and Gas sector makes up a large proportion
of the puzzle, a view supported by Goodridge et al. (2018), who also highlighted
the importance of the Financial Services sector, and the possible impact of post
Great Recession de-leveraging on measured productivity. The impact of reduced
investment in R&D has been studied in the context of government R&D investment
by Valero and Roland (2015), and in a more general context by Millard and Nicolae
(2014). Both these papers find that reduced investment in R&D after the Great
Recession may have led to decreased productivity growth, due to a slower growth
in technology and innovation.
2.5.4 Conclusion
In section 2.5.2 we saw that measurement errors in UK output and labour supply
may have had a small but significant effect on UK productivity, and in section 2.5.3
we saw that a large proportion of the non-cyclical stagnation in productivity can be
explained. However, there remains a substantial portion of the stagnation in UK
productivity that is unexplained, and so other possible causes for the productivity
puzzle must be sought. Barnett et al. (2014) estimated that of a productivity gap
of 16% at the time , 4% can be explained by measurement errors, less than 1%
can be explained by cyclical factors and between 6% and 9% can be explained
by non-cyclical factors, leaving between 5% and 9% still to be explained by other
factors.
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One notable area for future research is to examine the impact of the changes
in international trade since the Great Recession have had on individual firms and
aggregate productivity levels. Bems et al. (2013) showed that after the Great
Recession there was a large decrease in overall levels of international trade, this
in turn could have reduced UK productivity growth through a combination of a
reduction in the opportunities for learning-by-exporting, as well as by decreased
levels of competition from international competitors, which might have allowed
unproductive firms to survive. This decrease could also have reversed the previous
beneficial effects of globalisation, particularly in the services sector, according to
Sentance (2015). The impact of globalisation on productivity growth in the services
sector was significant in the years leading up the Great Recession. The fall in this
after the crisis led to falls in productivity growth from decreased competition, and
increased inefficiencies in the movement of credit.
Additionally, as highlighted in section 2.3, it is possible for changes in the
origin and destination of trade to have an impact on productivity. It can also
be seen that the UK has been exporting an increasingly small proportion of
its trade to the European Union. (See ONS (2016b)). This may have allowed
less competitive (less productive) firms to shelter behind the implicit increase in
trade barriers derived from increased levels of trade with areas with barriers to
trade and decreased trade with areas with no barriers. Given that this trend of
increasing proportional trade with the rest of the world started after the Great
Recession, reversing the previous trend, this may offer an explanation of part of the
Productivity Puzzle. I explore this possible effect on UK Productivity in Chapter
3.
2.6 Conclusions
The literature reviewed for the purpose of this thesis discussed four main topics.
The first topic is the empirical examination of the possible effect of the level of
productivity and changes in productivity on the flows of international trade. The
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second topic is the empirical examination of the possible effect of international
trade on productivity at both a macroeconomic and microeconomic level. The
third topic is theoretical models of international trade and productivity that seek
to incorporate findings from both of the first two topics into their model. The final
topic is explanations for the UK Productivity Puzzle, divided into those examining
measurement errors, cyclical explanations and non-cyclical explanations.
Through the review of the literature on each of these four topics, many significant
gaps in the existing literature have emerged, of which I seek to address four in
this thesis. First, although there is conclusive evidence that increased import
volumes lead to increased productivity, there has been no examination thus far of
the impact of changes in the origin of imports, once import volumes are accounted
for. Second, although there has been much examination of the role of trading firms
in driving the response of the economy to macroeconomic shocks in theoretical
models of trade and productivity, there has thus far been very little examination of
the role that non-trading firms play in driving this response. Given that such firms
are both the least productive and most numerous type of firms (88% of UK firms
according to the ONS), the response of these firms is likely to play a key role in
driving the response of productivity and other macroeconomic variables to shocks.
Third, although there has been much examination of whether Ricardian Trade
Theory is empirically valid, there has thus far been no examination of the extent
to which differences in relative productivity levels can explain relative bilateral
flows of international trade, and thus the extent to which these flows are driven by
Ricardian Comparative Advantage. Fourth, although many explanations have been
put forward for the UK Productivity Puzzle, a significant portion of the shortfall in
UK productivity remains unexplained. Thus far there has been no examination of
the role that changes in international trade may have played in driving some part
of the weakness in UK productivity, which I seek to also address in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3
The Impact of Changes in Import
Origin on UK Productivity
3.1 Introduction
Barriers to imports are an important factor in determining the impact of
international trade on a country’s level of productivity. Nickell (1996) shows
that changes in competition faced by domestic firms impact a country’s level of
productivity. Such changes in competition faced by domestic firms can appear
following changes in average per-unit barriers to trade resulting from changes
in trade barriers, which as Melitz (2003) shows, impact a country’s level of
productivity. However, barriers to trade do not always need to change for average
per-unit barriers to trade to impact a country’s level of productivity, as this can also
change when a country changes its proportion of imports among trading partners
with dissimilar barriers to trade, but, as we show in section 3.2, any changes in
import origin have to be caused by a driver that does not directly impact domestic
competition in order that the specific impact of the change in import origin can be
isolated.
In this chapter we examine the extent to which changes in the origin of a
country’s imports can impact labour productivity, by analysing the link between
the import share, defined as percentage of imports from a region in total imports,
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and aggregate labour productivity, for the case of the United Kingdom, for the
period 1990-2015, for both goods and services. In the United Kingdom, starting in
2007 labour productivity fell considerably, especially during the Great Recession
(2008-2009), and the growth rate of productivity after 2009 stagnated compared
with its pre-crisis growth rate. After a larger than normal fall in the level of
productivity (6% compared to an average of 1.5% for the 4 previous UK recessions
(Barnett et al. (2014)), the subsequent prolonged stagnation in productivity was so
large that, in 2017 Q4, UK labour productivity was 16% lower than a continuation
of its pre-crisis trend would predict. This drop in productivity is unusual in
the context of previous recessions, where productivity recovered quickly, and
also in the context of the worldwide recovery in productivity. Indeed, after the
Great Recession, productivity took 26 quarters to return to its pre-recession level,
compared with an average of seven quarters for the previous four UK recessions
(Barnett et al. (2014)). In 2015, according to the ONS, the G7, excluding the
United Kingdom, were approximately 18% more productive than the United
Kingdom, compared with around 3% in 2007. This unusual and largely unexplained
nature of the stagnation in UK productivity is referred to as the UK Productivity
Puzzle. Moreover, the drop in UK productivity in both goods and services sectors
especially during the Great Recession was preceded by a significant fall in the
proportion of UK imports originating in the European Union in both sectors.
This chapter seeks to contribute to two strands of literature. The first
strand comprises the well documented impact of (changes in) trade/imports
on productivity. Increased total trade volume leads to increased competition
resulting in increased productivity growth. Macdonald (1994), Hung et al. (2004),
Bernard et al. (2006a) and Bloom et al. (2016) show that there is a positive and
significant relationship between the volume of imports and productivity. In these
papers, higher volumes of imports following reductions in the level of barriers to
imports (due to trade liberalisation) lead to more competition in the domestic
market, inducing higher productivity growth. Unlike these studies, we examine the
impact of (changes) in imports on labour productivity when there are no changes in
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the level of barriers to imports, but average per unit barriers to imports change as
a result of shifts in the origin of imports between trading partners with dissimilar
barriers to trade. A related strand of literature is Schmitz (2005), Chaney (2008),
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) and Eslava et al. (2013), which examines the impact
of changes in per-unit barriers to trade on productivity, and which provide the
theoretical background mechanism for the question addressed here.
The second strand of literature explores various explanations put forward for
the UK Productivity Puzzle. The focus of this literature is on explaining the
subsequent stagnation in productivity, which suggests that the underlying factors
behind the weakness in productivity are more structural in nature (more persistent
causes related to the financial crisis). Thus far, a number of explanations have been
put forward. Changes in the labour supply in the UK after the Great Recession
was first put forward as a non-cyclical explanation for the UK Productivity Puzzle
(see for example Blundell et al. (2014), Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014), Gregg
et al. (2014), Bell and Eiser (2015), and Patterson et al. (2016)), followed by the
reduction in the supply of credit seen since the Great Recession and other financial
factors (see for example Oulton and Sebastia-Barriel (2013), Corry et al. (2011),
Broadbent (2012), Franklin et al. (2015), Riley et al. (2014) and Riley et al. (2015),
while papers such as Sargent (2013) and Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014) suggest that
the interactions between the previous two explanations, namely the interactions
between the labour market and the supply of credit, could also be considered a
further explanation for this puzzle. Another explanation for the stagnation in
UK productivity explored in this literature is that of the increase in firm survival
rates among less productive firms first observed by Barnett et al. (2014) and then
explored by Arrowsmith et al. (2013), Ellman (2015) and Harris and Moffat (2016).
Sector specific explanations by McCafferty (2014) and Bryson and Forth (2015)
examining the oil and gas sector which makes up a large proportion of the puzzle,
and the impact of reduced investment in R&D (Valero and Roland (2015) and
Millard and Nicolae (2014)) have also been put forward as explanations for the
puzzle.
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However, despite all this important body of work, a significant proportion of
the puzzle remains unexplained, according to Barnett et al. (2014), and this is
where this chapter seeks to contribute. We attempt to provide a complementary
explanation to the ones already presented in the literature by providing yet another
possible explanation which could contribute to explaining the still unexplained
part of the puzzle/productivity shortfall. None of the explanations presented
so far examine the effect of changes in international trade, more specific in UK
imports, on UK productivity in an attempt to explain this puzzle. Such a change
in imports could affect UK productivity in two ways. First, Bems et al. (2013)
showed that after the Great Recession there was a large decrease in overall levels
of international trade (the great trade collapse), which in turn could have reduced
UK productivity growth through a combination of a reduction in the opportunities
for learning-by-exporting and lower levels of competition from international
competitors, which might have allowed unproductive firms to survive, possibly
reversing the beneficial effects of globalisation, particularly in the services sector,
according to Sentance (2015). However, after the crisis ended trade picked up
while UK productivity stagnated, showing that the great trade collapse could not
explain the stagnation in UK productivity. The second way in which trade could
have affected UK productivity is through changes in the origin of UK imports,
which may have caused changes in average per-unit barriers to trade which, as
Melitz (2003) shows, impact a country’s level of productivity. To the best of our
knowledge the impact of import origin changes on UK productivity has not been
addressed so far in this literature.
To explore this, Figure 3.1 plots the growth rate of gross value added (GVA)
per employee in tradable goods (the pink solid line), defined as agriculture, forestry
and fishing, mining and quarrying, manufacturing (ONS SIC07 codes A-D), and
the growth rate of the import share for the goods sector (the pink dotted line),
defined as the percentage of EU goods imports in total UK goods imports. It also
plots the growth rate of GVA per employee in tradable services (the blue solid line)
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defined as transportation and storage, information and communication, financial
and insurance, professional, scientific and technical, and other services (ONS SIC07
codes H, J, K, M and S), and the growth rate of the tradable services import share
(the blue dotted line), defined as the percentage of EU services imports in total UK
service imports.
Figure 3.1: UK Import Share from the European Union and UK Productivity
Growth for Tradeable Goods and Services
According to the literature, the time lag for changes in trade to impact productivity
is about one year. (See, for example, Cameron et al. (2005) and Macdonald (1994).)
Once this time lag is accounted for, there appears to be a weak correlation between
the growth rate of tradable goods productivity and the growth rate of the goods
import share, as shown by the pink dotted and solid lines in Figure 3.1 (correlation
coefficient = 0.34). There appears to be a much stronger correlation between the
growth rate of tradable services productivity and the growth rate of the tradable
services import share shown by the blue dotted and solid lines, once the one-year
time lag is accounted for (correlation coefficient = 0.52). The question that arises
is how can this apparent link between the import share and labour productivity be
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explained?
Since the United Kingdom joined the European Union in 1972, there have
been no tariff and limited non-tariff barriers to trade for UK imports from the
European Union1, whereas there have been significant tariff and non-tariff barriers
to UK imports from the rest of the world in both goods and services2. A fall in
the volume of imports from the European Union relative to the rest of the world
will lead to an increase in the average per-unit barrier to UK imports. However,
this increase in the average per-unit barrier to UK imports will not necessarily
lead to an increase in the number of firms with low productivity and thus induce
a reduction in average productivity as predicted by Melitz (2003), as competition
might not necessarily change.
To illustrate this, assume two hypothetical worlds: one world in which a
country imports 60% of its goods from countries with which it has free trade
agreements, and 40% from countries with which it does not have free trade
agreements, and another world in which the same country imports 40% imports of
its goods from countries with which it has a free trade agreement, and 60% from
countries with which it does not have free trade agreements. The importing country
will face more competition from imports in the first hypothetical world than in the
second one due to lower average per-unit barriers to trade. In the case in which
the driver of the change in import share is not directly linked to competition in the
importing country (such as, for example, a shift in tastes/preferences), we expect
competition from imports to change, leading, as Nickell (1996) argues, to a change
in productivity. However, if the move from the one hypothetical world is caused
by a driver that is directly linked to competition in the importing country, such as
would be the case if the move were driven by changes in the relative price , the
effect of the change in the import share on competition, and thus productivity,
cannot be identified. In this chapter we examine the impact of shifts in the origin
1See ‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Part 3, Title II)’.
2See https://www.gov.uk/goods-sent-from-abroad/overview.
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of imports where the driver of the change in import share is not directly linked to
competition and are therefore expected to lead to changes in productivity.
Given the low correlation between the growth rate of productivity and the
growth rate of the import share seen in the case of tradable goods, we expect the
change in the UK import share for goods to have been caused by a driver that
is directly linked to competition in the UK, rather than an indirect cause such
as a shift in preferences. We show that this was the case given China’s accession
to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and the ensuing period of high
relative productivity growth in China when compared to the European Union. We
would therefore expect no causal link from the UK goods import share growth to
productivity growth in tradable goods.
However, given that there were no significant changes in UK barriers to services
imports from outside the European Union and lower barriers to services imports
from the European Union after the Nice treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon treaty in
20073, then, absent significant changes in relative productivity or exchange rates,
we would expect any change in the UK import share to have been driven by changes
in tastes, which are not directly linked to competition in the UK, rather than by
a driver such as changes in relative prices, which would be directly linked to UK
competition. We would therefore expect to identify a link between productivity
growth and the growth of the UK import share for services. Therefore, in this
chapter we investigate whether changes in the UK import share from the European
Union induced changes in UK labour productivity for tradable services. Ideally,
we would analyse the changes in import share and productivity at firm level, given
the theoretical framework we employ. However, we analyse productivity solely
at the macroeconomic level, due to the lack of comprehensive firm-level data on
competition and engagement in international trade for the United Kingdom4.
3See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12001C%2FTXT for
details on the Treaty of Nice and http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/ for details on the Lisbon Treaty.
4Although such firm-level data for goods is available for the UK from HMRC, there is no such
firm-level data in services available which we could use for our analysis.
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We find that there is Granger causality from the UK import share to UK
labour productivity in tradable services. Given this Granger causality and the
exogeneity of the shift in the import share, we argue that there is a causal
relationship from the UK import share to UK labour productivity in the tradable
services sector. Given this causal relationship, and the fact that according to the
ONS in 2015 approximately 28% of UK GDP consists of tradable services, we argue
that the decreases in the proportion of UK services imports from the EU from 2006
to 2015 led to decreases in UK productivity and therefore could further contribute
to our understanding of the UK Productivity Puzzle.
Outline of the Chapter
The chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 we outline the theoretical
link between the import share and productivity. In Section 3.3 we present our
macroeconomic empirical analysis and an application of our findings to the UK
Productivity Puzzle. Section 3.4 concludes with a summary of findings and
suggestions for future research.
3.2 The Link Between the Import Share and
Labour Productivity for the United Kingdom
In this section we outline the theoretical link between the import share and
productivity distinguishing between drivers of the import share that are directly
and indirectly linked to competition in the UK. We then present and discuss the
different sources of change in the import share for goods and services separately for
the United Kingdom for the period 2000-2015. We then assess whether the drivers
of the import share changes for goods and services, were directly or indirectly linked
to UK competition and thus UK productivity, which enables us to characterise the
link between changes in the origin of imports and productivity.
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3.2.1 The Theoretical Link Between Import Share and
Labour Productivity
Understanding the link between the import share and productivity helps us identify
if changes in the origin of imports could be a driver of productivity. If a country
changes its proportion of imports between trading partners with dissimilar barriers
to trade (captured in this chapter by the import share), this results in new average
per-unit barriers to imports. Nickell (1996) argues that changes in the competition
faced by domestic firms have an effect on a country’s level of productivity, and as
Melitz (2003) shows, changes in competition can be induced by changes in average
per-unit barriers to trade. The import share can change as a result of: changes in
preferences and/or tastes, or changes in the relative price of imports from different
trading partners. The question that arises is to what extent changes in tastes or
in the relative price directly affect productivity and therefore, how much of the
indirect effect (through changes in the import share) of the changes in tastes or
relative prices can be offset by the direct effect they might have on productivity?
A change in tastes, which as Barten (1964) shows will affect consumer demand,
will lead to changes in the import share, which, through the mechanism above, will
lead to changes in productivity. For example, if UK tastes shift such that imports
from the rest of the world are in greater demand relative to the imports from the
European Union, this will lead to a decline in the import share from the European
Union, leading to new, higher average per-unit barriers to imports. Higher, average
per-unit barriers to imports will decrease competition in the domestic market, and
as Melitz (2003) shows, lower competition in the domestic market induces changes
in the number of firms with lower productivity, allowing unproductive firms to
enter the market leading to lower average productivity. The change in tastes has
no direct impact on competition; therefore, we can conclude that in this case,
the driver of change in import share only indirectly impacts productivity. Thus,
in this case we would expect changes in the import share to cause changes in
productivity. However, if the change in the import share is driven by a change in
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the relative price, the impact on productivity is more complex. A change in the
relative price can be driven by: a change in relative productivity, a change in the
relative exchange rates, or a change in the relative tariff and non-tariff barriers to
imports.
For example, a decrease in the relative price of imports from the rest of the
world, if driven by relative productivity or relative exchange rate changes, will lead
UK consumers to switch from EU goods to the cheaper rest of the world goods,
thus decreasing the import share and increasing the average per-unit barriers to
imports. In the absence of a direct link from the relative price to productivity,
domestic productivity would decrease. However, the relative price and productivity
are also directly linked through competition. In this example, the decrease in
the relative price will directly lead to an increase in productivity in the domestic
country through an increase in competition in the domestic market, as domestic
producers are forced to compete with new, lower import prices. Therefore, even
though the import share decreased and thus per-unit barriers to imports increased,
productivity increases due to the direct competition effects.
In the case where the change in the relative price is driven by a change in
the relative tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports, then the link between changes
in the import share and productivity disappears. For example, in the case where a
decrease in the relative price of imports from the rest of the world is driven by a
decrease in barriers to imports from the rest of the world, then the average per-unit
barriers to trade will not increase as the import share decreases, but will instead
decrease, thus, increasing competition and productivity on the domestic market.
Therefore, since changes in relative price directly impact productivity, we cannot
isolate any effect of changes in the import share on productivity in this case.
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3.2.2 Sources of Changes in the UK Import Share for the
Goods and Services Sectors
As we have seen in Figure 3.1, there are different degrees of correlation between
the growth rate of tradeable goods productivity and the growth rate of the goods
import share, and the growth rate of tradeable services productivity and the growth
rate of the tradeable services import share, once the one-year time lag is accounted
for, with the latter stronger than the former. Therefore, for the analysis conducted
here, we outline separately the evolution of UK imports of goods and services from
trading partners with dissimilar barriers to trade, and the drivers of changes in the
relative price of imports from 2000 to 2015.
Sources of Changes in the UK Import Share for the Goods Sector
In this section we present the evolution of the UK import share from the European
Union for goods from 2000 to 2015, and the potential drivers of the changes in the
price of imports from China relative to that of imports from the European Union,
which led to the increase in UK goods imports from China relative to goods imports
from the European Union for this period. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001
and the ensuing period of high relative productivity growth in China compared to
the European Union could be the main driving forces leading to a change in the
UK import share for goods.
The UK import share from the European Union for goods dropped from
2002 to 2011, as a result of a significant increase in UK imports of goods from
China, following China’s accession to the WTO in 20015. Data from the ONS Pink
Book shows that between 2002 and 2011, the proportion of UK imports of goods
from China increased by 176%, from 2.9% to 7.9%, while the proportion of UK
imports of goods from the European Union declined by 12.9%, from 58.5% to 50.9%.
Thus, overall, the ratio of UK goods imports from China to UK goods imports from
the European Union increased by 216.8% over this time period, from 4.9% to 15.6%.
5According to our calculations based on data from the ONS Pink Book.
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Next we present the potential drivers of the change in the relative price of
imports from China and the European Union, in order to identify which of them
led to the increase in UK goods imports from China relative to goods imports from
the European Union: tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade to UK imports from
China and the European Union, the relative productivity between China and the
European Union, and the relative exchange rate (values of the renminbi and the
euro).
Both the tariff and non-tariff barriers to UK imports from China decreased
significantly following China’s accession to the WTO in 20016. Thus, the tariff
rates and quotas on UK imports from China dropped considerably leading to a
decrease in the relative price of Chinese goods. Next, an examination of World
Input-Output Database (WIOD) productivity data7 from 2002 to 2011 shows
that the ratio of China’s productivity in tradeable goods to EU tradeable goods
productivity increased by 170.3%, from 5.7% to 14.4%. Upward et al. (2013) argue
that the official productivity figures in Chinese tradeable goods industries may
not accurately reflect the productivity of exporters, and the actual productivity of
Chinese firms engaged in exporting is, in fact, much greater due to higher levels of
protection from foreign competition. The increase in the relative productivity of
Chinese firms would cause Chinese goods to become relatively cheaper.
The ratio of the renminbi-sterling exchange rate to the euro-sterling exchange rate
increased by 14.6% over the period 2002-20118. A decrease in the relative value
of the Chinese yuan compared with the euro caused Chinese goods to become
relatively cheaper compared with goods from the European Union. Changes in
relative productivity levels, exchange rates and barriers to imports all contributed
to a decrease in the relative price of Chinese goods compared to EU goods. As
6See Edmonds et al. (2008) and https://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/acc e/acc e.htm
7See Timmer et al. (2015) for full details of the World Input-Output Database.
8See https://www.investing.com/currencies/.
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presented in earlier, if a change in the import share is driven by a change in relative
prices, then the effect of the change in the import share on competition and thus
productivity is unidentifiable, as such a change in relative prices will also directly
affect competition and thus productivity in the importing country. Therefore, given
the shift in the import share for goods was driven by changes in the relative price,
we would not expect to identify a causal link between productivity growth and the
import share growth for tradeable goods. Thus, in our econometric analysis we do
not test for causality from the import share to productivity for tradeable goods.
Sources of Changes in the UK Import Share for the Services Sector
In this section we present the evolution of the UK import share from the European
Union for services from, 2000 to 2015, and the potential drivers of the relative
price of imports from the United States and the European Union which led to the
increase in UK services imports from the United States relative to services imports
from the European Union for this period.
The UK import share from the European Union for services declined from
2004 to 2009. This decline was driven by a large increase in UK imports of services
from the United States of America. Data from the ONS Pink Book shows that the
proportion of UK imports of services that originated in the United States increased
by 9.1% during this period, from 16.2% to 17.6%, while over the same period,
the proportion of UK imports of services that originated in the European Union
declined by 12.6%, from 55.7% to 48.7%. Thus, overall, between 2004 and 2009,
the ratio of UK services imports originating from the United States to UK services
imports originating from the European Union increased by 24.8%, from 29.1% to
36.4%.
We next outline the potential drivers of the changes in the relative price of
imports from the United States and the European Union, in order to identify which
of them led to the increase in UK services imports from the United States relative
to services imports from the European Union: tariff and non-tariff barriers to
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trade to UK imports from the United States and the European Union, the relative
productivity between the United States and the European Union, and the relative
exchange rate (values of the US dollar and the euro).
Unlike for UK goods imports from China, there were no significant changes
in either tariff or non-tariff barriers for UK services imports from the US over
2004-2009. However, after the Nice treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon treaty in 20079
the non-tariff barriers to trade for imports of services from the European Union
decreased. Thus, US services would have become relatively more expensive over
this period. As WIOD data shows, from 2004-2009, the ratio of US productivity
in tradeable services to EU tradeable services increased by 7.5%, from 73.1% to
78.6%. In a similar manner to the imports of goods, the increase in the relative
productivity of the United States would cause US services to become relatively
cheaper. The ratio of the dollar-sterling exchange rate to the euro-sterling exchange
rate increased by 12.1% over the period 2004-200910. A decrease in the relative
value of the US dollar compared with the euro, would cause US services to become
relatively cheaper compared with services from the European Union.
Following a cheapening of the US dollar relative to the euro, US services became
cheaper. Alongside this, we have seen an increase in US services productivity.
However, given the decrease in non-tariff barriers to imports of services from the
European Union and the resultant increase in the relative price of US services, we
cannot entirely explain the change in the import share for services. It can therefore
be argued that the change in the import share for services was driven, at least in
part, by changes in tastes. We would therefore expect to identify a causal link from
the import share for services to productivity in tradeable services in our empirical
analysis.
9See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12001C%2FTXT for
details on the Treaty of Nice and http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/ for details on the Lisbon Treaty.
10See https://www.investing.com/currencies/.
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Next, we present a breakdown the change in the origin of UK services imports at an
industry level, in order to identify the particular industries that drove the changes
in the origin of UK services imports. Using data from the World Input Output
Database11 we can calculate the percentage change in the ratio of UK imports from
the USA to UK imports from the EU for each services industry. We then weight
each of theses percentages by the proportion of UK imports from each industry
in total UK services imports, to derive a measure of the industries that primarily
drove the change in UK services import origin. Table 3.1 shows the import weighted
change in the USA to EU import ratio, indexed such that the import weighted
change in the USA to EU import ratio in Media activities is equal to 1.
As Table 3.1 shows, the main drivers of the changes in the origin of UK services
imports are Other Service Activities, Architectural and Engineering Services,
Scientific Research and Development, Telecommunications and in particular Media
Activities, which accounted for almost the same proportion of the change in import
origin as the other four combined. Media activities as an industry are particularly
susceptible to changes in consumer tastes, as it is well known that such activities are
price invariant across different origin countries. Increasing UK consumer demand
for US television and cinema media is likely to have played a significant role in
driving the change in the origin of services imports, and is only indirectly linked to
changes in competition on the UK market through the change in the import origin.
The other four primary drives of the change in the origin of UK services are all
industries that are likely to be greater impacted by changes in tastes, much more
so than other services industries such as financial or insurance activities. Given
that the change in the UK services import share was driven by changes in tastes,
which only indirectly affects UK productivity we can consider the change in import
share to be exogenous to the change in productivity. Therefore, if we find evidence
of Granger causality in the empirical regressions we can conclude that we have
identified a causal relationship.
11See Timmer et al. (2015) for full details of the World Input-Output Database.
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Table 3.1: Industry Level Drivers of the Change in the Origin of UK
Services Imports
WIOD Code Industry Name Import Weighted Change
in US/EU Import Ratio
J59t60 Media Activities 1
J61 Telecommunications 0.311
M72 Scientific Research and Development 0.272
M71 Architectural and Engineering Services 0.265
RtS Other Service Activities 0.243
M69t70 Legal and Accounting Activities 0.055
M73 Advertising Services 0.098
O84 Public Administration and Defence 0.049
H51 Air Transport 0.045
H52 Warehousing and Transportation Support 0.028
M74t75 Other Professional Activities 0.027
K65 Insurance Services 0.018
H53 Postal and Courier Activities 0.008
T Household Activities -0.004
K64 Financial Services -0.002
K66 Auxiliary Financial and Insurance Services -0.002
G45 Wholesale Trade of Motor Vehicles -0.009
Q Health and Social Work -0.009
P85 Education -0.022
H49 Land Transport -0.029
F Construction -0.032
G47 Retail Trade (except motor vehicles) -0.037
L68 Real Estate Activities -0.050
H50 Water Transport -0.066
I Accomodation and Food Service -0.081
J62t63 IT Services -0.092
J58 Publishing Activities -0.198
N Administrative Services -0.263
G47 Wholesale Trade (except motor vehicles) -0.296
In this chapter we investigate whether changes in the UK import share from
the European Union caused changes in UK labour productivity for tradeable
services. Therefore, in the next section we test for Granger causality from the
import share for services to productivity in tradeable services. If we find Granger
causality, given the exogeneity of the shift in the import share, we will argue that
there is a causal relationship from the UK import share to UK labour productivity
in the tradeable services sector.
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3.3 Econometric Analysis
Given the theoretical framework in the previous section, in an ideal world, we
would analyse the changes in import share and productivity at firm level. However,
due to the lack of firm-level data on competition and engagement in international
trade for the United Kingdom, we analyse productivity and competition changes
solely at the macroeconomic level.
Our hypothesis is that a change in the origin of imports impacts labour productivity.
We test this hypothesis by examining whether the change in the UK import share
from the European Union for services, which as we have already argued, was driven
by changes in tastes, caused changes in UK labour productivity for tradeable
services, when we allow for variations in the import to GDP ratio, using a simple
empirical analysis, on annual data for the years 1990-201512. Econometrically,
given that the driver of the change in the origin of UK imports (i.e. changes in
tastes) was not directly linked to competition in the UK, we will be able to isolate
the causal impact of any changes in the origin of imports on UK productivity.
3.3.1 Data
The data used to calculate UK productivity are from the UK Office for National
Statistics (ONS) ‘GDP (O) Low Level Aggregates 2016’ and ‘A01 Labour Markets
Statistics Summary Data Tables 2016’. Our analysis will be conducted on data
from 1990 to 2015, which is the longest possible time range for which data is
available (productivity data at industry level is only available from 1990). The ONS
measures productivity at sectoral level as output-per-hour and output-per-job. We
would like to have examined Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which better reflects
underlying productivity, rather than partly being a reflection of the level of capital
employed by each worker, see, for example, Harris and Moffat (2015a). However,
we follow the existing literature exploring the UK Productivity Puzzle, for example
12For completeness we run the same analysis for tradeable goods, the results of which are
presented in Appendix A.4.
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Barnett et al. (2014) and Bryson and Forth (2015)) and use gross value added
(GVA) output per employee and GVA output per hour, given the lack of available
data on TFP at a sectoral level.
Industry level GVA per employee figures are calculated by dividing ONS
industry level GVA from Table 3: ’CVM £Million’ of the ONS ‘GDP (O) Low
Level Aggregates 2016’ by the ONS industry level workforce jobs from Table 6:
‘Workforce Jobs By Industry’ of the ONS ‘A01 Labour Markets Statistics Summary
Data Tables 2016’. We know that only productivity in the tradeable goods and
tradeable services-sectors will be associated with changes in import share, thus
only tradeable goods and services will be included in the measure of productivity
used in the empirical analysis. Tradeable industries are defined as industries where
the export/output ratio is greater than 5%13. The tradeable and non-tradeable
categorisation is presented in Table 3.2.
To calculate the ratio of exports to output for each industry, we use data
from the World Input Output Database14. This database contains the input-output
tables for 40 countries (including all EU countries) across 35 different industries
from 1995 to 2011. The data was used to compile an average export/output ratio
for each industry, across the 17 years of available data. The industries in the
WIOD are categorised by the EU industry classifications, which we matched to the
equivalent ONS SIC07 industry classifications.
The GVA per employee figures for tradeable goods are constructed by summing
the GVA and employee figures for ‘Agriculture, forestry & fishing’, ‘Mining &
quarrying’ and ‘Manufacturing’, and then dividing the summed GVA by the
total number of jobs. Similarly, for GVA-per-Employee for tradeable services we
summed the GVA and jobs figures for ‘Transport & storage services’, ‘Information
13This percentage was used to match the tradeable/non-tradeable industries to those in Goldstein
and Officer (1979) and Melliss (1993).
14See Timmer et al. (2015) for full details of the World Input-Output Database.
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Table 3.2: Tradeable/Non-Tradeable Industry by ONS SIC07
Classifications
Industry Name ONS WIOD Tradeable*
SIC07 Code Code (Yes/No)
Agriculture, forestry & fishing A A, B Yes
Mining & quarrying B C Yes
Manufacturing C 15t37 Yes
Electricity, gas, steam & air D E No
conditioning supply
Water supply, sewerage, waste E E No
& remediation activities
Construction F F No
Wholesale & retail trade; Repair of G 50t52 No
motor vehicles
Transport & storage H 60t63 Yes**
Accommodation & food service activities I H No
Information & communication J 64 Yes
Financial & insurance activities K J Yes
Real estate activities, administrative L, N 70 No
& support activities
Professional scientific & technical activities M 71t74 Yes
Public admin & defence; Compulsory O L No
social security
Education P M No
Human health & social work activities Q N No
Arts, entertainment & recreation R N/A No
Other service activities S O Yes
Notes: *Defined as an export/output ratio of greater than 5%.
**Includes non-tradeable ‘Inland transport’, however, all other industries are
tradeable.
& communication services’, ‘Finance & insurance services’, ‘Professional services’
and ‘Other services’ and then dividing the summed GVA by the total number of jobs.
The UK import share from the European Union is calculated as the percentage
of UK imports from the European Union in total UK imports. The data used to
calculate this share is from the ONS Annual Pink Book, the main directory of
UK trade statistics. The Pink Book provides data on import origin and export
destination broken down by worldwide geographical region starting from 1988. This
data is available for both goods and services; however, trade data is not available
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at an industry level.
The increase in the number of EU member states from 1995 to 2013 by 16
states may have resulted in jumps in the share of UK imports originating in the
European Union15. However, data from the ONS Pink Book shows no significant
change in UK imports from the European Union in 1995 and 2004, when groups of
new countries joined the European Union, as most UK imports from the European
Union originate in countries that were EU members prior to 1995 (Germany, France,
Ireland, Spain, and Belgium). The majority of changes in the number of states
acceding to the European Union were completed by 2004. The three countries
that joined after 2004 (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia) provide an extremely
small proportion of UK imports16. The UK import to GDP ratio is defined as the
percentage of UK imports in UK GDP. The data used to calculate this ratio is
from the ONS Annual Pink Book and ‘Gross Domestic Product: Chained Volume
Measures: Seasonally Adjusted £m (ABMI) 2016’.
3.3.2 Econometric Methodology and Results
To test our hypothesis, we follow standard econometric procedure. We first
establish whether the variables (log GVA per employee, log UK import share,
and log import to GDP ratio for goods and services) are stationary using the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips and Perron (1988) unit root tests.
We then establish whether the series are cointegrated using the Johansen (1991)
test. Finally, given that the variables are non-stationary and there is one and
only one cointegrating relationship between them, we perform the test for Granger
causality by fitting a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) to the time-series
variables employed for this analysis, using the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step
approach. Econometric identification of a causal relationship requires both Granger
15Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and
Croatia in 2013.
16From 2004 to 2014, on average, 86% of UK imports from the European Union are from countries
that were EU members before 1995.
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causality and a driver of changes in the independent variable that is exogenous to
changes in the dependent variable. Thus, we can consider the causal relationship
to be identified in the empirical regressions if we find evidence in favour of Granger
causality in our empirical regressions, given that we have already shown that changes
in the import share in services were exogenous to changes in productivity. The time
series variables are as follows: PROD TS, IS S and IM S, where PROD TS denotes
the natural logarithm of UK productivity in tradeable services, IS S denotes the
natural logarithm of the European Union’s share of UK imports in services, and
IM S denotes the natural logarithm of UK import to GDP ratio in services17.
Unit Root Tests
The results of the unit root test for services data, according to both the ADF
and the Phillips-Perron tests show that all variables are non-stationary at the 5%
significance level, and that the first difference of these variables are stationary at the
5% significance level, as reported in the Table A1 in Appendix A.1. We therefore
confirm that all the time series are integrated processes of order one, I(1), and
proceed with cointegration tests.
Cointegration Tests
Given that all the time series are I(1), some of these time series may exhibit
long-run cointegrating relationships with each other. To test for the presence of
long-run cointegrating relationships we employ the Johansen (1991) test. The
results of the Johansen (1991) test show that there is one and only one cointegrating
relationship for services, as presented in Table A2 in Appendix A.2. Given this
result, we next use the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step approach to estimate
the VECM, rather than the Johansen (1991) methodology, to avoid the larger loss
of degrees of freedom associated with the Johansen (1991) methodology.
17For the analysis of tradeable goods presented in Appendix A.4, the time series variables are
PROD TG, IS G and IM G where PROD TG denotes the natural logarithm of UK productivity in
tradeable goods, IS G denotes the natural logarithm of the European Union’s share of UK imports
in goods, and IM G denotes the natural logarithm of UK import to GDP ratio in goods.
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The use of the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step approach to VECM estimation,
in our case requires the assumption that there exists a long-run relationship
between productivity and at least one of the right hand side variables. If no such
long-run relationship exists, then the estimated coefficients in our VECM below
will be spurious. The existing literature shows that there is a long-run relationship
between productivity and the import to GDP ratio, for example, Macdonald (1994),
Bernard et al. (2006b) and Bloom et al. (2016), therefore we can be confident that
the assumption necessary for the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step approach
holds18.
Vector Error Correction Model
Our Johansen (1991) test results for cointegration suggest that our three services
time-series variables have a cointegration rank of one. The optimal lag length
was identified using the Schwartz Information Criterion and the Hannan-Quinn
Criterion, and was found under both these criteria to be one (see Appendix A.3
for results). The first step in the Engle and Granger (1987) approach to VECMs is
the estimation of the long-run relationship:
PROD TSt = 8.4057+
(0.3631)∗∗∗
0.9982IS St+
(0.2226)∗∗∗
0.9877IM St+
(0.03765)∗∗∗
θSt.
(3.3.1)
Rearranging, we obtain the estimated residual equation:
θ̂St = PROD TSt − 8.4057− 0.9982IS St − 0.9877.IM St (3.3.2)
We run the Cointegration ADF (CADF) and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests on the
time series of the estimated long-run relationship residual (θ̂St−1) to determine
18Peseran and Shin (2002) showed that, in a VECM, the system of cointegrating equations
is exactly identified if the number of restrictions on the cointegrating equations is exactly equal
to the number of cointegrating vectors squared. If there are more restrictions than the number
of cointegrating vectors squared, then the system is over-identified, whereas if there are fewer
restrictions than the number of cointegrating vectors squared, the system is under-identified. In
our case, the restriction on the cointegrating equation exactly identifies the system, as the number
of restrictions is equal to the number of cointegrating vectors squared, ie, one, and thus we next
proceed to estimating the full VECM.
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whether these deviations from long-run equilibrium are stationary. If they are, then
we can argue that equation (1) estimates a long-run cointegrating relationship for
services. The results of the CADF and Phillips-Perron tests are presented in Table
3.3:
Table 3.3: CADF and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results
Variable CADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
θ̂St−1 -3.351** [0] -3.351**
Notes: The figures in brackets denote the optimal lag length, determined using the
Schwarz Information Criteria. Significant at or below ** 1% and * 5% significance.
Given that the optimal lag length, determined using the SIC is zero for services, the
CADF and the Phillips-Perron tests are identical. We find that θ̂St−1 is stationary
at the 1% significance level. These results mean that the long-run relationship
estimated in equation (3.3.1) is the long-run cointegrating relationship for services.
We next proceed to undertake the second step of the two-step Engle and Granger
(1987) approach, namely the estimation of the full VECM. The estimated VECM
for tradeable services is as follows:
∆PROD TSt = η1+δ11θ̂St−1+δ21∆PROD TSt−1+δ31∆IS St−1+δ41∆IM St−1+1t,
(3.3.3)
∆IS St = η2 + δ12θ̂St−1 + δ22∆PROD TSt−1 + δ32∆IS St−1 + δ42∆IM St−1 + 2t,
(3.3.4)
∆IM St = η3 + δ13θ̂St−1 + δ23∆PROD TSt−1 + δ33∆IS St−1 + δ43∆IM St−1 + 3t.
(3.3.5)
The estimated models and causality tests are presented in Table 3.4, where
equations (3.3.3), (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) in the table present the estimated coefficients
and causality tests for equations (3.3.3), (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) respectively.
In a VECM model, according to Granger (1988), causality can occur in three
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Table 3.4: Services VECM Results
Equation Dependent θ̂St−1 ∆PROD TSt−1 ∆IS St−1 ∆IM St−1 F1 F2 Constant
Variable
(3.3.3) ∆PROD TSt -0.3675** 0.6137*** 0.2673 -0.1853 4.0743** 2.0639 0.01090*
(-0.1609) (-0.2065) (-0.2318) (-0.2091) (0.005703)
(3.3.4) ∆IS St 0.09459 0.2364 -0.1094 -0.2067 1.5114 1.1101 1.999×10−3
(-0.1738) (-0.1983) (-0.2226) (-0.2009) (0.005478)
(3.3.5) ∆IM St 0.3648** 0.04359 0.6509*** 0.1947 3.2328* 5.0193** 0.01446**
(-0.1720) (-0.1963) (-0.2204) (-0.1988) (0.005422)
Notes: The figures in brackets are the standard errors. Significant at or
below *** 1%, ** 5% and *10% significance.
different ways: long-run, short run and overall Granger causality. Long-run
causality is shown by the coefficients on the estimated long-run residuals (θ̂St−1).
The impact of these estimated long-run residuals on the dependent variables
captures the extent to which the dependent variable is out of equilibrium and thus,
according to Granger (1988), can be interpreted as long-run causality. Short-run
causality in a VECM is shown by the lagged differences of the independent
variables. It is suggested by Granger (1988) that the impact of the independent
lagged differenced variables on the dependent variables captures the short-run
changes in the model, and thus can be interpreted as short-run causality. Finally,
Granger causality is shown by the joint significance of the estimated long-run
residuals and the lagged differences of the independent variables. If the coefficient
of a lagged differenced independent variable is jointly significant with the coefficient
on the estimated long-run residuals, then we can argue that this independent
variable Granger causes the dependent variable. Toda and Phillips (1994) examine
the asymptotics for causality tests, in both a VAR and VECM framework, and
conclude that these three forms of causality are robust in a VECM framework.
The results of the estimated VECM for tradeable services presented in Table
3.4, shows that the coefficient on the estimated long-run residuals θ̂St−1 is strongly
significant in equation (3.3.3) and in equation (3.3.5). This implies that, in
tradeable services, long-run causality runs from the EU share of UK imports and
from the import to GDP ratio to productivity, and from productivity and the
EU share of UK imports to the import to GDP ratio, but does not run from
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productivity and the import to GDP ratio to the EU share of UK imports. The
estimation results for equation (3.3.3) show that in the short run there is no
causality between either the EU share of UK imports or the import to GDP
ratio and productivity, and that the import to GDP ratio does not Granger
cause productivity. However, the EU share of UK imports does Granger cause
productivity in tradeable services. The estimation results for equation (3.3.4) show
that there is no short run or Granger causality from either productivity or the
import to GDP ratio to the EU share of UK imports in tradeable services. Finally,
the estimation results for equation (3.3.5) show that although there is no short-run
causality from productivity to the import to GDP ratio, there is short-run causality
from the EU share of UK imports to the import to GDP ratio. Additionally, the
results of the joint F tests show that productivity Granger causes the import to
GDP ratio and the EU share of UK imports Granger causes the import to GDP ratio.
We have argued in the previous section that the change in the UK import
share for services was exogenously driven by a change in tastes. Hence, since
our results show that the EU share of UK imports Granger causes productivity
in tradable services, we argue that there is a causal link from the EU share of
UK imports to productivity in tradable services. Therefore, we conclude that
in the United Kingdom, for the period analysed, a decrease in competition from
imports in tradable services driven by an exogenous change in the origin of imports,
caused a decrease in productivity in tradable services, which is consistent with the
findings of Chaney (2008) and Eslava et al. (2013). Given that the period from
2006-2010 was characterised by a decline in the proportion of services imports that
originated in the European Union at the same time as a significant stagnation
in UK productivity, we next use the results of our analysis to examine the UK
Productivity Puzzle.
3.3.3 UK Productivity Puzzle
In order to quantify the impact of the change in the EU share of UK imports in
services on overall UK labour productivity for the years following the financial
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crisis (2007-2015), we refer to our VECM estimation results for tradable services.
We calculate (using a ‘back of the envelope’ approach) how much of the
shortfall in UK productivity relative to a continuation of its pre-crisis trend as of
2017 Q4 can be explained by/attributed to the fall in the proportion of UK imports
of services originating in the European Union starting with 2007. The EU share
of UK imports in services decreased over this period by 6.13% (from 52.6% to
49.3%). The estimation results in the long run relationship equation (3.3.1) imply
that the above fall in import share is associated with a fall of 6.12% in the long-run
productivity level in tradable services over the same period. Given that in 2015,
according to the ONS, 28% of UK GDP is made up of tradable services, the fall
in productivity in the tradable services sector would result in a fall of 6.12 x 0.28
= 1.7% in overall UK productivity. The shortfall in UK productivity relative to a
continuation of its pre-crisis trend, as of 2017 Q4 was 16%. Thus, our calculations
show that the change in the EU share of UK imports of tradable services around
the time of the Great Recession can explain about 10% of the shortfall in UK
productivity relative to a continuation of its pre-crisis trend as of 2017 Q4. We
therefore argue that changes in trade, in our case changes in import origin of
tradable services, did impact UK labour productivity following the financial crisis,
and that we offer yet another explanation which can be considered explaining the
stagnation in UK productivity along the other explanations put forward in the
literature, such as changes in the labour supply ( Blundell et al. (2014), Pessoa
and Van Reenen (2014), Gregg et al. (2014), Bell and Eiser (2015), and Patterson
et al. (2016)), reduction in the supply of credit seen since the Great Recession and
other financial factors (Oulton and Sebastia-Barriel (2013), Corry et al. (2011),
Broadbent (2012), Franklin et al. (2015), Riley et al. (2014)), the interactions
between these two (Sargent (2013) and Pessoa and Van Reenen (2014)) increase in
firm survival rates among less productive firms (Barnett et al. (2014), Arrowsmith
et al. (2013), Ellman (2015) and Harris and Moffat (2016)) among others.
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3.4 Conclusion
There are two results that stand out from our investigation. First, in addition
to the impact of the volume of imports on productivity, which had already
been extensively analysed in the literature, we show that changes in the origin
of imports - when caused by drivers not directly linked to competition in the
importing country such as changes in tastes - can also matter for productivity,
in the manner of Melitz (2003): changes in the average per-unit barrier to trade
(driven in this chapter by changes in the origin of imports) lead to changes in
competition, inducing adjustments in productivity. Indeed, we find that for the
United Kingdom, over the period 1990-2015, in tradable services, changes in the
origin of imports, driven by changes in tastes, caused changes in labour productivity.
Second, given that a large proportion of UK GDP consists of tradable services, we
examine the extent to which the drop in the proportion of UK imports of services
originating in the European Union seen since the 2007 financial crisis and the fall
in tradable services productivity which accompanied it can explain stagnation of
UK labour productivity seen since then, referred to as the UK Productivity Puzzle.
Our calculations show that the changes in UK import origin from 2006 to 2014
would be associated with a 1.7% fall in UK productivity. Given that the fall in
UK productivity relative to a continuation of its pre-crisis trend as of 2017 Q4 was
16%, the change in the EU share of UK imports can explain about 10% of this fall
in UK productivity. Therefore, we conclude that the exogenously driven change in
the share of UK imports of tradable services originating in the European Union did
impact labour productivity in the UK. Thus, our results provide a complementary
explanation to those already existent in the literature for the UK Productivity
Puzzle (see Barnett et al. (2014) and Bryson and Forth (2015) for a review of this
literature), as a large part of the puzzle remains unexplained.
Future research should investigate two extensions to the current analysis.
First, it should focus on extending the analysis conducted in this chapter to more
countries, the OECD for example, in order to explore the extent to which the
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relationship between the origin of imports and productivity is robust to country
characteristics, such as size, geographical characteristics and trade barriers. Second,
it should extend the highly aggregate analysis conducted in this chapter to greater
disaggregation in order to identify which industries are the primary drivers of the
causal relationship from import share to productivity in tradable services.
Chapter 4
International Trade, Non-Trading
Firms and Their Impact on
Labour Productivity
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the role of the entry and exit of less productive non-trading
domestic firms into the domestic market in driving labour productivity and its
persistence, in response to shocks to macroeconomic variables. The analysis takes
place in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium macroeconomics model of
international trade with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. Recent
research has thoroughly examined the effects of international trade on non-trading
firms in such a framework.
For the purpose of our analysis, two important results stand out from this
research. First, exports impact productivity of non-trading domestic firms
thorough competition for inputs, as exporting firms demand additional labour to
serve international markets, and this drives up the real wage. The increase in the
real wage forces the least productive non-trading firms to exit, thus increasing
average productivity. Second, imports impact labour productivity at an aggregate
level thorough increased competition. Domestic firms face increased competition
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from importers and this forces the least productive non-trading firms to exit,
thus increasing average productivity. The key papers that develop these results
are: Melitz (2003), Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014),
empirically supported by papers such as Amiti and Konings (2007), Yasar and
Paul (2007) and Bloom et al. (2016). Important precursors to the analytical
foundations of these results are contained in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman
(1979), Krugman (1980), Hopenhayn (1992a) and Hopenhayn (1992b).
Ghironi and Melitz (2005), Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014) and many other
important papers, make the assumption that the productivity of non-trading firms
does not change as a result of the entry and exit of less productive non-trading
domestic firms into the domestic market in response to macroeconomic shocks.
Instead, they assume that the distribution of firm-level productivity is exogenously
fixed. This assumption is appropriate when analysing the response of firms that
trade internationally to macroeconomic shocks and the impact of these firms on
the economy. However, this assumption may be less appealing when analysing
the role of non-trading domestic firms in driving labour productivity, given that
less than 1% of US firms engage in international trade (according the US Census
2016). The non-trading firms also tend to be less productive than firms that
engage in international trade. A wide body of literature, such as Delgado et al.
(2002), Andersson et al. (2008) and Sharma and Mishra (2015), has shown the
self-selection effect, where productive firms self-select into international markets.
The non-trading domestic firms are both relatively less productive and most
numerous; and small macroeconomic shocks can have significant effects on their
entry and exit. Unlike Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014),
in our model, we allow for the entry and exit of non-trading firms into the domestic
market to endogenously drive changes in the distribution of firm-level productivities.
Three recent influential papers discuss some of the issues we address in this
chapter. The first is Melitz (2003). He demonstrates that the distribution of
non-trading firms’ productivity responds to permanent shocks to barriers to trade
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following changes in competition for inputs. However, his analysis is conducted
in a static model and it cannot therefore examine the dynamic behaviour of the
distribution of non-trading firms’ productivity, nor can it examine its response to
temporary shocks.
The two other related key papers are by Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel
Jaef and Lopez (2014). Although the analyses in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014) are conducted in a dynamic, stochastic, general
equilibrium model, the distribution of firm-level productivity is exogenously fixed,
and therefore, the impact of the entry and exit of firms into the domestic market on
the productivity of domestic firms cannot be investigated. This limits their analysis
of the response of productivity to macroeconomic shocks to only the extensive
margin, with all changes to productivity being driven only by the entry and exit of
firms. Unlike Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014) who only
capture the extensive margin of production through the total number of domestic
firms, we also allow for an endogenously determined productivity distribution of
producing firms, capturing variations in the intensive margin of production as well.
Limiting their analysis to only the extensive margins of production also limits the
impact of any changes in barriers to imports, which as Bloom et al. (2016) show
operate through both the intensive and extensive margins of production, and thus
may underestimate the impact of changes in barriers to imports on productivity
relative to the impact of changes in barriers to exports. According to Bloom et al.
(2016), competition from Chinese imports alone accounts for 14% of European
technological growth from 2000 to 2007 through both technological change within
firms and reallocated employment between firms, as less productive firms exit the
market the latter of which is ignored in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef
and Lopez (2014).
This chapter is also closely related to the recent literature examining the
impact of firm entry and exit on productivity in a closed economy. The main
theoretical papers, starting with Hopenhayn (1992b) and Hopenhayn (1992a),
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are Clementi and Palazzo (2016), Woo (2016) and Lee and Mukoyama (2018),
while Moreira (2017) and Sedlacek and Stern (2017) provide important empirical
examinations of the impact of firm entry and exit on productivity in a closed
economy. Our chapter builds on this literature by extending the closed economy
analysis of entry and exit dynamics to an open-economy framework in order to
analyse the effect of international trade flows on the impact of firm entry and exit
on productivity.
In this chapter we develop a model in an open economy framework that allows us to
examine the role of the entry and exit of less productive non-trading domestic firms
on labour productivity, through both the extensive margin of production and, by
allowing endogenous changes in the firm-level productivity distribution, through the
intensive margin of production as well. We conduct our analysis in a ‘three-country’
setup to allow for a possible future analysis of changes in trade barriers which
results in trade diversion, but which we do not take up here. We use our model to
analyse the extent to which the response of labour productivity to macroeconomics
shocks in our model could explain the behaviour of UK productivity since the
Great Recession. Despite the response of labour productivity to macroeconomics
shocks being a clear question of first-order policy importance, to our knowledge, it
has not been addressed so far in the class of models employed here, although such
models are widely employed for policy-oriented analyses.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: In Section 4.2 we outline our
model and discuss its features and in Section 4.3 we present the model calibration.
In Section 4.4.1 we analyse the role of entry and exit of non-trading firms into
the domestic market in driving labour productivity in response to shocks to
macro variables. In Section 4.5 we use our model to analyse the behaviour of UK
productivity since the Great Recession and examine the role the entry and exit of
non-trading domestic firms in the UK market might have played in driving labour
productivity. In Section 4.6 we discuss our results and offer some thought on areas
for future research.
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Figure 4.1: Timeline of a Period
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4.2 The Model
Our basic framework builds on the model of Ghironi and Melitz (2005), the
component parts of which are now familiar in the literature, therefore we develop
the key equations more concisely. We develop a three-country (h, i and j ) model
with endogenous average firm-level productivity. Figure 4.1 presents a timeline for
one period, detailing the behaviour of firms and households.
4.2.1 Households
Households are homogeneous and demand goods from both domestic and foreign
producers. The representative household in country h supplies Lht units of labour, to
only the firms in country h, at a nominal wage rate W ht ; the real wage rate is denoted
by wht . The representative household maximises their expected intertemporal utility
from consumption subject to their budget constraint:
max
w.r.t:Cht ,B
h
t ,x
h
t ,C
h
t+1
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
(
Chs
1−γ − 1
1− γ
)
,
subject to: Bht + v˜
h
tN
h
Htx
h
t +C
h
t = (1+r
h
t−1)B
h
t−1 +(d˜
h
t + v˜
h
t )N
h
Dtx
h
t−1 +w
h
t L
h
t , (4.2.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective household discount factor, γ > 0 is the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and Cht is the consumption basket,
defined over a continuum of goods Ω in every period. Ct =
(∫
ω∈Ω ct(ω)
θ−1
θ dω
) θ
θ−1
,
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods, Bht−1 is the consumer’s
holdings of bonds at the beginning of the period (chosen during the previous
period), which pay a risk free rate of interest, rht−1; x
h
t−1 represents the consumer’s
holdings of shares in a mutual fund of domestic firms at the beginning of the period
(chosen during the previous period); v˜ht and d˜
h
t are the average value and per-period
profits of firms respectively; NhDt is the number of firms at the start of a period and
NhHt is the number of firms at the end of the period. After the end of every period,
an exogenously given proportion of firms δ dies out, thus the number of firms at
the start of a period, NhDt, will be equal to the number of firms operating in the
market at the end of the previous period, NhHt−1, adjusted to reflect the proportion
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of firms that die out: NhDt = (1− δ)NhHt−1. The derivations of v˜ht , d˜ht , NhDt and NhHt
will be presented in the next section. Additionally, we impose financial autarky:
households accumulate risk free domestic bonds and shares in only the firms in their
domestic economy. We also assume that there are no bubbles or ’Ponzi’ schemes in
the economy.
In each period, only a subset of goods, Ωt ∈ Ω, will be available. Let pht (ω)
denote the country h currency nominal price of a good ω ∈ Ωt. The consumption
based price index in country h is P ht =
(∫
ω∈Ωt p
h
t (ω)
1−θdω
) 1
1−θ
and the household
demand, for each individual good ω, is given by cht (ω) =
(
pht (ω)
Pht
)−θ
Cht . The
representative households in countries i and j solve a similar problem.
4.2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of firms in each of the three countries, h, i and j, each
producing a different variety of good ω ∈ Ω. Firm ω employs LPt(ω) units of
labour to produce output at time t. Their marginal cost in nominal terms will
depend on: (i) the country specific aggregate technology level Zt, which evolves
according to an AR(1) process with persistence ρ, common to all firms within a
country; (ii) the firm-level productivity z, and (iii) the nominal wage rate Wt;
therefore, MC = Wt/Ztz. The firm-level productivity of each firm is drawn by
the firm from a distribution G(z) with support on [zmin, ∞), at the end of every
period. In Ghironi and Melitz (2005) the firm level productivity, z, is drawn on
market entry and fixed thereafter. Assuming that the productivity is drawn every
period in our model ensures that the Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
proposition that average firm level productivity is a fixed proportion of the cutoff
productivity level holds, even in the presence of fixed costs of domestic production1.
To enter the market, and then draw a firm-level productivity for production in the
following period, the firm must, as in Hopenhayn (1992b) and Melitz (2003), pay a
1Our timing assumption is the same as the timing assumption made in Cacciatore (2014), for
the productivity of a specific worker-firm match
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sunk entry cost, fE, expressed in terms of effective labour units.
2 In the manner
of Hopenhayn (1992a) and Melitz (2003), but unlike in the models in Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014), firms also have to pay a per-period
fixed cost of production, fhD, measured in terms of effective labour units. The
exporting firms will also pay a per-period costs of entering each foreign markets i
and j, fhXi and f
h
Xj, respectively, both measured in terms of effective labour units.
In addition, exporting firms have to pay a per-unit iceberg cost such that a firm
needs to export τ units of their good in order to sell one unit in the destination
market. Finally, we assume that all three markets are monopolistically-competitive.
The firms’ problem is to maximise profits subject to their production function
and the three consumer demand curves. Given that each firm produces a
single variety of good, ω, and that the firms optimal behaviour is determined
by their firm-level productivity level z, we move from indexing by ω to indexing
by z, such that ct(ω) ≡ ct(z) and pt(ω) ≡ pt(z) for a firm with a given productivity z.
A firm with firm-level productivity z in country h solves the following constrained
maximisation problem:
Max: dht (z) = p
h
Dt(z)y
h
Dt(z) + p
h
Xit(z)y
h
Xit(z)i + p
h
Xjt(z)y
h
Xjt(z)j −W ht LhPt(z)
−W
h
t f
h
D
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− W
h
t f
h
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Zht
− W
h
t f
h
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,
w.r.t : phDt(z), y
h
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h
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h
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h
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h
Xjt(z), L
h
Pt(z),
subject to : yhDt(z) + τ
h
tiy
h
Xit(z) + τ
h
tjy
h
Xjt(z) = zZ
h
t L
h
Pt(z),
yhDt(z) =
(
phDt(z)
P ht
)−θ
Cht ,
yhXit(z) =
(
phXit(z)
P it
)−θ
Cit ,
yhXjt(z) =
(
phXjt(z)
P jt
)−θ
Cjt ,
2Effective labour units are calculated as units of labour multiplied by the technology level Zt.
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where, τhit and τ
h
jt are the iceberg costs of exporting from country h to countries i
and j respectively at time t; for a firm with a given firm-level productivity level
z in country h, dht (z) is its total profit, p
h
Dt(z), p
h
Xit(z) and p
h
Xjt(z) are the prices
of domestic goods, exports to country i and exports to country j, denominated in
units of the currency of country h, i and j respectively; yhDt(z), y
h
Xit(z) and y
h
Xjt(z)
are the total units of goods sold by the firm in the domestic market and countries i
and j respectively, we assume that supply matches demand: yt(z) = ct(z); L
h
Pt(z) is
the amount of labour used in production; Cht , C
i
t and C
j
t are aggregate consumption
in countries h, i and j respectively; P ht , P
i
t and P
j
t are the consumption-based price
indices of countries h, i and j and, i and j are the nominal exchange rates (units
of h currency per unit of i and j currency) between country h and countries i and
j respectively.
Solving this problem, the firm sets their output price as a mark-up over the
marginal cost, where the mark-up is given by θ/(θ − 1). Given this, the real prices
of the firm’s goods in each market are as follows: the real price of domestic goods in
country h is ρhDt(z) =
phDt(z)
Pht
= θ
θ−1
wht
Zht z
, the real price of goods exported to country i
from country h is ρhXit(z) =
phXit(z)
P it
=
τhit
Qit
ρhDt(z), and the real price of goods exported
to country j from country h is ρhXjt(z) =
phXjt(z)
P jt
=
τhjt
Qjt
ρhDt(z), where Q
i
t is the
real exchange rate between country h and country i, equal to i
P it
Pht
, Qjt is the real
exchange rate between country h and country j, equal to j
P jt
Pht
and wht = W
h
t /P
h
t is
the real wage. Equivalent price equations hold for countries i and j.
Total firm profits are given by the sum of profit from domestic sales, dhDt,
and potential profit from exporting, dhXit and d
h
Xjt, to countries i and j respectively.
Given the fixed costs of domestic production and exporting, there will be some
firms that do not draw high enough firm-level productivity to make a profit (or
break even) in the domestic market, who then exit the market entirely, and some
firms that do not export to one or the other of the two foreign markets. Therefore,
there are cutoff productivity levels below which a firm will not produce for either
the domestic market, zhDt = inf{z : dhDt ≥ 0} or for each of the foreign markets,
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zhXit = inf{z : dhXit ≥ 0} and zhXjt = inf{z : dhXjt ≥ 0} for exports to countries i and
j respectively.
We assume that the lower bound of the productivity distribution zmin is low
enough compared to the domestic cutoff level zhDt, such that this is above zmin. We
further assume that the domestic cutoff level, zhDt, is low enough relative to the
export cutoff levels zhXit and z
h
Xjt such that both z
h
Xit and z
h
Xjt are above z
h
Dt. These
assumptions ensure that: 1) there will be an endogenously determined subset of
firms that pay the sunk entry cost fE, but do not produce for the domestic market,
and 2) there will be an endogenously determined non-traded sector - the firms with
productivities between zhDt and the lower of z
h
Xit and z
h
Xjt. The subset of firms
that pay the sunk entry cost, but do not draw a productivity at the end of the
period above the expected cutoff level for domestic production immediately exit the
market. Therefore, if they want to enter the market again and try to then draw a
productivity above the cutoff level they must pay the sunk entry cost again. Firm
profits are therefore:
dht (z) = d
h
Dt(z) + d
h
Xit(z) + d
h
Xjt(z),
dhDt(z) =

1
θ
(ρhDt(z))
1−θCt − w
h
t f
h
D
Zht
if z ≥ zhDt,
0 otherwise,
(4.2.2)
dhXit(z) =

Qit
θ
(ρhXit(z))
1−θCit − w
h
t f
h
Xi
Zht
if z ≥ zhXit,
0 otherwise,
(4.2.3)
dhXjt(z) =

Qjt
θ
(ρhXjt(z))
1−θCjt − w
h
t f
h
Xj
Zht
if z ≥ zhXjt,
0 otherwise.
(4.2.4)
In Ghironi and Melitz (2005) the first equation, giving profits from domestic
production, will simply be as follows, without the fixed cost of domestic production,
dhDt(z) =
1
θ
(ρhDt(z))
1−θCt, as all firms will produce for the domestic market.
Equivalent firm profit equations hold for countries i and j.
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Firm Averages
In every period there is a number of firms, NhDt, that produce for the domestic
market, given the cutoff level of domestic production, zhDt. A number of these firms,
given by NhXit and N
h
Xjt, export to countries i and j respectively. In a similar manner
to Melitz (2003), we define ‘average’ productivity for all domestic firms, z˜hD, and for
firms that export to countries i and j, z˜hXi and z˜
h
Xj, as:
z˜hDt =
[
1
1−G(zhDt)
∫ ∞
zhDt
zθ−1dG(z)
] 1
θ−1
,
z˜hXit =
[
1
1−G(zhXit)
∫ ∞
zhXit
zθ−1dG(z)
] 1
θ−1
,
z˜hXjt =
[
1
1−G(zhXjt)
∫ ∞
zhXjt
zθ−1dG(z)
] 1
θ−1
.
Melitz (2003) shows that these productivity averages contain all the information
on the productivity distributions relevant for macroeconomic variables. Thus, our
model is isomorphic to a model where NhDt firms with productivity z˜
h
Dt produce for
the domestic market, and NhXit and N
h
Xjt firms with productivities z˜
h
Xit and z˜
h
Xjt
produce for each of the two export markets. The average price in the domestic
market, will be equal to the price of the firm with average productivity, p˜hDt =
phDt(z˜
h
Dt) and the average price in each of the exporting markets will be equal to
the price of the exporting firms with average productivities p˜hXit = p
h
Xit(z˜
h
Xit) and
p˜hXjt = p
h
Xjt(z˜
h
Xjt). The nominal price index in country h reflects the nominal price
of both domestic firms and imports from foreign firms. The nominal price index can
therefore be written as:
P ht = [N
h
Dt(p˜
h
Dt)
1−θ +N iXht(p˜
i
Xht)
1−θ +N jXht(p˜
j
Xht)
1−θ]
1
1−θ .
Dividing both sides by P ht
1−θ
we obtain the following real price index:
NhDt(ρ˜
h
Dt)
1−θ +N iXht(ρ˜
i
Xht)
1−θ +N jXht(ρ˜
j
Xht)
1−θ = 1. (4.2.5)
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Equivalent price index equations hold for countries i and j.
Average total profits are given by the sum of average profits from domestic
sales and average profits from exporting, adjusted to the proportion of firms that
export to a each market:
d˜ht = d˜
h
Dt +
1−G(zhXit)
1−G(zhDt)
d˜hXit +
1−G(zhXjt)
1−G(zhDt)
d˜hXjt.
This equation can then be written explicitly with the ratios of exporting firms to
total domestic firms:
d˜ht = d˜
h
Dt +
NhXit
NhDt
d˜hXit +
NhXjt
NhDt
d˜hXjt. (4.2.6)
Equivalent average total profit equations hold for each of the two foreign countries,
i and j.
Firm Value
All producing firms, other than the firm with productivity equal to the cutoff level
(z = zhDt), make positive profits. Thus, the average profit level in country h will be
positive (d˜ht > 0), and the average firm will have a positive value, derived from
expected future profits. After the end of a period, an exogenously determined
proportion δ of firms in each country will cease to operate. Given that these firms
cease to operate after new entrants have entered the market, a proportion δ of the
successful new entrants will never operate. Since households own the firms, we can
solve the households’ problem to calculate the average value of firms in the economy,
v˜ht . Given that the firms are owned entirely by domestic households the value of a
firm on entry will be given by the limit of the household share Euler equation: If
we assume that there are no bubbles in the economy then lim
j→∞
˜βt+j v˜t+j = 0, where
β˜t+j = [β(1−δ)]jEt
(
Cht+j
Cht
)−γ
, then the value of a firm will be equal to the discounted
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present value of its expected profit stream:
v˜ht = Et
∞∑
s=1
[β(1− δ)]s
(
Cht+s
Cht
)−γ
d˜ht+s.
Thus, as long as d˜ht is positive, the average firm value in country h will also be
positive (v˜ht > 0).
Firm Entry and Exit
In each period, NhUEt new firms will pay the sunk entry cost to commence production,
and then at the end of the period, draw a firm-level productivity, z, for production
in the following period. Upon drawing their productivity, some firms will have
a productivity less than the expected cutoff level for domestic production in the
following period, Et(z
h
Dt+1), thus a proportion of firms, G((z
h
Dt+1)), that pay the
entry cost will not produce, as they draw a productivity below the expected cutoff
level and will instead exit the market immediately. Firms will choose to enter the
market until the average firm value, which, unlike in Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and
Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014), is adjusted by the probability of successfully entering
the market, is equal to the initial entry cost, fhE, expressed in effective labour units,
which leads to the free entry condition:
v˜ht (1−G(Et(zhDt+1))) =
wht f
h
E
Zht
, (4.2.7)
which, rearranged, is:
v˜ht =
1
1−G(Et(zhDt+1))
wht f
h
E
Zht
.
The number of firms operating at the end of the period, NhHt, will be equal to
the number of firms operating at the start of the period, NhDt, plus the number of
successful new entrants NhEt. The number of successful new entrants will be equal
to the number of firms that pay the entry cost, NhUEt, adjusted by the probability
of entering the market: NhEt = (1 − G(Et(zhDt+1)))NhUEt. The number of firms at
the end of the period will therefore be given by: NhHt = N
h
Dt + N
h
Et = N
h
Dt + (1 −
G(Et(z
h
Dt+1)))N
h
UEt. Given the timing of firm entry and exit we have assumed, the
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number of firms operating during a period will be given by:
NhDt = (1− δ)NhHt−1 = (1− δ)(NhDt−1 +NhEt−1). (4.2.8)
Note that, because the total number of firms can only change endogenously at
the end of the period, the average productivity of domestic production during a
period, z˜hDt, will be predetermined during a period, and will only change in between
periods, as a result of the entry and exit of less productive non-trading firms from
the domestic market.
4.2.3 Parametrising Productivity
In order to solve the model we assume that the firm-level productivities, z, follow
a Pareto distribution with lower bound zmin and shape parameter k. We assume
that k > θ − 1 to ensure that the average of firm size is finite3. Thus, we have
G(z) = 1− (zmin/z)k.
Average firm-level productivities are then: z˜hD = νz
h
Dt, z˜
h
Xit = νz
h
Xit, z˜
h
Xjt = νz
h
Xjt,
where ν = [k/(k − (θ − 1))] 1θ−1 .
The proportion of country h firms that export to each market is given by:
NhXit
NhDt
=
1−G(zhXit)
1−G(zhDt)
,
NhXjt
NhDt
=
1−G(zhXjt)
1−G(zhDt)
.
Using G(z) and average firm-level productivities, these can then be rewritten as:
NhXit
NhDt
=
(
zhmin
zhXit
)k
(
zhmin
zhDt
)k = (z˜hDt)k(z˜hXit)−k, (4.2.9)
3According to Axtell (2001), k/(θ − 1) is around 1.06 in the US.
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NhXjt
NhDt
=
(
zhmin
zhXjt
)k
(
zhmin
zhDjt
)k = (z˜hDt)k(z˜hXjt)−k. (4.2.10)
Equivalent equations for the proportion of firms that export hold for countries i
and j.
Given the parametrisation of G(zhDt), we rewrite the free entry condition (4.2.7) :
v˜ht =
1
1−G(Et(zhDt+1))
wht f
h
E
Zht
=
(
Et(z
h
Dt+1)
zhmin
)k
wht f
h
E
Zht
. (4.2.11)
Equivalent free entry conditions hold for countries i and j.
The country h zero domestic profit cutoff condition dhDt(z
h
Dt) = 0, zero export profit
cutoff conditions dhXit(z
h
Xit) = 0 and d
h
Xjt(z
h
Xjt) = 0, and equations (4.2.2), (4.2.3)
and (4.2.4) for firm profits, imply that country h average domestic profits and
average export profits to each market will satisfy:
d˜hDt = (θ − 1)
(
νθ−1
k
)
wht f
h
D
Zht
, (4.2.12)
d˜hXit = (θ − 1)
(
νθ−1
k
)
wht f
h
Xi
Zht
, (4.2.13)
d˜hXjt = (θ − 1)
(
νθ−1
k
)
wht f
h
Xj
Zht
. (4.2.14)
In a similar manner to the domestic profits equation, (4.2.2), the domestic zero profit
equation above differs from Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and Lopez
(2014). In these papers, given that there is no fixed cost of domestic production, all
firms produce for the domestic market, and therefore no zero domestic profit cutoff
condition exists. Equivalent zero profit conditions will hold for countries i and j.
4.2.4 Market Clearing
The wage rate in each country will adjust such that the exogenously set labour
supply is equal to the sum of labour used in production, labour used as a sunk cost
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of entry, labour used as fixed costs of domestic production, and labour used as fixed
costs of exporting to each foreign market. The resultant labour market clearing
condition is:
Lht = L
h
Pt +
(
Et(z
h
Dt+1)
zhmin
)k
NhEtf
h
Et
Zht
+
NhDtf
h
Dt
Zht
+
NhXitf
h
Xit
Zht
+
NhXjtf
h
Xjt
Zht
, (4.2.15)
where LhPt = (Y
h
Dt/z
h
Dt +Y
h
Xit/z
h
Xit +Y
h
Xjt/z
h
Xjt)/Z
h
t is the labour used in production,
equal to the sum of labour used in domestic production, Y hDt/Z
h
t z
h
Dt, and the
labour used in producing for both export markets, Y hXit/Z
h
t z
h
Xit and Y
h
Xjt/Z
h
t z
h
Xjt for
exports to i and j respectively, where Y hDt, Y
h
Xit and Y
h
Xjt are, respectively the total
number of units of output produced for the domestic market, and for exporting to
countries i and j.
Given that we have assumed no government borrowing, no physical capital
and financial autarky, aggregate bond holdings must equal zero at the end of
the period, and the aggregate number of shares per company must equal unity.
The assumption of financial autarky (value of exports=value of imports) for all
countries, also yields the balanced trade equation:
QitN
h
Xit(ρ˜
h
Xit)
1−θCit +Q
j
tN
h
Xjt(ρ˜
h
Xjt)
1−θCjt = N
i
Xht(ρ˜
i
Xht)
1−θCht +N
j
Xht(ρ˜
j
Xht)
1−θCht .
(4.2.16)
Equivalent labour market clearing and balanced trade equations will hold for
countries i and j.
4.2.5 Model Summary
Table B1 in the Appendix summarizes the main equilibrium conditions of the model.
The equations in this table constitute a system of 56 equations in 56 endogenous
variables: wht , w
i
t, w
j
t , ρ˜
h
Dt, ρ˜
i
Dt, ρ˜
j
Dt, ρ˜
h
Xit, ρ˜
h
Xjt, ρ˜
i
Xht, ρ˜
i
Xjt, ρ˜
j
Xht, ρ˜
j
Xit, d˜
h
t , d˜
i
t, d˜
j
t ,
d˜hDt, d˜
i
Dt, d˜
j
Dt, d˜
h
Xit, d˜
h
Xjt, d˜
i
Xht, d˜
i
Xjt, d˜
j
Xht, d˜
j
Xit, N
h
Dt, N
i
Dt, N
j
Dt, N
h
Et, N
i
Et, N
j
Et,
NhXit, N
h
Xjt, N
i
Xht, N
i
Xjt, N
j
Xht, N
j
Xit, z˜
h
Dt, z˜
i
Dt, z˜
j
Dt, z˜
h
Xit, z˜
h
Xjt, z˜
i
Xht, z˜
i
Xjt, z˜
j
Xht, z˜
j
Xit,
v˜ht , v˜
i
t, v˜
j
t , r
h
t , r
i
t, r
j
t , C
h
t , C
i
t , C
j
t , Q
i
t and Q
j
t . Of these endogenous variables, 9 are
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predetermined as of time t : the total numbers of firms in each country NhDt, N
i
Dt and
N jDt, the average firm level productivities, z˜
h
Dt, z˜
i
Dt and z˜
j
Dt and the risk-free interest
rates, rht , r
i
t and r
j
t . Additionally, the model features 21 exogenous variables: the
aggregate productivities Zht , Z
i
t and Z
j
t , and the policy variables f
h
Et, f
i
Et, f
j
Et, f
h
Dt,
f iDt, f
j
Dt, f
h
Xit, f
h
Xjt, f
i
Xht, f
i
Xjt, f
j
Xht, f
j
Xit, τ
h
it, τ
h
jt, τ
i
ht, τ
i
jt, τ
j
ht and τ
j
it. Changes in
fhXit, f
h
Xjt, f
i
Xht, f
i
Xjt, f
j
Xht, f
j
Xit, τ
h
it, τ
h
jt, τ
i
ht, τ
i
jt, τ
j
ht and τ
j
it reflect changes in trade
policy. For country h, the trade policy instruments will be fhXit, f
h
Xjt, τ
h
it and τ
h
jt,
for country i, the trade policy instruments will be f iXht, f
i
Xjt, τ
i
ht and τ
i
jt, and for
country j, the trade policy instruments will be f jXht, f
j
Xit, τ
j
ht and τ
j
it.
4.3 Calibration
The papers we address here, such as Ghironi and Melitz (2005), assume complete
symmetry between the countries in their models, including in terms of country size
and barriers to trade. We take a different approach. We allow for asymmetries in
country size and barriers to trade, and we calibrate our model accordingly. We
interpret periods as three months, which determines the discount factor β = 0.99,
and the risk aversion parameter γ = 2, standard values in quarterly business cycle
models. The firm exit rate, δ, is set to 0.0235, such as to match the 9.4% UK
annual firm death rate.4 Following Bernard et al. (2003), θ is set to 3.85 and k is
set to 3.4, satisfying the condition that k > θ − 1.
The three countries in the model are set as the UK (h), the EU (i) and the
Rest of the World (RoW) (j), where RoW is defined as all countries in the world
that are not members of the European Union. The per unit iceberg costs τ were
calculated using data from the World Bank Trade Costs database, and the ONS
Pink Book. The World Bank Trade Costs database provides the tariff equivalent
4Firm death rate is obtained from the ONS Business Demography Statistics (2016).
5We note that, although the value of θ may appear low (standard macro literature sets θ = 6 to
deliver a 20% mark-up over marginal cost), the mark-up in this chapter represents mark-up over
average cost, including the entry cost. We have conducted sensitivity analyses on the value of θ,
and all values from 1.9 to 4.5 give similar responses to model simulations.
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rate, x, for trade between pairs of countries, which allows the calculation of the
average tariff equivalent rate for 2005-2015 for each country pair. These tariff
equivalent rates were then mapped into an iceberg cost, IC, for each country pair
according to: IC = x/(1 + x).
The iceberg costs were calculated individually for UK imports from the EU,
UK imports from the RoW, UK exports to the EU and UK exports to the RoW
as a weighted average on the basis of total exports/imports from each country.
For example, the iceberg cost for UK exports to the EU was calculated as the
sum of: the iceberg cost for UK trade with each European country multiplied
by the proportion of UK exports going to each European country. Given that
the UK and the EU are part of a customs union and share similar geographic
characteristics, we assume that the iceberg costs of exporting and importing
from the EU to the RoW are the same as the iceberg costs of exporting and
importing from the UK to the RoW. The iceberg costs are therefore as follows:
τhi = 1.316, τ
h
j = 1.450, τ
i
h = 1.326, τ
i
j = 1.450, τ
j
h = 1.459 and τ
j
i = 1.459.
6
The fixed costs of exporting from the UK to the EU and UK to the RoW
are calibrated such that the proportion of UK firms that export to the EU, and to
the RoW match the proportions reported by the ONS Annual Business Survey of
Importers and Exporters (approximately 7% and 8%, respectively). The remaining
fixed exporting costs are then set in the same proportions as the iceberg costs. The
fixed costs of domestic production in the EU and RoW are calibrated such that the
number of firms in the EU and RoW are 9.93 and 24.2 times the number of firms in
the UK, to match data from Eurostat and the World Bank. As in de Soyres (2016)
we then normalize the fixed cost of domestic production in the UK so that no
domestic entry threshold lies below the lower bound of the productivity distribution.
6Although the iceberg costs appear high, particularly for UK-EU trade (given the absence of
formal trade barriers) their values reflect not only the cost of formal barriers to trade, but also
other costs of exporting, such as language barriers and transport costs.
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We normalise fE, zmin and Z to 1 for all three countries
7 as well as normalising the
labour force in the UK to 1. Finally, the labour forces in the EU and RoW were
set such that, in the calibrated model, UK GDP is equal to 1/6.58 of EU GDP and
1/24.2 of RoW GDP, in line with 2017 World Bank data. Table B2 in the appendix
sets out the full parameter values used for the calibration.
4.4 Transmission of Macroeconomic Shocks
In this section we examine how the entry and exit of less productive non-trading
firms effects the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. First, we analyse the
impact of different transitory macroeconomic shocks on productivity and its
persistence. Second, we examine the relative impact of changes in barriers to
imports and barriers to exports. Third, we analyse the impact of permanent
macroeconomic shocks on various macroeconomic variables. The first analysis
seeks to provide an explanation for the wide variation in empirically calculated
figures for the persistence of labour productivity which range from 0.85 in Pancrazi
and Vukotic (2011) to 0.906 in Backus et al. (1992) and 0.994 in Baxter (1995),
by analysing how the persistence of labour productivity varies in our framework
depending on the source of the macroeconomic shock. The second analysis seeks to
examine whether changes in barriers to imports or exports have a greater impact
on productivity. Intuitively, given that barrier to import changes directly affect all
firms in the economy, while barrier to export changes directly affect only trading
firms, barrier to import changes would have a larger impact on productivity.
However, existing models such as Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and
Lopez (2014) are not able to replicate this result, and barrier to export changes have
a much larger impact on productivity. The third analysis seeks to determine how
the entry and exit of less productive non-trading firms affects the response of the
7Changing the entry cost, fE , and the fixed cost of domestic production, fD, while maintaining
the same ratios fX/fE and fD/fE does not have any effect on the firm-level productivity variables,
zD and zX , as they are determined by the free entry condition and the zero profit conditions.
Changing fE , fD and fX by the same proportion will not alter the calibrated values for firm-level
productivity.
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economy to permanent macroeconomic shocks, by comparing the response in our
framework to the responses in the baseline Ghironi and Melitz (2005) framework,
where the productivity distribution is exogenously fixed.
For the purpose of our analysis, to match output per worker productivity
data as closely as possible, we adopt the definition for aggregate productivity
specified in Kehrig (2015). Productivity is defined as total output divided by the
sum of labour used in production, labour used to pay the fixed costs of domestic
production and labour used to pay the fixed costs of exporting to each foreign
market:
ZhO =
Y ht
LhPt + F
h
t
,
where Y ht is total output, L
h
Pt is labour used in production, as defined earlier and
F ht is the labour used to pay the fixed costs, equal to the sum of the labour used to
pay the fixed costs of domestic production
NhDtf
h
Dt
Zht
and the fixed costs of exporting to
each foreign market
NhXitf
h
Xit
Zht
and
NhXjtf
h
Xjt
Zht
for exports to i and j respectively. Total
output will be made up of output for the domestic market, Y hDt, and output for each
foreign market, Y hXit and Y
h
Xjt for exports to the EU and RoW respectively. Note
that, because of the variable iceberg costs of exporting, the output for exporting
will be equal to the number of units sold in each foreign market, multiplied by the
iceberg cost of exporting to that market. All future references to labour productivity
should be taken to refer to productivity as measured above.
4.4.1 Endogenous Productivity Persistence
In this sub-section we examine the impact of transitory shocks to aggregate
technology, sunk entry costs and the fixed costs of domestic production on the
persistence of labour productivity, and quantify the extent of this impact for
the first two shocks, in order to provide a possible explanation for the wide
variation in empirically calculated figures for the persistence of labour productivity,
which range from 0.85 in Pancrazi and Vukotic (2011) to 0.906 in Backus et al.
(1992) and 0.994 in Baxter (1995). The introduction of the entry and exit of
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less-productive non-trading domestic firms into our model allows the persistence of
labour productivity to vary endogenously in response to different macroeconomic
shocks, unlike in existing models, such as the models in Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014).
Figure 4.2 shows the response of labour productivity in country h to three
different macroeconomic shocks: a one period, 1 percentage point positive shock to
aggregate technology, Zh, shown by the dashed line; a one period, 3.56 percentage
point negative shock to the sunk costs of entry, fhE, shown by the dotted line; and
a one period, 2.88 percentage point positive shock to the fixed costs of domestic
production, fhD, shown by the dot-dash line. The solid line shows the time path of
the shocks themselves and the length of time (in quarters) after the shock is on
the horizontal axis. Figure 4.3 shows the response of labour productivity in the
closed economy version of the model, where it is assumed that countries do not
trade internationally to the three types of macroeconomic shocks as in Figure 4.2:
a one period, 1 percentage point positive shock to aggregate technology, Zh, shown
by the dashed line; a one period, 3.65 percentage point negative shock to the sunk
costs of entry fhE, shown by the dotted line; and a one period, 1.53 percentage point
positive shock to the fixed costs of domestic production, fhD, shown by the dot-dash
line. Finally, the solid line shows the time path of the shocks themselves and the
length of time (in quarters) after the shock is on the horizontal axis. In both the
open and closed economy cases, the shock size is set such that the initial response
of labour productivity is 1% above its steady-state level.
We assume that these shocks hit at the beginning of the period, before production
starts, and follow an AR(1) processes:
Zˆht = ρ ∗ Zˆht−1 + t,
fˆhEt = ρ ∗ fˆhEt−1 + t,
fˆhDt = ρ ∗ fˆhDt−1 + t,
4.4. Transmission of Macroeconomic Shocks 90
Figure 4.2: Open Economy Response of Labour Productivity to Macroeconomic
Shocks
Figure 4.3: Closed Economy Response of Labour Productivity to Macroeconomic
Shocks
where Zˆht , fˆ
h
Et and fˆ
h
Dt are the deviations of aggregate technology, sunk costs of
entry and fixed costs of domestic production respectively, from their steady-state
levels, in period t, ρ is the exogenously set persistence of shocks and t is the
magnitude of the shock in period t. We assume that the persistence of the shocks,
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exogenously given, is equal to ρ = 0.90, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005).8
If the distributions of firm productivities were fixed exogenously, then in
both the open and closed economies, the persistence of labour productivity would
have been solely determined by the exogenously given persistence parameter for
the macroeconomic shocks, ρ, as is the case in standard RBC models. However,
when the distribution of firm productivities is endogenously determined through
endogenous changes in the cut-off productivity levels, an endogenous degree
of persistence is now present in the response of labour productivity to each of
these shocks. The extent to which this is the case, depends on the source of the
macroeconomic shock, and whether the shock is occurring in an open or closed
economy setting:
1. An aggregate technology shock, Zh, in both the open and closed economy
settings, induces labour productivity, ZhO, to return to its steady-state level
at a much slower rate than aggregate technology, due to the behaviour
of the average firm-level productivity, zhD. Firm-level productivity remains
above its steady-state level for a significantly longer period of time than
aggregate technology. The half life of productivity in response to the aggregate
technology shock is 14 periods in the open economy and 16 periods in the
closed economy, compared to a half life of 8 periods for the shock itself. Over
these time periods, this is equivalent to a persistence of 0.952 for productivity
in the open economy and 0.953 in the closed economy, compared to a shock
persistence of 0.9. Comparing these results to Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014),
where the distribution of firm-level productivity is exogenously fixed, we see
that allowing for an endogenous firm-level productivity response, through
the entry and exit of less productive non-trading firms, introduces further
endogenous persistence to the response of productivity. In their paper, the
half life of productivity (in the open economy framework) is approximately
8We conduct robustness checks on the value of ρ, examining the responses of labour productivity
for a range of values from ρ = 0.85, as in Pancrazi and Vukotic (2011) to ρ = 0.994, as in Baxter
(1995). For this range of values, the responses were similar in all cases. Results are available on
request.
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12 periods, with an approximate total TFP persistence of 0.95, lower than in
both the open and closed economy versions of our model.
2. A shock to the sunk costs of entry, fhE, in both the open and closed economy
settings, induces labour productivity, ZhO, to return to its steady-state level at
a much slower rate than the sunk cost of entry, but quicker than in the case of
a shock to aggregate technology, due to the behaviour of the average firm-level
productivity, zhD. Firm-level productivity remains above its steady-state level
for a significantly longer time than aggregate technology. The half life of
productivity in response to the aggregate technology shock is 13 periods in
the open economy and 14 periods in the closed economy, compared to a half
life of 8 periods for the shock itself. Over these time periods, this is equivalent
to a persistence of 0.938 for productivity in the open economy and 0.945 in
the closed economy, compared to a shock persistence of 0.9.
3. In the case of a shock to the fixed costs of domestic production, fhD, in
both the open and closed economies, the persistence of labour productivity is
significantly lower than the persistence of the shock itself, driven by the rapid
entry of less productive firms, when initial lower profits drive firms off the
market resulting in less initial competition. In this case, labour productivity
falls below its initial steady-state level, before slowly returning to it, as the
shock dissipates.
The different persistence of labour productivity between the open and closed
economies and across the various macroeconomic shocks studied here is driven by
the responses of firms and consumers which differ in each case. Thus, in Figures
4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 we show the dynamic response of consumption, Ch, average
productivity for domestic production, z˜hD, labour productivity, Z
h
O, the real wage,
wh, the number of firms, NhD, and the number of new entrants, N
h
E, to the one
period transitory shocks, outlined above, to aggregate technology, the sunk costs of
entry and the fixed costs of domestic production, respectively. The solid lines plot
the response in the open economy, while the dotted lines plot the response in the
closed economy.
4.4. Transmission of Macroeconomic Shocks 93
Figure 4.4: Response to Transitory Aggregate Technology (Zh) Shock
Figure 4.4 shows that in response to a positive aggregate technology shock, in
both the open and closed economy, firms with lower firm-level productivity, who
would otherwise be unable to enter the market, enter the market, decreasing in the
first instance average domestic firm-level productivity, z˜hD. However, as the new
firms enter the market, NhE, driven by potentially higher profits, the relatively less
productive firms are forced out of the market, due to the increased competition
in the market and average domestic firm-level productivity then increases. The
positive aggregate technology shock also increases the real wage, wh, leading firms
to increase their prices, thus leading to a reduction in demand. The real wage
increase leads to a rise in the fixed entry cost and the fixed cost of domestic
production (measured in effective labour units). These higher costs mean that
when firms are hit by the exogenous death shock, new firms do not enter the
market to replace them, and thus, average firm-level productivity falls back to its
initial steady state, albeit at a slower rate than the aggregate technology level.
However, in the open economy, the later persistence of productivity is higher than
in the closed economy, driven by a larger increase in the number of entrants and
hence a larger increase in the number of domestic firms. The larger number of
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entrants in the open economy is caused by the increase in the competitiveness of
domestic exporters in foreign markets, driven by the increase in domestic aggregate
technology. The spike in technology not only increases domestic profits, but also the
profits from exporting, thus more firms enter the market to take advantage of the
increased total profits. The larger increase in the number of domestic firms leads
to an increase in domestic wages, as competition for labour increases, causing the
number of new entrants to fall. This explains the higher persistence of productivity
in the open economy after around period 22. Our results are consistent with the
empirical findings of Moreira (2017) and Sedlacek and Stern (2017), that the entry
and exit of less productive firms into the market can drive a persistent response of
labour productivity to macroeconomic shocks.
Figure 4.5: Response to Transitory Shock to the Sunk Cost of Entry (fhE)
Figure 4.5 presents the response paths of the same macroeconomic variables as
Figure 4.4 to a negative transitory shock to the sunk cost of entry in both the open
and closed economies. Comparing to the case of the aggregate technology shocks,
the response paths now appear less smooth, as a change in the sunk cost of entry
predominantly impacts new firms entering the market, and existing firms only
indirectly, through changes in the real wage. Given its low impact on existing firms,
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a decrease in the sunk cost of entry leads to a lower increase in productivity, shown
by the larger shock size needed for a 1% increase in productivity. A reduction in
the sunk entry cost in the open economy (temporarily) allows new firms to enter
the market, NhE, and drives up the real wage, w
h, which causes less productive
firms to become unprofitable and exit the market, thus driving up both firm-level
productivity, z˜hD, and labour productivity, Z
h
O. However, as the sunk cost of entry
returns to its pre-shock value, the number of new entrants decreases, as firms are
hit by the exogenous death shock. The real wage therefore returns to its initial
steady-state level, as do productivity and consumption, Ch. The rate at which
productivity and consumption return to steady state is lower than the rate at
which the shock dissipates due to the increase in the number of domestic firms,
which leads to increased competition in the domestic market, which, in turn,
drives up productivity temporarily. It is only as the number of firms returns to its
steady-state level that the average firm-level productivity also returns to steady
state. In the closed economy the response of productivity is similar, although the
driving forces are slightly different. In response to the decrease in the sunk costs
of entry, more firms attempt to enter the economy, thus driving up the wage rate,
as more labour is required to pay the sunk costs of entry. The increase in the
wage rate drives up the cutoff productivity for domestic production, as firms now
face higher fixed costs of domestic production (denominated in effective labour
units) and higher wage costs. Given that the number of successful entrants into
the market is dependent on the probability of drawing a productivity higher than
the cutoff level, the increase in the cutoff level means that although more labour is
being used to pay the sunk costs of entry, the number of successful entrants into
the market decreases, as more firms now draw a productivity below the threshold
level, and thus exit the market immediately. As the shock dissipates, and thus the
number of firms attempting to enter the market decreases, so does the wage rate
and therefore the average domestic firm productivity as well.
Figure 4.6 presents the response paths of the same macroeconomic variables as
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 to a positive transitory shock to the fixed costs of domestic
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Figure 4.6: Response to Transitory Shock to the Fixed Cost of Domestic Production
(fhD)
production in both the open and closed economies. When the shock to the fixed
costs hits, relatively less productive firms are no longer able to make profits, and
exit the market, NhE, thus leading to an increasing average firm productivity, z˜
h
D,
in the period immediately after the shock. As a result of higher productivity,
firms are able to pay a higher real wage, wh, and also make higher profits. The
higher real wage and higher profits are passed onto households leading to higher
consumption, Ch. The increase in fixed costs also means that less productive
firms are no longer able to make sufficient profits to pay back their sunk costs
of entry, so they do not enter the market, thus further increasing productivity.
However, as the shock dissipates, and the number of firms returns to equilibrium,
the competition in the market decreases, due to a lower number of firms in the
market, NhD. This leads to a higher number of relatively less productive firms
to quickly enter the market, dragging down average firm-level productivity and
causing labour productivity to dip below its original steady-state level before
returning to equilibrium. Given that the competition on the domestic market is
larger in the open economy due to competition from imports, the increase in the
fixed costs of domestic production cause a larger number of unproductive firms to
exit the market in the open economy compared to the closed economy, resulting in
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a much less persistent response of productivity to such a shock in the open economy.
In this section we have examined the impact of the entry and exit of less
productive non-trading firms into the market on the persistence of the response
of labour productivity to different macroeconomic shocks, in order to provide a
possible explanation for the wide variation in empirically calculated figures for
labour productivity persistence. We have shown that the entry and exit of less
productive non-trading firms into the market introduces an endogeneity into this
persistence, and allows the response of productivity to aggregate technology and
sunk costs of entry shocks to be more persistent than the shocks themselves. At the
same time, we showed that the response of productivity to a shock to the fixed costs
of domestic production is less persistent than the shocks themselves. Therefore,
it is possible that when the empirically calculated persistence of productivity is
lower, as in Pancrazi and Vukotic (2011), this may be because the shock driving
the response of productivity was acting on the fixed costs of domestic productivity,
while larger persistence, such as that found in Baxter (1995), may be because the
shock driving the response of productivity was acting on the aggregate technology
levels of firms.
4.4.2 Import and Export Cost Shocks
In this section we seek to examine whether changes in barriers to imports or
exports have a greater impact on productivity. As mentioned earlier, intuitively,
given that barrier to import changes directly affect all firms in the economy, while
barrier to export changes directly affect only trading firms, barrier to import
changes would have a larger impact on productivity. However, existing models
such as Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014) are not able
to replicate this result, and barrier to export changes have a much larger impact on
productivity. The introduction of the entry and exit of less productive non-trading
firms into the domestic market allows imports to affect the average productivity of
non-trading firms directly, and therefore may generate a larger response of labour
productivity to barriers to imports. To fully explore the relative impact of barriers
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to imports and exports in driving the entry and exit of less productive non-trading
domestic firms (and thus productivity), we analyse the dynamic responses of labour
productivity to transitory shocks of the same magnitude to changes in barriers to
imports and barriers to exports broken down between shocks to the variable and
fixed costs of trade. We assume that the shocks follow AR(1) processes similar to
the previous transitory shocks.
In Figure 4.7 we present the response of labour productivity to a one period,
1 percentage point negative shock to the iceberg costs of importing, τ ih, and τ
j
h,
shown by the solid line, and a one period, 1 percentage point negative shock to
the iceberg costs of exporting, τhi , and τ
h
j , shown by the dotted line. In Figure 4.8
we present the response of labour productivity to a one period, 1 percentage point
negative shock to the fixed costs of importing, f iXh and f
j
Xh, shown by the solid line
and a one period, 1 percentage point negative shock to the fixed costs of exporting,
fhXi and f
h
Xj, shown by the dotted line.
Figure 4.7: Response of Labour Productivity to Transitory Shocks to the Iceberg
Costs of Trade
Figure 4.7 shows that a shock to the variable costs of importing induces a larger
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Figure 4.8: Response of Labour Productivity to Transitory Shocks to the Fixed
Costs of Trade
impact on labour productivity, 0.79% above the initial steady state, than a shock
of the same magnitude to the variable costs of exporting, about 0.62% above the
initial steady state.9 Figure 4.8 shows a slightly different result to Figure 4.7. As
in the case of shocks to the variable cost of trade, a shock to an importing cost,
in this case the per period costs of exporting to the UK (UK imports), induces an
increase in UK productivity, albeit to a more limited extent than a variable cost of
importing shock, 0.07% above the initial steady state. However, a shock to the per
period costs of exporting from the UK induces a reduction in UK productivity of
0.25%. These results can be explained by the ways in which different types of firms
are impacted by trade costs. Our result that a reduction in barriers to imports lead
to an increase in productivity is consistent with the existing empirical literature,
see for example Amiti and Konings (2007), Yasar and Paul (2007) and Bloom et al.
(2016).
9We show that this result is invariant to country size. As the size of the domestic economy
increases relative to the size of the other countries, the magnitude of the response of labour
productivity to trade barrier shocks diminishes, however the response to import barrier changes
remains higher than the response to export barrier changes.
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To further examine the driving mechanisms behind these results Figures 4.9
and 4.10 present the response path of consumption, Ch, average productivity for
domestic production, z˜hD, labour productivity, Z
h
O, the real wage, w
h, the number
of firms, NhD, the number of new entrants, N
h
E, the average firm productivity of
exporters to the EU10, zhXi, the number of exporters to the EU, N
h
Xi, and the total
output for exporting to the EU, Y hXi, to the one period transitory shocks presented
above. The solid lines plot the response to the shocks to the barriers to imports,
while the dotted lines plot the response to the shocks to the barriers to exports.
Figure 4.9: Breakdown of the Response to Transitory Shocks to the Iceberg Costs
of Trade
As the variable cost of imports decrease, the amount of competition from imports
increases too, as the domestic market becomes more attractive to foreign exporters.
As competition increases, less productive non-trading firms, who are impacted by
competition from imports, are no longer able to make profits and thus exit the
market, driving up both firm-level productivity, z˜hD, and labour productivity, Z
h
O,
significantly, as Figure 4.9 shows. As the less productive firms exit the market,
10Note that the responses of the average firm productivity, number of and output for exports to
the RoW are almost identical for those for exports to the EU
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causing decreases in the number of firms, NhD, the competition for inputs decreases,
which allows less productive firms to re-enter the market, causing productivity to
quickly drop, and even dip below its initial steady-state level, as was also seen in
the case of a transitory shock to the fixed costs of domestic production, presented
in section 4.4.1.
Changes in the variable cost of exporting meanwhile significantly impact the
domestic firms that engage in international trade (export); however, these firms
make up a relatively small proportion of the total number of domestic firms (less
than 1% of US firms according to the 2016 Census). On the other hand, non-trading
domestic firms make up the majority of firms and are only directly impacted by
changes in barriers to exports through changes in the competition for inputs, which,
in our model, is competition for labour11, reflected in the wage rate, wh. The
decrease in the variable cost of exporting impacts both the number of exporting
firms, NhXi, (the extensive margin of trade) and the total output for exporting,
Y hXi (intensive margin of trade), both of which increase after the variable cost of
exporting decreases.
When variable costs of exporting decrease, competition for inputs and, to a
lesser extent, competition from importers will change, and affect productivity in
the same direction: exporting firms demand additional labour to serve international
markets, and this drives up the real wage which forces the least productive
non-trading firms to exit, thus increasing average productivity. Additionally,
competition from importers will further increase labour productivity but only
through general equilibrium effects on exporters in foreign countries. As in the
case of changes in barriers to imports, as the less productive firms exit the market,
the competition for inputs decreases, allowing less productive firms to re-enter the
market, causing productivity to quickly decrease, and even dip below its initial
11In addition, changes in barriers to exports will indirectly change competition from imports
through general equilibrium effects on foreign countries, but the impact of this change in
competition is small.
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steady-state level.
Given that the impact of an increase in competition from imports has a
greater impact on non-trading firms than increased competition for inputs because
non-trading firms are directly impacted by changes in competition from imports,
but only indirectly impacted by changes in competition for inputs, the impact of
changes in barriers to imports on productivity is greater than the impact of changes
in barriers to exports, consistent with the empirical literature, such as Bloom et al.
(2016).
Figure 4.10: Breakdown of the Response to Transitory Shocks to the Fixed Costs
of Trade
As Figure 4.10 shows, the impact of a reduction in the fixed costs of importing
causes an almost identical response to a decrease in the variable cost of importing,
albeit of a smaller magnitude. In both cases, the competition from imports increase,
driving less productive firms out of the market, leading to a decrease in the number
of firms, NhD, and increasing both firm-level productivity z˜
h
D and labour productivity
ZhO. As the shock dissipates, the competition from imports returns to steady state
and thus the number of domestic firms also returns to equilibrium. As the number
of firms returns to equilibrium, the competition for labour also intensifies, causing
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productivity to also return to its steady-state level.
The impact of a reduction in the fixed costs of exporting on the other hand,
leads to a significantly different response of productivity. In this case, labour
productivity decreases, before slowly returning to equilibrium as the shock
dissipates. As the fixed cost of exporting decreases, less productive firms are
able to enter the exporting markets, as a result of the decrease in the cutoff
productivity for exporting. The number of exporting firms then increases, and
thus so does the number of units of labour needed to pay for the fixed costs
of exporting, causing an increase in the real wage, wh. As firms set their price
equal to a fixed mark-up over marginal cost, the combination of increased wage
costs and decreased average productivity of exporters causes the average price of
exports to increase, decreasing foreign demand, and leading to a decrease in the
number of units of output that are sold in domestic markets, even if the total
value of exports increases. Thus, although the number of exporting firms, NhXi,
increases (the extensive margin of trade) the total output per firm, Y hXi, decreases
(intensive margin of trade), leading to a reduction in the total number of export
units sold. Given that the labour used in production (the labour force less the
labour used in the sunk cost of entry) increases as a result of the reduction in
the number of new entrants, and that the number of units of output produced
for export markets decreases, labour productivity, measured as output per hour falls.
In this section we examined which of changes in barriers to imports or changes in
barriers exports have a greater impact on productivity. We showed that, once we
allow for the entry and exit of less productive non-trading firms into the domestic
market changes in barrier to imports have a larger impact of labour productivity
than changes in barriers to exports of the same magnitude. Existing models such
as Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014) are not able to
replicate this result, as in these models changes in barriers to imports only affect
the allocation of labour between trading and non-trading firms, rather than causing
endogenous changes in the average productivity of domestic firms.
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4.4.3 Permanent Shocks
This section analyses how the entry and exit of less productive non-trading firms
affects the response of the economy to permanent macroeconomic shocks, by
comparing the response in our framework to the responses in the baseline Ghironi
and Melitz (2005) framework, where the productivity distribution is exogenously
fixed. For this comparison, we examine the dynamic response of consumption,
Ch, average firm productivity, z˜hD, labour productivity, Z
h
O, the real wage, w
h,
the number of firms, NhD, and the number of new entrants, N
h
E, to three separate
permanent macroeconomic shocks in country h: first, a permanent 1% increase in
aggregate, Zh; second, a permanent 1% decrease in the sunk cost of entry fhE; third,
a permanent 1% increase in the fixed cost of domestic production, fhD.
Figure 4.11 shows the dynamic response of consumption, Ch, average firm
productivity, z˜hD, labour productivity, Z
h
O, the real wage, w
h, the number of firms,
NhD, and the number of new entrants, N
h
E, to a permanent 1% increase in aggregate
technology in country h. The increase in aggregate technology allows the relatively
less productive firms, previously unable to make profits, to immediately enter the
market, sharply increasing the number of new entrants, and driving down average
firm-level productivity and leading to an increase in the number of firms. However,
the decrease in average firm-level productivity is not as large as the increase in
aggregate technology (0.6% in the short run and 0.18% in the long run, compared
to an 1% increase in aggregate technology), therefore labour productivity increases.
The increase in labour productivity allows firms to pay a higher real wage, and make
higher profits, leading to an increase in consumption. As the real wage increases,
the less productive firms who initially entered the market are no longer able to pay
the higher real wage and exit the market, allowing firm-level productivity to return
slowly to its new, lower, steady-state level.
The endogenisation of the distribution of firm productivity in our model introduces a
smoothing effect to the behaviour of the endogenous variables, such as consumption
and the real wage, as these variables move more gradually to their new steady-state
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Figure 4.11: Response to a Permanent Increase in Aggregate Technology(Zh)
level in our model than in the case in which the distribution of firm productivity is
fixed, as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). In our model, consumption does not jump
immediately to a higher level as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), but moves gradually
to its new steady state, driven by the entry and subsequent exit of less productive
firms, matching more closely the seasonally adjusted US GDP in the World Bank
data. A similar behaviour is observed when examining the other endogenous
variables, such as the real wage, the number of new entrants, and the number of
domestic firms: the response of these variables in our model is much smoother than
of those observed when the distribution of firm productivity is fixed.
Figure 4.12 shows the dynamic response of consumption, average firm productivity,
labour productivity, the real wage, the number of firms and the number of new
entrants to a permanent 1% decrease in sunk entry costs in country h. The
decrease in the sunk entry costs allows a large number of new productive firms
to immediately enter the market, increasing sharply the number of new entrants,
NhE. The increased competition for inputs from the new productive firms drives the
relatively less productive firms out of the market, thus increasing average firm-level
productivity, z˜hD. As in the case of the permanent increase in aggregate technology,
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the increase in productivity allows firms to pay a higher real wage, wh, and make
higher profits, leading to an increase in consumption, Ch. After the initial sharp
increase in labour productivity, as more productive firms slowly enter the market,
the relatively less productive firms are driven out by the increased competition for
inputs, and thus consumption, Ch, labour productivity, ZhO, and the real wage, w
h,
slowly increase to their new, higher steady-state levels.
Figure 4.12: Response to a Permanent Decrease in Sunk Costs of Entry (fhE)
The introduction of endogenous firm-level productivity in our model has the effect
of counteracting the initial consumption undershooting in Ghironi and Melitz
(2005). In contrast to their model, consumption in our model raises sharply, before
increasing slowly to its new higher steady-state level, driven by the sudden exit
of unproductive firms from the market, giving the movement/change in the cutoff
productivity level for domestic production. As in the case of the transitory shock,
the decrease in sunk entry costs immediately drives up the real wage as new firms
enter the market, as well as increasing average firm-level productivity, both of
which increase consumption. As more firms enter the market, this effect continues,
albeit at a decreasing rate, as the economy moves towards the new steady state.
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Figure 4.13: Response to a Permanent Increase in Fixed Costs of Domestic
Production (fhD)
In contrast to the dynamic responses to permanent shocks to aggregate technology
and the sunk costs of entry, a permanent shock to the fixed cost of domestic
production can induce significant overshooting of the endogenous variables. In
Figure 4.13 we present the dynamic response of consumption, average firm
productivity, labour productivity, the real wage, the number of firms and the
number of new entrants to a permanent 1% increase in the fixed cost of domestic
production in country h. A permanent increase in the fixed cost of domestic
production induces consumption, the real wage, labour productivity and the
number of new entrants to overshoot sharply their new steady-state levels before
slowly returning to their new equilibrium levels. The increase in fixed costs of
domestic production drives the relatively less productive firms out of the market
immediately, as they are no longer profitable, leading to an immediate increase in
average firm productivity. The increase in fixed costs of domestic production also
leads to a sharp fall in the number of new entrants, NhE, as the least productive
firms, previously able to enter the market and make profits, are no longer able to
enter. The exit of the least productive firms from the market decreases competition
for inputs, and allows the relatively less productive firms to slowly enter the
market, driving labour productivity down to its new, higher steady-state level.
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Thus, productivity overshoots its new steady-state level initially, before slowly
falling as the competition for inputs decreases. Similar to the permanent increase
in aggregate technology and the permanent decrease in the sunk cost of entry, the
increase in firm-level productivity allows firms to pay a higher real wage, wh, and
make higher profits, which sharply increases consumption, Ch. However, as (more)
new firms enter the market, productivity moves towards its new equilibrium level,
leading the real wage and consumption to fall back to their new, lower steady-state
levels.
In this section we analysed how the entry and exit of less productive non-trading
firms affects the response of the economy to permanent macroeconomic shocks, by
comparing the response in our framework to the responses in the baseline Ghironi
and Melitz (2005) framework, where the productivity distribution is exogenously
fixed. We showed that our model generates smoother responses to permanent
shocks to technology and the sunk costs of entry, which better reflects movements
in seasonally adjusted US GDP data from the World Bank.
4.5 UK Productivity Puzzle
Since 2008, productivity in the UK has stagnated to such an extent that in 2017
Q4, it was 16% lower than the continuation of its pre-crisis trend would predict
(measured as output per employed worker). In Figure 4.14, the solid (dark blue)
line plots quarterly UK productivity and the dashed (light blue) line plots its
pre-crisis trend.
The decline and the subsequent stagnation in UK productivity could have been
driven by two factors: 1) business responses to a reduction in consumer demand,
leading to a temporary drop in productivity; 2) more persistent supply-side factors,
such as a reduction in investment in research and development (see for example
Millard and Nicolae (2014)) or changing credit conditions (see for example Franklin
et al. (2015)), leading to a permanent decrease in UK productivity growth.
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Figure 4.14: UK Labour Productivity
In the first case, the reduction in consumer demand may have led to labour
hoarding by businesses, as Patterson (2012) and Martin and Rowthorn (2012)
argue or, according to Goodridge et al. (2013a) and King and Millard (2014),
to higher investment in intangible assets. Both labour hoarding and higher
investment in intangible assets would cease once consumer demand recovered,
allowing productivity to start returning to pre-crisis levels. In the case of the more
persistent supply-side factors, the number of firms with relatively low productivity
may have permanently increased causing a permanent drop in average UK labour
productivity. Franklin et al. (2015) note that after the Great Recession, in the
UK, the supply of credit decreased, particularly for firms entering the market,
allowing less productive firms to survive due to lower competition. The decrease
in the supply of credit was also examined by Corry et al. (2011), who noted the
lower firm creation rates in the UK after Great Recession, which they explained
by the decreased availability of loans to new businesses, as a result of financial
institutions increased internal capital requirements. Similar constraints on UK firm
credit post Great Recession were found by Saleheen et al. (2017) in their survey of
UK businesses, and by Chadha et al. (2017) in their examination of the sectoral
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differences of UK productivity.
In addition to examining the credit restrictions UK firms faced after the Great
Recession, the recent UK Productivity Puzzle literature also examines the impact
of lower debt servicing costs on UK productivity. Arrowsmith et al. (2013) examine
the extent to which bank forbearance and low interest rates have led to increased
firm survival. They argue that although the extent to which bank forbearance
affected UK productivity is small, low interest rates made debt servicing costs lower
which had a large effect on UK productivity. The link between the debt burden
of a firm, driven by the interest burden, and firm survival in the UK was also
examined by Guariglia et al. (2016), who concluded that there was a statistically
significant link between the interest burden of a firm and their survival rate during
the Financial Crisis and Great Recession. Given that the interest burden decreased
post Great Recession, it can be argued that firm survival rates increased, leading
to lower productivity growth.
In this chapter we examine the effect of both a reduction in consumer demand and
of (more) persistent supply-side factors such as changing credit conditions, captured
here by a reduction in the supply of credit for firms entering the market and by a
lower debt servicing cost for existing firms (driven by lower interest payments) on
labour productivity in the UK since the Financial Crisis/Great Recession, in order
to gauge the extent to which they could explain the UK Productivity Puzzle.
The reduction in consumer demand, driven by the Financial Crisis and subsequently
by the Great Recession, is simulated as a temporary shock to aggregate technology
in all three countries, matching the magnitude of the decrease in productivity in the
UK, the EU and the RoW. The reduction in the supply of credit for firms entering
the market is simulated as a permanent positive shock to the sunk cost of entry.
The reduction in the debt servicing cost is simulated as a permanent negative shock
to the per-period fixed cost of domestic production. We run simultaneously through
our model the three shocks, which are calibrated for this exercise as follows:
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1. To simulate the reduction in consumer demand driven by the Financial Crisis
and subsequently by the Great Recession in the UK, the EU and the RoW,
per-period shocks to aggregate technology (Zht , Z
h
t and Z
h
t ) of -0.011, -0.008
and 0.00025 respectively, are run for 4 periods, to match the reductions in
productivity according to the OECD data.
2. After the Great Recession, in the UK, the credit supplied by the financial
sector to the domestic market decreased by 22% from 2008 to 2015.1213
Approximately 25% of a new start-up cost is related to setting up a company,
including the costs associated with obtaining credit. If all company’s start-up
costs were directly linked to the supply of credit, the increase in fhE would be
5.5% (22% times 25%). However, given that not all start-up costs are directly
related to domestic credit, for a more accurate calibration for a more realistic
simulation exercise, fhE is only increased by 4% relative to its pre-crisis level.
To match the timing in the data, we assume that fhE increased by 0.166% in
each of the first 24 periods.
3. The average interest paid by the UK companies registered with the Bureau
Van Dijk Orbis database, decreased over 2008-2015 by 4%, in nominal terms.
In real terms, however, the reduction was substantially larger: 20.2%. Over the
same time period, the average interest paid (as a proportion of total fixed cost
was) 10.5%. To simulate the impact of the reduction in the UK interest rate,
and its effect on the debt servicing cost, the fixed cost of domestic production
in the UK, fhD, is reduced by 2.1% (20.2% times 10.5%) relative to the pre-crisis
level. To match the timing of the reductions in the UK interest rate, fhD is
decreased by 0.5% in each of the first 4 periods, and by 0.1% in period 5.14
The dashed green line in Figure 4.14 plots the simulated UK labour productivity
according to our model, when simultaneously running through the model the
12According to World Bank data on credit supplied by the UK financial sector to the domestic
market from the start of the Great Recession to 2017.
13From 210% of GDP in 2008 to 163% of GDP in 2015.
14the Bank of England took approximate 1 year and one quarter to reduce the interest rate to
its post-crisis level.
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shocks presented above. We note that it matches the data quite well in the
periods immediately following the Financial Crisis. The initial drop in the level
of productivity according to the results of our simulation is 6.43% relative to
pre-crisis trend, while according the data this is 6.45%. Up to 2011 Q3, simulated
productivity successfully replicates the behaviour of UK productivity, when it
explains about 4.3% points of the 6.4% shortfall of the UK productivity relative to
a continuation of its pre-crisis trend, illustrating the role entry and exit of relatively
less productive non-trading domestic firms into the domestic market can have on
aggregate productivity. However, the slowdown in growth after 2011 Q3 cannot
be accounted for. Our result shows that in response to a 4% increase in the sunk
entry cost and a 2.1% reduction in per-period fixed cost of domestic production
in the UK relative to their pre-crisis levels, UK labour productivity is expected
to decrease in the long run by 1.22%, while the shortfall of UK productivity from
the continuation of its pre-crisis trend kept increasing to be 16% in 2017 Q4. The
results of our simulation indicate that changes in credit conditions (as captured
here) can explain a small but significant part of this shortfall. Our calculations
show that of the 1.99% long-run decrease in UK productivity, approximately 1%
is attributable to the increase in firm start-up costs, and approximately 0.22% is
attributable to decreased debt servicing cost for existing firms. If the firm set-up
costs were entirely dependent on the supply of credit, and therefore the start-up
costs increased by 5.5% after the Great Recession, then the long-run decrease in
UK productivity attributable to increased start-up costs becomes larger, from 1%
to 1.4%.
An analysis of the effect of each of the shocks on labour productivity, reveals
that in response to a temporary negative consumer demand shock, labour
productivity decreases to almost 5.4% below its initial steady-state level, as
shown by the dotted line in Figure 4.15. This shows that if the reduction in
UK labour productivity was solely caused by declining consumer demand, then
UK productivity would have returned to its initial steady-state level within
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Figure 4.15: The Effect of Individual Shocks on Labour Productivity
approximately 10 years with no permanent effect.
On the other hand, the response of labour productivity to a permanent positive
start-up credit supply shock, shown by the dotted line, is to never recover to its
initial steady-state level, reaching its new long run steady-state level which is 1%
below the initial one soon after approximately 10 years. Labour productivity will
first slightly increase, as a result of increased demand for labour which drives up
the real wage following the increase in the sunk cost (as the fixed/sunk costs are
expressed in labour unit terms), leading relatively less productive (non-trading)
firms to exit the market. But as this happens, labour productivity decreases, as
competition in the UK market decreases following the increase in the start-up
costs, allowing unproductive firms to remain in the market, while exiting firms
are not replaced at the same rate as before because of the higher start-up costs,
permanently decreasing productivity.
Similarly, the response of labour productivity to a permanent negative debt
servicing cost shock, as shown by the dashed line, is to permanently lower average
productivity to 0.22% below the initial steady-state level. This is as the effect
of lower interest payments on existing debt is to decrease the cost of staying
in the market, allowing relatively less productive (non-trading) firms to stay
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and/or enter the market and make profits. Short term, the effect of a reduction
in interest payments (through its effect on the debt servicing cost) on labour
productivity is more pronounced, immediately following the lower cost of staying in
the market, lowering average productivity to up to 1% below the initial steady state.
These results do not provide an explanation for the increasing shortfall of
the UK productivity relative to a continuation of its pre-crisis trend, driven by
lower trend productivity growth post crisis, but do provide an explanation as to
why this shortfall is non-zero i.e. why the level of productivity has fallen.
We argue that changes in credit conditions in the UK following the Financial
Crisis led to a higher number of relatively less productive firms entering the UK
market, which - unlike in existing models - is captured and driven in our model
by an endogenous average firm-level productivity, as the firm-level productivity
distribution changes. However, our model shows that changes in credit conditions
cannot fully explain the magnitude of the UK Productivity Puzzle. Franklin
et al. (2015) show that 5-8% of the UK productivity decline up to 2014, could be
explained by reductions in UK credit supply, while our model suggests that only
1.22% could be explained by such reductions. In Franklin et al. (2015) the decline
of UK labour productivity is explained by the substitution of capital with more
labour-intensive methods of production caused by the increased cost of capital.
Given that we do not model capital in our model, the degree to which changes in
credit conditions, as captured in our chapter, can contribute to our understanding
of the UK Productivity Puzzle is not surprising.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed a three-country dynamic, stochastic, general
equilibrium macroeconomic model of international trade with monopolistic
competition and heterogeneous firms, in order to explore the role of the entry and
exit into the domestic market of less productive non-trading domestic firms on
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labour productivity and its persistence in response to shocks to macroeconomic
variables. Unlike the existing literature, we allow for the distribution of firm-level
productivity to be endogenously determined in our model through the entry and
exit of less productive non-trading firms into the domestic market, and we run our
analysis in a three-country world. Two main results stand out from our study:
First, unlike in the existing theoretical literature such as Ghironi and Melitz
(2005), we show that changes in barriers to imports have a much larger effect on
domestic productivity than changes in barriers to exports of an equivalent size. In
this existing theoretical literature, labour productivity can only change as a result
of changes in the number of domestic firms (the extensive margin of production).
In our model we allow for changes in the extensive as well as intensive margins of
production, through endogenous changes in both the number of domestic firms and
the productivity distribution of producing firms. Our results show the key role of
the entry and exit of less productive non-trading firms into the domestic market
in driving productivity, a result which is consistent with empirical papers such as
Yasar and Paul (2007) and Bloom et al. (2016).
Second, the entry and exit of less productive non-trading domestic firms into
the domestic market can explain the persistence of labour productivity in response
to transitory macroeconomic shocks. We show that the persistence of labour
productivity in response to transitory shocks to aggregate technology and the
sunk cost of entry is higher than the exogenous persistence of the two shocks, but
the persistence of labour productivity in response to transitory shocks to fixed
costs of domestic production is lower than the exogenous persistence of the shock,
irrespective of the calibration of the persistence of the shock. Therefore, we offer a
potential explanation for the wide variation in the empirically calculated figures for
the persistence of productivity from 0.85 in Pancrazi and Vukotic (2011) to 0.906
in Backus et al. (1992) and 0.994 in Baxter (1995).
We also use our model to examine the extent to which changes in credit
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conditions seen in the UK shortly after the Financial Crisis/Great Recession could
contribute to our understanding of the UK Productivity Puzzle. We show that
our model can successfully replicate the behaviour of UK productivity for the first
three and a half years after the Great Recession. We conclude that changes in
consumer demand and credit conditions can account for about 4.3% points of the
6.4% shortfall of the UK productivity in 2011 Q3 relative to a continuation of its
pre-crisis trend, illustrating the role entry and exit of relatively less productive
non-trading domestic firms into the domestic market can have on aggregate
productivity. The non-trading domestic firms are both the most unproductive
firms and most numerous and therefore small credit changes can have significant
effects on the entry and exit of these firms, leading to large changes in aggregate
productivity.
Future research might investigate the role of non-trading firms’ exit and entry into
the domestic market in driving labour productivity and its persistence, in a context
in which two current restrictive assumptions in the model are relaxed: 1) trade
balances in every period; and 2) full employment. Relaxing the first assumption
would allow us to account for the intertemporal consumption smoothing allowed by
international trade (Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)). Relaxing the assumption of full
employment would allow us to examine the relationships between trade, firm entry
and exit, job creation and destruction, productivity and the unemployment rate.
Chapter 5
Is Ricardo Still Relevant? An
Empirical Re-examination of
Ricardian Trade Theory
5.1 Introduction
Ricardian Trade Theory predicts that countries will specialise, produce and export
in the industries in which they have a comparative advantage. Since the end of
the 1970s, Ricardian Trade Theory has received little attention in the empirical
literature, primarily due to the lack of a clear link between the underpinning
theoretical foundations and empirical examination of the theory. The most
widely used methodology for empirically examining Ricardian Trade Theory, the
‘third-country method’ developed by MacDougall (1951), was widely discredited
as a valid test of the underlying theory (see for example Bhagwati (1964), Sailors
and Bronson (1970) and Deardorff (1984)), calling into question the results of
all of the earlier empirical examination of Ricardian Trade Theory, as well as
those of Golub and Hsieh (2000). The lack of a clear link between theoretical
foundations and the empirical examination was addressed by Costinot et al. (2012),
who developed an innovative theoretical framework which allows them to conduct
theoretically underpinned empirical tests of Ricardian Trade Theory. They found
clear support for Ricardian Trade Theory across a wide range of robustness checks,
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for manufacturing industries across 21 countries in 1997.
The fixed effects methodology used by Costinot et al. (2012) allows an exploration
whether Ricardian Trade Theory holds in international trade, through an
examination of the significance of the elasticity of exports to observed productivity,
θ, which they found to be both positive and significant across a wide range
of specifications, as Ricardian Trade Theory would predict. However, their
methodology does not allow them to draw any conclusions on the extent to which
the pattern of relative bilateral trade can be explained by differences in relative
productivities i.e. Ricardian Comparative Advantage. The fixed effects terms
in their specification capture factors such as barriers to trade, preferences and
wage differentials, meaning that the specific impact of relative productivities
cannot be isolated. To isolate solely the impact of relative productivity differences
on relative bilateral exports it is necessary to move away from a fixed effects
methodology and towards a direct comparison of relative bilateral exports to
relative productivities, which is the methodology adopted in this chapter. This
methodology is considerably more computationally intensive which may explain
why, to the best of my knowledge, it has not been adopted in the literature up to this
point. Adopting this methodology allows the identification of whether Ricardian
Trade Theory holds in international trade, again through an examination of the
significance of the elasticity of relative bilateral exports to relative productivities, θ,
but also allows the first examination of the extent to which relative productivities
differences can explain relative bilateral international trade flows and, therefore,
the extent to which these relative bilateral trade flows are driven by Ricardian
Comparative Advantage, in a manner consistent with robust theoretical foundations.
In addition to not allowing a theoretically consistent examination of the extent to
which trade flows are consistent with the predictions of Ricardian Trade Theory, the
earlier empirical examinations of Ricardian Trade Theory, as well as Costinot et al.
(2012), focus solely on the patterns of production and trade in goods industries,
with no analysis of whether the pattern of trade in services is also consistent with
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the predictions of Ricardian Trade Theory. Given that services trade makes up an
increasing proportion of international trade (from 24.6% in 2000 to 29.7% in 2015),
it is of vital importance to determine whether Ricardian Trade Theory retains
empirical relevance in 21st century international trade.
This chapter seeks to address the following two questions: first, to what
extent can the pattern of relative bilateral international trade flows be explained by
relative productivities differences, and therefore be said to be driven by Ricardian
Comparative Advantage; and second, to what degree does the extent to which
Ricardian Comparative Advantage drives the pattern of international trade vary
across industries and countries.
This chapter is related to the wide body of empirical literature that sought
to determine the validity of Ricardian Trade Theory (see for example MacDougall
(1951), Stern (1962), Balassa (1963), Kreinin (1969) and recently Golub and Hsieh
(2000) and Costinot et al. (2012)). This chapter contributes to this literature in
two ways: firstly, by examining whether Ricardian Trade Theory retains empirical
validity when examining both goods and services industries simultaneously, and to
what extent the elasticity of trade to productivity varies across different industries;
and second, by determining to what extent the pattern of bilateral trade flows can
be explained by Ricardian Trade Theory, and again, how this extent varies across
different industries. This chapter is also related to a wider literature that examines
specialisation according to Ricardian Comparative Advantage more generally (see
for example Costinot and Donaldson (2012), Jaimovich and Merella (2015) and
Costinot et al. (2016)), as well as to the wider literature that explores the sources
of comparative advantage (see for example Harrigan (1997), Romalis (2004), Nuun
(2007), Manova (2008) and Sampson (n.d.)).
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 briefly outlines
the theoretical framework, developed in Costinot et al. (2012), as well as the
‘correct’ method for empirically testing Ricardian Trade Theory in their framework.
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Section 5.3 presents the results of the empirical testing, divided between the baseline
regression in section 5.3.2 and the alternative industry and country samples in
section 5.3.3. Finally, section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical Framework
This section briefly outlines the theoretical framework, developed by Costinot et al.
(2012), and outlines the testable predictions of this framework. The world economy
in this framework consists of i = 1, ..., I countries, each with a single factor of
production, labour which is assumed to be perfectly mobile between industries
within each country, but immobile between countries, to allow for differentials in
the wage rate. The total labour force in each country, i, is denoted by Li, which
is paid at the wage rate wi. In each country there are k = 1, ..., K industries,
later divided between both goods and services industries, which display constant
returns to scale in their production functions. For the purposes of the theoretical
framework, all nominal variables are assumed to be denominated in a common
currency, in the later empirical analysis, all nominal variables are pre-converted
into a common currency (US Dollar), on a year by year basis.
In each industry in each country there will be an infinite number of different
varieties, all indexed by ω ∈ Ω ≡ {1, ...,+∞}. The number of units of output that
will be produced with one unit of labour for variety ω of good k in country i, i.e.
the variety specific productivity, is denoted by zki (ω). As in Eaton and Kortum
(2002) and Costinot et al. (2012), I assume that these productivities are drawn
from a Frechet distribution F ki , such that F
k
i (z) = exp[−(z/zki )−θ] ∀ z ≥ 0, where
zki > 0, θ > 1, such as to ensure that any differences in technology between any
two countries will depend only on two parameters, θ and zki . θ is the degree of
intra-industry heterogeneity, which allows for idiosyncratic differences in technology
across different varieties. Note that it is assumed that θ is identical across both
different industries in the same country, but also across different countries as well.
Assuming that θ is common across industries, implicitly rules out wage differentials
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interacting with differences in the degree of intra-industry heterogeneity across
sectors to drive trade flows, allowing the model to retain the clear relationship
between productivity, comparative advantage and bilateral trade flows key to
Ricardian Trade Theory. In the results of this chapter θ will be the key parameter
of interest, giving a measure of the elasticity of relative bilateral trade flows to
changes in relative productivities. Figure 5.1, illustrates that as the value of θ
increases, the productivity distribution becomes more concentrated, and that as
the value of zki increases, the productivity distribution becomes more dispersed.
Figure 5.1: Frechet Distribution Illustration
The other parameter that drives difference in technology, zki , represents the
fundamental productivity level of industry k in country i. This fundamental
productivity captures all those factors that make an industry better suited to, and
thus more productive in one country than another, such as climate, infrastructure,
geographical conditions, both political and economic institutions and the education
and health levels of the country’s workforce. Within each industry k, it is solely
cross country variation in zki that drives cross country variations in relative labour
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productivity and thus the comparative advantage at the heart of Ricardian Trade
Theory, given that θ is common across all countries and industries. The assumption
that the productivity of each variety is drawn from a Frechet distribution formally
implies the following: zki /z
k
i′ = E[z
k
i (ω)]/E[z
k
i′(ω)] ∀i, i′ and k. Finally, note that
fundamental productivity zki , will not be equal to measured productivity. In autarky
the two would be equivalent, however, once countries open up to international
trade some less productive varieties will be driven out of business. Thus, measured
productivity, after countries have opened up to trade will be higher than the
fundamental productivity that drives Ricardian Comparative Advantage. The
extent to which measured productivity is higher than fundamental productivity
will depend upon the degree of a country’s openness. The greater the degree of
openness, the greater the extent to which the less productive varieties are driven
out of the market, and therefore the greater the wedge between fundamental and
measured productivities.
In the Costinot et al. (2012) model, trade costs are of the standard ‘iceberg’
form, where τ > 1 units of output must be shipped in order for 1 unit of output to
be sold in the destination country, the remaining τ − 1 units are assumed to melt
away. τ kij denotes the iceberg cost for exports in industry k from country i to country
j. Note that, for simplicity, when the goods melt away they are not redistributed
in any way as income through for example tariffs on imported goods. These iceberg
costs incorporate not only formal barriers to trade such as tariffs or quotas, but
also informal and other barriers to trade, such as transportation costs, product
standards, cultural differences, geographical barriers, infrastructure barriers and
language costs. All of these factors have been shown to be quantitatively important
factors in determining the level of trade for both goods, see for example Disdier and
Head (2008) and services, see for example Head et al. (2009). Given the presence
of informal barriers to trade it is possible for the goods of two industries that both
face no formal barriers to trade, for example through the provisions of a single
market or free trade area, to have different values for the iceberg costs τ as a result
of different impacts of informal barriers to trade. These informal barriers also mean
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that even in the presence of a single market or FTA it is not necessarily the case
that τ kij = τ
k
ji. To rule out cross country arbitrage opportunities, it is assumed
assume that τ kij ≤ τ kilτ klj ∀i, j and l.
As in Costinot et al. (2012), markets in the model are assumed to be perfectly
competitive, which, taken with the assumption of constant returns to scale implies
pkj (ω) = min
1≤i≤I
[τ kijwi/z
k
i (ω)], where τ
k
ii = 1, i.e. there are no iceberg costs if countries
consume their own output. Within each industry k, for each variety ω, consumers
are assumed to search between all the different countries to find the best price
available. In each country, consumers have a nested utility function, as in Melitz
(2003), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and similar, where the outer tier is of
Cobb-Douglas form, while the inner tier is of Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) form. Note that the outer Cobb Douglas utility function could be replaced
with any other utility function and the same testable cross sectional predictions
will be derived. Therefore, along with the previous assumptions, the functional
form of utility implies the following expression for total nominal expenditure
on variety ω in industry k in country j: xkj (ω) = [p
k
j (ω)/p
k
j ]
1−σkj αkjwjLj where
pkj ≡
[∑
ω∈Ω p
k
j (ω)
1−σkj
]1/(1−σkj )
, 0 ≤ αkj ≤ 1 is the expenditure share on varieties
in industry k in country j and σkj < 1 + θ is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties within the same industry. The assumption that σkj < 1 + θ ensures that
the CES price index pkj will be well defined in each country. Note that demand
can vary both across industries in the same country, and across countries, through
variation in both αkj and σ
k
j .
Using all of the above assumptions, it is possible1 to derive an expression for
the value of total bilateral exports from country i to country j in industry k, xkij:
xkij =
(wiτ
k
ij/z
k
i )
−θ∑I
i′=1(wi′τ
k
i′j/z
k
i′)
−θα
k
jwjLj.
1See Lemma 1 of Costinot et al. (2012)
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Using this expression for total bilateral exports, allows me to use a
difference-in-difference approach to derive an expression for relative bilateral exports,
as a function of relative fundamental productivity levels and relative trade costs.
Using the first difference xkij/x
k′
ij , controls for cross country differences in wages,
wj, and labour forces, Lj, and therefore cross country differences in incomes, wjLj,
across different import countries. Taking the second difference (xkij/x
k′
ij )/(x
k
i′j/x
k′
i′j)
controls for differences in the shares of expenditure, αkj , across different industries
within the different importing countries. Using this difference-in-difference
approach, and then taking logs, gives the following relationship between relative
bilateral exports, relative fundamental productivity levels, and relative trade costs:
ln
(
xkijx
k′
i′j
xk
′
ijx
k
i′j
)
= θln
(
zki z
k′
i′
zk
′
i z
k
i′
)
− θln
(
τ kijτ
k′
i′j
τ k
′
ij τ
k
i′j
)
. (5.2.1)
Note that, as in Costinot et al. (2012), this equation does not examine the
impact of differences in measured productivity, but solely the impact of differences
in fundamental productivity levels. Remember that measured productivity is
conditional on the particular variety of good being produced, whereas fundamental
productivity is the theoretical productivity before production begins. To derive
an expression that relates bilateral exports with measured productivity, to enable
empirical testing of Ricardian Trade Theory, it is first necessary to define the
relationship between fundamental and observed productivity levels. Using the
assumption above that the productivity of each variety is drawn from a Frechet
distribution, it can be shown that zki /z
k
i′ =
(
z˜ki /z˜
k
i′
) × (pikii/piki′i′)1/θ, where pikii =
xkii/
∑I
i′=1 x
k
i′i is the inverse of the degree of a country’s openness, giving the
proportion of a country’s total consumption of the varieties from one industry k
that is produced domestically, i.e. xkii, and where z˜
k
i is observed productivity in
industry k in country i. This relationship is the formal form of the relationship
highlighted earlier: as openness increases (pikii decreases), the wedge between
fundamental productivity z and observed or measured productivity z˜ increases as
the less productive varieties are driven from the market. The term
(
pikii/pi
k
i′i′
)1/θ
exactly corrects for this trade driven internal selection. Using our equation for the
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relationship between fundamental and observed productivity it is now possible to
derive a relationship between relative exports and observed productivity:
ln
(
x˜kijx˜
k′
i′j
x˜k
′
ij x˜
k
i′j
)
= θln
(
z˜ki z˜
k′
i′
z˜k
′
i z˜
k
i′
)
− θln
(
τ kijτ
k′
i′j
τ k
′
ij τ
k
i′j
)
, (5.2.2)
where x˜kij = x
k
ij/pi
k
ii are bilateral exports, adjusted for the degree of openness
of the exporting country, henceforth ‘corrected’ exports. Equation (5.2.2) gives
the testable predictions of the model, and allows the testing of Ricardian Trade
Theory, through the sign and significance of θ in the regressions below. It is
important to note however, assuming the model above is correctly specified, that
relative productivities alone do not drive the pattern of relative bilateral exports,
and that relative trade costs are likely to also play an important role, if there is
significant variation in formal and informal barriers to trade across countries and
industries. In the regressions below, given a lack of available data on barriers to
trade at an importer-exporter-industry level, the trade cost term ln
(
τkijτ
k′
i′j
τk
′
ij τ
k
i′j
)
will be
incorporated into the regression error, and thus the specification will only test the
impact of relative productivity differences on relative bilateral exports, rather than
testing the validity of the relationship predicted by equation (5.2.2) as a whole. As
mentioned in Costinot et al. (2012), the approach that is used in their paper and
which I adopt in my analysis, differs from the previous empirical testing of Ricardian
Trade Theory in three key respects: first, the theory dictates that the dependent
variable should be the log second differences of bilateral exports, corrected for the
degree of openness in the exporting country. Second, the theory clarifies that general
equilibrium interaction effects should not introduce significant bias into the analysis,
as long as both productivity and bilateral exports are in log difference-in-difference
form, and third, that the theoretical model allows the economic origins of both the
error terms, and of the predictive power of Ricardian Trade Theory to be understood.
If the empirical methodology derived from equation (5.2.2), has low predictive power,
shown through low R2 values, then it is likely that either there is significant variation
in bilateral barriers to trade, both between industries within the same country, but
also between both the same and different industries between countries, or the model
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is miss-specified in some way.
5.3 Results
This section investigates, first, the extent to which observed cross country differences
in relative productivity can explain the cross country variation in relative bilateral
trade flows, i.e. the extent to which Ricardian Comparative Advantage drives the
patterns of international trade. Second, this section explores the variation in the
extent to which Ricardian Comparative Advantage drives international trade across
different industry samples as well as the variation in the extent to which Ricardian
Comparative Advantage drives international trade across different country samples,
to explore the impact of cross country variations in barriers to trade and country
size.
5.3.1 Data
The tests conducted in this chapter require three different sets of data: for the
baseline regression, data on labour productivity and bilateral trade flows are
required, and for the instrumental variable regressions, data on Research and
Development (R&D) spending at an industry level is required. Next, the sources of
these data series are outlined.
Productivity
Data on productivity is obtained from the World Input Output Database (WIOD)
2016 Release Socio-Economic Accounts, see Timmer et al. (2015). The database
reports gross output, value added, and number of persons engaged at an industry
level for 43 countries and 56 industries for the years 2000-2015 inclusive. The
countries include all 28 EU member countries, as well as 15 other countries, detailed
in table C1 in the appendix. Ideally, as Costinot et al. (2012) explain, the inverse
of producer price indexes would be employed as the empirical counterpart to z˜ki ,
however, producer price indexes are not available from the WIOD. Therefore, to
ensure comparability with the older existing literature (see MacDougall (1951), Stern
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(1962), Balassa (1963) and Golub and Hsieh (2000)) and the alternative measures of
productivity table in Costinot et al. (2012), I use output per person engaged as the
empirical counterpart to z˜ki . As a robustness check, I will later use value added per
person engaged as the empirical counterpart to z˜ki , to correct for the higher levels of
intermediate inputs used in the different industries. Costinot et al. (2012) show that,
as a result of mis-measurement error in productivity, the coefficient of θ in regressions
of output per engaged person are likely to be lower than the accurate figure, however,
the ability of the model to explain cross-country patterns of bilateral trade, proxied
by the regression’s R2, increases. Therefore, all results should be interpreted in
this context. As a further robustness check on my results I also use Research and
Development expenditure at a country-industry level to estimate an instrumental
variable for each of the two measures of productivity above. Data on Research and
Development at the country-industry level was obtained from the OECD ‘Business
enterprise R-D expenditure by industry (ISIC 4)’ database.
Bilateral Trade Flows
The values for the bilateral trade flows, xkij, and the openness of each
exporter-industry, pikii, are obtained from the World Input-Output Tables 2016
Release, see Timmer et al. (2015). The tables contain data on input-output
linkages at an industry level for the same 56 industries and 43 countries as the
Socio-Economic accounts, plus a ‘Rest of the World’ aggregator for all other
countries, for the years 2000-2015. The measure of xkij is the value of bilateral
exports from each of the 43 countries to all the other 42 countries, i.e. the domestic
consumption of domestic production is excluded, i 6= j. The domestic consumption
of domestic production is is excluded so that the analysis can focus solely on the
pattern of international trade without any possible ‘Home Bias’ effects on the
econometric estimates. The econometric results should therefore be interpreted
as solely explaining the pattern of international trade and not the wider pattern
of consumption. As outlined in section 5.2, the openness indicator, pikii, is the
proportion of domestically produced consumption in industry k in total consumption
of industry k, and is calculated as follows: pikii = x
k
ii/
∑I
i′=1 x
k
i′i.
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5.3.2 Baseline Results
In the baseline specification I estimate the empirical specification first using OLS
for all countries and industries, using the data described above, I then estimate
the same specification using an instrumental variables (IV) approach, to correct for
possible measurement errors and simultaneity bias. The empirical specification that
I estimate is derived from equation (5.2.2) in section 5.2.
OLS Estimation
In the baseline specification I estimate the following model using OLS for all
countries and industries, using the data described above, derived from equation
(5.2.2) in section 5.2:
ln
(
x˜kijx˜
k′
i′j
x˜k
′
ij x˜
k
i′j
)
= θ ln
(
z˜ki z˜
k′
i′
z˜k
′
i z˜
k
i′
)
+ ln
(
kij
k′
i′j
k
′
ij 
k
i′j
)
, ∀ i 6= i′ 6= j and k 6= k′, (5.3.3)
where lnx˜kij = lnx
k
ij − lnpikii is ‘corrected’ exports in industry k from country
i to country j, where exports have been adjusted for the degree of exporting
country industry openness. lnz˜ki is the observed productivity, which differs
from fundamental productivity because of differences in exporting country level
openness pikii. The error terms 
k
ij incorporate both industry level variable trade
costs, including both formal and informal barriers to trade, as well as potential
measurement error in both the bilateral trade flows and observed productivity.
This specification captures the extent to which relative bilateral trade flows are
driven by relative productivity differences, and therefore the extent to which these
relative bilateral trade flows are driven by Ricardian Comparative Advantage. If
a country has a comparative advantage in one industry, i.e. they have a lower
opportunity cost of production in that industry,
z˜ki
z˜k
′
i
>
z˜k
i′
z˜k
′
i′
then the first country
should export relatively more to a third country in that industry than the second
country does in the same industry to the same third country,
x˜kij
x˜k
′
ij
>
x˜k
i′j
x˜k
′
i′j
. If the
coefficient on θ is positive and significant when the regression is estimated, then
it can be said that Ricardian Comparative Advantage drives the relative bilateral
flows of international trade, and an examination of the R2 will give the extent to
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which this is the case.
In Costinot et al. (2012), instead of the full equation above, the authors
estimate the following econometrically equivalent reduced form equation with
exporter importer fixed effects and importer industry fixed effects:
lnx˜kij = δij + δ
k
j + θz˜
k
i + 
k
ij, (5.3.4)
where δij and δ
k
j are, respectively exporter importer fixed effects and importer
industry fixed effects. Although the reduced form equation (5.3.4) is econometrically
equivalent to the full specification (5.3.3), in so far as the estimates of θ will be
econometrically equivalent, there is a significant disadvantage of adopting the
reduced form methodology. Specifically, by adopting this methodology there is
no way of isolating the extent to which relative bilateral flows of international
trade are driven by differences in relative productivities i.e. Ricardian Comparative
Advantage, through an examination of the R2 of the regression results, as the R2
in the reduced form specification will also capture the ability of the fixed effects to
predict the pattern of international trade. Therefore, to estimate how much of the
relative bilateral flows of international trade are driven by differences in relative
productivities it is necessary to move away from the reduced form specification
(5.3.4) used in Costinot et al. (2012) and estimate the full specification (5.3.3)2.
In Costinot et al. (2012) it was not necessary to estimate the full specification,
as the focus of their analysis was on the estimation of the value and significance
of θ, in order to assess whether Ricardian Trade Theory holds, and the reduced
form specification is significantly less computationally intensive. However, for the
purpose of my analysis the full specification is necessary, and therefore that is the
specification that is estimated for the results below.
2While it may be possible to estimate the reduced form specification (5.3.4) with and without
the productivity term and compare the R2 values to estimate the specific impact of productivity,
this would result in an underestimation of the impact of relative productivity on relative exports,
due to the correlation between the productivity and the fixed effects terms. Some countries are
naturally more productive in all industries, which would be captured in the fixed effects term, but
is a key component of the productivity variable.
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What a reduced form specification can, however, show is the validity of the
model outlined in section 5.2. Given the low R2 values estimated above for the full
specification, it could be argued that the theoretical model is invalid, however, the
R2 values for the reduced form specification is high, even when such a specification
has not accounted for importer-exporter-industry specific variations in barriers to
trade. The high R2 values for the reduced form specification suggest that the wider
model is valid, and retains explanatory power, even if relative productivities do not
account for a significant portion of the model’s explanatory power.
It is important to note that, as Costinot et al. (2012) highlight, specifications
(5.3.3) and (5.3.4) will only be fully econometrically equivalent for balanced panels.
Given the missing observations in the data used for the analysis in this chapter,
the reduced form estimation will only provide an average of the full specifications,
across the different possible reference countries and industries. These missing
observations also mean that, in order to correctly estimate both the value of θ,
and the explanatory power of the overall specification, it is necessary to estimate
equation (5.3.3) not only across all combinations of importer, exporter and industry,
but also across all possible combinations of reference country and industry as well
for every year. If the panel was balanced, with no missing observations, then the
choice of reference country and industry would be irrelevant, however, given the
missing observations, all combinations of importer, exporter, industry, reference
country and reference industry for each year must be estimated.
Table 5.1: Baseline Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable log(relative log(relative log(relative log(relative
‘corrected’ exports) exports) ‘corrected’ exports) exports)
Estimation method OLS OLS IV IV
log(relative output 0.505*** 0.732*** 2.374*** 6.034***
per worker) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00252) (0.00187)
Number of Observations 2,468,171,696 2,468,171,696 157,571,000 157,571,000
R2 0.0101 0.0258 0.0056 0.0621
***, ** and * represent variables that are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively.
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Column 1 in Table 5.1 shows the results of the baseline OLS regression of equation
(5.3.3). The table clearly shows that the estimate of θ (the parameter that estimates
the impact of relative productivity on relative bilateral exports) is both positive
and statistically significant at a 1% significance level, consistent with the findings
of Costinot et al. (2012). The main difference between the estimates of θ in this
chapter and previous work, such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), Simonovska and
Waugh (n.d.) and Costinot et al. (2012), is that in this chapter, the parameter θ is
estimated for trade in both goods and services. The results clearly show that, even
with the expanded industry sample size, Ricardian Comparative Advantage does
successfully predict the pattern of bilateral exports. However, the estimates for θ
are lower than in Costinot et al. (2012), 0.504 compared to 1.123, driven by the
larger industry and country sample in my analysis3. Column 2 in Table 5.1 shows
the results of the same OLS regression, but where the dependent variable uses
unadjusted exports, i.e. exports have not been corrected to adjust for the degree of
openness in the exporting country. Consistent with the results of Costinot et al.
(2012) my results show that not adjusting for exporting country openness would
lead to an overestimation of the impact of changes in productivity on bilateral
exports: 0.732 compared to 0.504 for ‘corrected’ exports. However, the estimated
value for θ is again positive and statistically significant as would be predicted by
Ricardian Trade Theory.
An examination of the R2 values for the regressions reveals that although
relative productivities do explain relative bilateral flows of international trade, the
extent to which bilateral flows of international trade can be explained by relative
productivities, i.e. Ricardian Comparative Advantage is low. Column 1 of Table 5.1
shows that relative productivities are only able to explain 1% of the relative bilateral
flows of international trade in goods and services. Similarly to the estimates of
θ, if exports are not adjusted to correct for the exporting country openness, the
3If we estimate equation (5.3.3 using only the industries and countries analysed in Costinot
et al. (2012), then the value of θ increases to 0.853. The remaining difference can be explained by
the use of output per worker data instead of inverse of producer price indexed, which, as Costinot
et al. (2012) show, reduces the estimated value for θ
5.3. Results 132
R2 may be overestimated. Column 2 shows that, for unadjusted exports relative
productivities can explain 2.6% of relative bilateral trade flows. However, even in
this case, the vast majority of the relative bilateral flows of international trade
cannot be explained by relative productivities, i.e, cannot be explained by Ricardian
Comparative Advantage. It is important to note that these R2 will not give a full
explanation of the extent to which the model outlined in section 5.2 is able to
predict the flows of international trade, due to the difference-in-difference approach,
and the fact that the relative trade costs term, ln
(
τkijτ
k′
i′j
τk
′
ij τ
k
i′j
)
, is incorporated into the
error term.
Instrumental Variables Estimation
The large sample size for the OLS estimates above ensures the econometric
consistency of the estimates, however, as Costinot et al. (2012) explain, there are
two reasons why the OLS estimates above may be econometrically biased and
therefore not give an accurate measure of the impact of Ricardian Comparative
Advantage: first, measurement errors in productivity data may lead to attenuation
bias, and second, endogeneity between exports and productivity, where higher
exports lead to higher productivity, causing simultaneity bias. To circumvent
these issues, as in Costinot et al. (2012) I adopt an instrumental variables (IV)
approach. Adopting this approach involves estimating the values of the observed
independent variable with the values of another independent variable that is
correlated with the first variable, but uncorrelated with the error terms. In this
chapter I instrument observed (log) productivity levels (z˜) with the (log) levels
of research and development (R&D) at an industry level in each country. Using
R&D activity to model technological change in this way follows previous work
such as Eaton and Kortum (2002), Griffith et al. (2004) and Costinot et al.
(2012). Implicitly, by adopting this method, I assume that relative levels of R&D
spending only impact on relative bilateral exports, through the impact on relative
productivities, and thus observed R&D activity is uncorrelated with the error terms
including relative trade costs which are included in the error terms. However,
this assumption seems reasonable, and follows the assumption made by Costinot
5.3. Results 133
et al. (2012). If there is a correlation between R&D expenditure and trade costs,
then some econometric bias will remain, however, in the absence of an alternative
instrument, this bias is unavoidable, and would have been present in the result of
Costinot et al. (2012) as well. Formally, I estimate the relationship between (log)
productivity and (log) levels of research and development (R&D) using OLS, and
then use the fitted values of productivity that I obtain as the independent variables
in the estimation of equation (5.3.3).
Estimating equation (5.3.3) using an IV methodology shows that there is
evidence of significant attenuation bias in the estimates of θ. Columns 3 and 4
in Table 5.1 show the results for estimating equation (5.3.3) using IV, where the
dependent variables are ‘corrected’ exports and unadjusted exports respectively.
Consistent with the findings of Costinot et al. (2012) the estimated coefficient for
θ, i.e. the estimated impact of differences in Ricardian Comparative Advantage,
increases significantly when using an IV methodology when compared to the
baseline OLS specification. Examining the R2 for the IV specifications shows
that, for the ‘corrected’ exports estimation there is a decrease in the extent
to which the relative bilateral flows of international trade can be explained by
relative productivity differences, from 1% to 0.55%. For unadjusted exports this
extent increases from 2.6% to 6.2%. Finally, similarly to the results of the OLS
specification, not adjusting for openness in the exporting country may lead to an
overestimation of the impact of relative productivity differences on the relative
bilateral flows of international trade.
Comparing the values of θ obtained using the IV methodology and output
per worker as the empirical counterpart of z˜ to the results of the alternative
productivity measures in Costinot et al. (2012) shows that the expansion of the
sample to include services industries lowers the estimated value of θ, from 2.72
in Costinot et al. (2012) to 2.37 in my analysis. Intuitively, this is likely to be
due to the other factors likely to be more important in driving bilateral services
trade, such as cultural similarity and language barriers, shown to be a key driver of
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services trade by Head et al. (2009), which would reduce the ability of productivity
differences to drive bilateral trade flows.
Robustness
For a robustness check, it is possible to use value added per worker as the empirical
counterpart to z˜, rather than output per worker. Intuitively, as you move further
down a supply chain, and thus the intermediate inputs into production increase,
the difference between output per worker and fundamental productivity increases,
whereas value added per worker adjusts for the level of intermediate inputs. As
shown earlier in section 5.3.1, using output per worker allows a comparison of the
results to the alternative productivity measures in Costinot et al. (2012), but may
not be reflective of z˜ as industries further down the production chain i.e. services
industries are included in the empirical analysis. Table 5.2 shows the results of the
same analysis as in Table 5.1, but where the independent variable is log(relative
value added per worker) instead of log(relative output per worker).
Table 5.2: Baseline Value Added Per Worker Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable log(relative log(relative log(relative log(relative
‘corrected’ exports) exports) ‘corrected’ exports) exports)
Estimation method OLS OLS IV IV
log(relative value added 0.375*** 0.561*** 1.911*** 4.856***
per worker) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00252) (0.00187)
Number of Observations 2,468,171,696 2,468,171,696 157,571,000 157,571,000
R2 0.0052 0.0141 0.0056 0.0621
***, ** and * represent variables that are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance
levels respectively.
The results obtained using value added per worker instead of output per worker
as the empirical counterpart to z˜ in Table 5.2 show clearly that more accurately
estimating productivity significantly reduces the estimated value for θ. For all four
different estimations, using OLS and IV and relative ‘corrected’ and unadjusted
exports, the estimated value for θ, although still positive and significant, indicating
evidence in favour of Ricardian Trade Theory, are all smaller than when output per
worker data is used.
Referring back to equation (5.2.2) in section 5.2, it is clear that a low R2 for
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both the OLS and IV specifications for equation (5.3.3) using both value added
per worker and output per worker to measure productivity, implies that the vast
majority of the differences in relative bilateral flows of international trade are
driven not by differences in relative productivities
(
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)
, but instead by other
factors, such as possibly differences in relative barriers to trade
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, which
are incorporated into the error term. Note that, if an analysis did not estimate
the full specification (5.3.3), but instead a reduced form equation with importer
industry and exporter importer fixed effects, as in Costinot et al. (2012), then the
R2 values in the specification would not be able to isolate the extent to which
relative bilateral flows of international trade are driven by Ricardian Comparative
Advantage, as the fixed effects will be explaining some of the variation in trade flows.
The findings above would be consistent with a sectoral gravity equation, if
for example, the decrease in trade volumes from a 1km increase in distance was
different for one industry than another. In that case, the ‘iceberg’ cost associated
with distance alone, denoted by τ kDIST ij, would be different both between industries
in the same country, τ kDIST ij 6= τ k′DISTij, but would also be in different proportions the
same two industries in two different countries τ kDIST ij/τ
k′
DISTij 6= τ kDIST i′j/τ k′DISTi′j.
The variation in the impact of barriers to trade across different industries is likely
to be greater than solely the impact of distance, as for example the impact of
cultural similarity could vary across industries, or the impact of language similarity.
A similar argument would apply to the impact of tariffs on bilateral trade flows
between two countries within a Free Trade Area (FTA), relative to bilateral trade
flows between the same importer country and a country outside the FTA. As long as
the tariff schedule for imports in industry k is not the same as in industry k′, then
there will be variation in cross country relative barriers to trade. Denote by τ kTRij
the tariff barrier to imports. For the countries in the FTA τ kTRij = τ
k′
TRij = 1, but for
the countries outside the FTA τ kTRi′j 6= τ k′TRi′j, therefore τ kTRij/τ k′TRij 6= τ kTRi′j/τ k′TRi′j.
The specifications above show that variations in these importer-exporter-industry
specific barriers to trade have the potential to explain a significant proportion of
the relative bilateral flows of international trade, if the model in section 5.2 is
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correctly specified, given how small a proportion of these relative bilateral trade
flows can be explained by relative productivities.
To examine whether the intuition above is correct, it is possible to estimate
equation (5.3.3) above for only those industries which are likely to have less
importer-exporter-industry specific variation. In the next section I estimate
equation (5.3.3), the baseline regression specification, for different samples of
industries and countries, and then conduct a meta-analysis to determine those
industries and countries for which the relative productivities are better able to
explain the relative bilateral flows of international trade.
5.3.3 Alternative Samples
Next, I explore how the extent to which relative bilateral flows of international
trade can be explained by relative productivities varies across different samples
of countries and industries, and the intuition behind this variation, including the
first examination of the extent to which relative productivities can explain relative
bilateral flows of international trade in services. To examine the variation in the
ability of relative productivities to explain relative bilateral trade flows, I estimate
equation (5.3.3) above for eight sub-samples of industries, and 5 sub-samples of
countries, using both the measures of productivity (value added per worker and
output per worker), as well as both ‘corrected’ and unadjusted exports as the
dependent variable using both OLS and IV specifications. The eight industry
samples are as follows: 1) industries with an export to output ratio of greater
than 5%, 2) industries with an export to output ratio of greater than 10%, 3) goods
industries with an export to output ratio of greater than 10%4, 4) the industries used
in Costinot et al. (2012), 5) manufacturing industries, 6) all services industries, 7)
services industries with an export to output ratio of greater than 5% and 8) services
industries with an export to output ratio of greater than 10%. The full list of which
industry is in which sample is in Table C2 in the appendix. The five country samples
4Note that sample 3 contains all goods industries other than ISIC Codes A01, C18, D and E36.
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are as follows: 1) the countries used in Costinot et al. (2012), 2) countries de facto
in the EU Single Market, 3) countries in the EU, 4) countries not in the EU or EEA
and 5) Countries whose GDP is in the world’s top 20. The full list of which country
is in which sample is in Table C3 in the appendix.
Meta-Analysis
In order to estimate the drivers of deviations from Ricardian Comparative
Advantage and the determinants of the extent to which relative bilateral flows of
international trade can be explained by relative productivities, I next conduct a
meta-analysis on the results of my estimations for different industry and country
samples. Although meta-analysis as a tool is more widely used to compare the
results of different studies within a literature, it is also appropriate for comparing
the results across my different sub-samples.
Once the regressions for each possible combination of industry sample, country
sample, independent variable and dependent variable samples have been estimated
I next conduct a meta-analysis on the results of these specifications, specifically to
examine the determinants of both the value of θ and the extent to which relative
bilateral flows of international trade can be explained by relative productivity
differences. Given the two different dependent variables, and two different possible
independent variables, along with the nine possible industry samples (1 full
sample and 8 sub-samples) and six possible country samples (1 full sample and 5
sub-samples) I have 2 × 2 × 9 × 6 = 216 observations for each of the OLS and IV
specifications. To examine the impact of each sub sample, while controlling for
differences between the different independent and dependent variables, as a data
fitting exercise, given the lack of a model for the data generating process, I estimate
the following two OLS regressions, with fixed effects for regressions that use output
per worker and ‘corrected’ exports, as well as fixed effects for each industry and
country sub sample, using, as the dependent variables, the the regression R2 and
the coefficient of θ from the estimates of equation (5.3.3) for each combination of
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industry sample, country sample, independent variable and dependent variable:
R2 = α0 + α1δIndep + α2δDep +
8∑
n=1
αn+3δInd n +
5∑
m=1
αm+11δCon m +  (5.3.5)
θ = β0 + β1δIndep + β2δDep +
8∑
n=1
βn+3δInd n +
5∑
m=1
βm+11δCon m +  (5.3.6)
Table 5.3 shows the results of my meta-analysis using, as the dependent variable
the regression R2 (Columns 1 & 2) and the coefficient of θ (Columns 3 & 4)from
the estimates of equation (5.3.3) for each combination of industry sample, country
sample, independent variable and dependent variable for both the OLS (Columns
1 & 3) and IV (Columns 2 & 4) specifications. Examining first the impact of
the different industry and country samples on the extent to which international
trade can be explained using Ricardian Trade Theory, in columns 1 and 2, we
can observe that for both the OLS and IV specifications, focusing on only those
industries with export to output ratios of greater than 5% and 10% the ability of
Ricardian Comparative Advantage to explain bilateral trade flows is substantially
larger. For the IV specification there are on average a 2.9% point and a 3.6%
point increase in the R2 values for industries with export to output ratios of
greater than 5% and 10% relative to all industries. If deviations from Ricardian
Comparative Advantage are driven by difference in relative trade costs, then
these results are as we would expect. Bilateral trade flows in those industries
that are more tradeable internationally will have lower variation in relative trade
costs, compared to industries that are relatively less tradeable, such as construction.
If we examine the difference between the ability of Ricardian Trade Theory
to explain bilateral trade flows in goods and in services we can see further evidence
that relative trade barriers are driving deviations from Ricardian Comparative
Advantage. Comparing the coefficient on δInd3 and δInd6, in columns 1 and 2 we can
see that in both the OLS and IV specifications the coefficient on δInd3 is positive
and significant, while the coefficient on δInd6 is negative and significant. This
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Table 5.3: Meta-Analysis Results
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable OLS R2 IV R2 OLS θ
Constant 0.0318*** 0.0765*** 0.692***
(0.0055) (0.0106) (0.0464)
δInd1 (5% Tradeable) 0.0130** 0.0289** 0.0952*
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δInd2 (10% Tradeable) 0.0204*** 0.0428*** 0.146***
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δInd3 (10% Tradeable Goods) 0.0210*** 0.0438*** 0.0102**
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δInd4 (Costinot et al. (2012)) 0.0210*** 0.0358*** -0.0239
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δInd5 (Manufacturing) 0.0195*** 0.0237** 0.0400
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δInd6 (Services) -0.0953 -0.0329*** -0.174***
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δInd7 (5% Tradeable Services) 0.00598 -0.0205* -0.0169
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δInd8 (10% Tradeable Services) 0.0163*** -0.0169 0.0666
(0.00584) (0.0113) (0.0493)
δCon1 (Costinot et al. (2012)) 0.0206*** 0.0212** 0.184***
(0.00477) (0.00919) (0.0403)
δCon2 (Single Market) 0.0216*** 0.0109 0.138***
(0.00477) (0.00919) (0.0403)
δCon3 (EU) 0.0219*** 0.00755 0.118***
(0.00477) (0.00919) (0.0403)
δCon4 (Non-EU) -0.0155*** 0.00424 -0.194***
(0.00477) (0.00919) (0.0403)
δCon5 (Top 20 by GDP) -0.0160*** -0.00676 -0.212***
(0.00477) (0.00919) (0.0403)
Dependent Variable FE YES YES YES
Independent Variable FE YES YES YES
Number of Observations 216 216 216
R2 0.626 0.655 0.619
***, ** and * represent variables that are significant at 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels respectively.
means that bilateral goods trade is better explained by Ricardian Trade Theory
and bilateral services trade is less well explained by Ricardian Trade Theory than
for all bilateral flows of international trade. It is likely that services trade will
have significantly more variation in relative trade costs, reflecting dissimilarities
in regulatory standards across different industries, cultural differences, language
barriers etc., which are likely to more significantly impact services industries, as in
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Head et al. (2009), compared to goods industries. The variation in relative trade
costs, increases the size of the
(
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′
ij τ
k
i′j
)
term in equation (5.2.2), which increases
the relative error term term in equation (5.3.3), driving increased deviation from
Ricardian Comparative Advantage, and reducing the ability of Ricardian Trade
Theory to explain the pattern of bilateral international trade.
The final piece of evidence that relative trade cost differences are driving
deviations from Ricardian Comparative Advantage is obtained by examining
bilateral trade flows for countries inside the EU compared to countries outside
the EU. Comparing the coefficient on Country fixed effects two, three and four
in column 1 shows that for the OLS specification5 the coefficient on δCon2 and
δCon3 are positive, while the coefficient on δCon4 is negative and significant. This
means that bilateral trade for countries inside the EU/EEA (δCon2) or inside
the EU (δCon3) is better explained by Ricardian Trade Theory and bilateral
trade for countries outside the EU is less well explained by Ricardian Trade
Theory than trade between all countries. Differences in relative trade costs
are likely to be much smaller inside a FTA, such as the EU/EEA, which allows
more of the variation in bilateral trade flows to be driven by productivity differences.
Next, the results of the meta-analysis highlight why the results for my baseline OLS
regression gave a lower estimated value for θ than the value estimated by Costinot
et al. (2012). Column 3 of Table 5.3, shows that for the particular country sample
used in their paper, compared to a larger country sample, the estimated value of θ
is higher. The results also show that even if Costinot et al. (2012) had estimated
a direct comparison of relative bilateral exports to relative productivity, it is likely
that they would not have been able to give an accurate estimate of the extent to
5Column 2 shows that for the IV specification there is little variation in the ability of Ricardian
Trade Theory to explain bilateral trade flows across different country samples, driven mainly by the
significant number of missing observations in R and D data for less tradeable/ services industries in
Non-EU countries. Therefore it appears that Ricardian Trade Theory can explain bilateral trade
flows in Non-EU countries solely because of the industries for which data is available for those
countries are those industries whose trade is likely to be driven more by Ricardian Comparative
Advantage and less by relative trade costs.
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which relative productivities can explain the overall patterns of relative bilateral
trade, as both the particular industry sample and the particular country sample
give higher values for R2 than for the whole industry and country samples.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I used the innovative theoretical framework developed by Costinot
et al. (2012) to offer the first exploration of the extent to which relative bilateral
flows of international trade can be explained by differences in relative productivity,
and thus the extent to which these flows are driven by Ricardian Comparative
Advantage. Unlike the fixed effect methodology used in their paper, I use a
more computationally intensive method, which enables the impact of Ricardian
Comparative Advantage to be isolated separately from exporter-importer or
importer-industry specific barriers to trade. I also extend the previous examinations
of trade in goods to provide the first examination of whether Ricardian Comparative
Advantage drives relative bilateral international trade in services. Finally, using
a meta-analysis I examine the drivers of deviations from the patterns of trade
expected if trade was driven solely by Ricardian Comparative Advantage. Two
main results stand out from my examination:
First, although Ricardian Trade Theory holds for relative bilateral international
trade flows in both goods, consistent with the findings of Costinot et al. (2012),
and services, shown by the positive and significant coefficient on the elasticity
of relative exports to relative productivity, θ, the extent to which these relative
bilateral trade flows are driven by Ricardian Comparative Advantage is low. In
the baseline specifications, a maximum of 1% of relative bilateral trade flows can
be explained by relative productivity differences. This result is robust to different
specifications and industry and country samples, and therefore other factors such
as barriers to trade, wage differentials and preferences are needed to explain the
vast majority of relative bilateral trade flows.
5.4. Conclusion 142
Second, the proportion of relative bilateral international trade flows that can be
explained by differences in relative productivities is larger for goods industries than
for services industries, driven by larger differences in importer-exporter-industry
specific barriers to trade in services, such as cultural or language differences that
have a significantly more heterogeneous impact on different services sectors than
different goods sectors, consistent with the findings of Head et al. (2009). Thus, as
services trade becomes an increasingly large portion of international trade, barring
any changes in the relative heterogeneity of importer-exporter-industry specific
barriers to trade in services we would expect the extent to which relative bilateral
flows of international trade are driven by Ricardian Comparative Advantage to
decline over time. Thus more focus needs to be placed on the identification of the
impact of importer-exporter-industry specific barriers to trade, to allow accurate
ongoing predictions of the patterns of international trade.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
This aim of this thesis is to contribute to our understanding of the links between
international trade and productivity, by further developing our understanding of
both the impact of changes in international trade on productivity, as well as
the impact of changes in productivity on international trade. To further this
understanding, I have sought to answer three significant research questions:
1. To what extent do changes in the origin of a country’s imports matter for
the impact of international trade on productivity, once changes in the overall
volume of trade are accounted for?
2. How does the endogenous response of less productive non-trading domestic
firms affect the response of productivity to changes in barriers to trade and
other macroeconomic shocks?
3. To what extent are relative bilateral flows of international trade explained by
differences in relative productivity levels, and thus, to what extent are these
flows driven by Ricardian Comparative Advantage?
After a comprehensive literature review, presented in Chapter 2, examining the
links between trade and productivity, Chapter 3 addresses the first of these
questions, and shows that in addition to the significant effect of import volumes
on productivity, observed in previous studies (see for example Hung et al. (2004),
Amiti and Konings (2007) and Bloom et al. (2016)), if a shift in the origin of a
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country’s imports is exogenously driven, it can cause changes in productivity. This
chapter shows that such an exogenous shift in the origin of UK services imports
away from the EU and towards Non-EU countries around the time of the Great
Recession caused around a 1.7% decrease in UK productivity. However, the decrease
in the proportion of UK goods imports originating in the EU at the same time
was endogenously driven, and thus its effect on UK productivity cannot be identified.
In Chapter 4 a new theoretical Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model, building on Ghironi and Melitz (2005), was developed to incorporate an
endogenous response of less productive non-trading domestic firms. This model is
then used to show that, unlike in previous theoretical models such as Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) or Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014), the endogenous response of these
firms allows the model to match the observed large increases in productivity in
response to barrier to import reductions seen in the empirical literature such as
Bloom et al. (2016). This chapter also shows that the endogenous response of less
productive non-trading firms introduces further endogeneity into the persistence of
labour productivity, on top of the limited endogeneity in existing models such as
Ghironi and Melitz (2005) or Fattel Jaef and Lopez (2014).
In Chapter 5 the innovative theoretical framework developed by Costinot
et al. (2012) was adopted, to present the first empirical test of the extent to
which Ricardian Comparative Advantage drives the relative bilateral flows of
international trade. Although the previous empirical testing such as MacDougall
(1951), Bhagwati (1964) and Costinot et al. (2012) could assess whether Ricardian
Trade Theory holds, they could not determine the extent to which relative bilateral
flows of international trade can be explained by differences in relative productivity
levels. This chapter builds on this literature and concludes that although
Ricardian Trade Theory holds across a wide range of countries and industries,
consistent with the existing literature, only a very small percentage of the bilateral
flows of international trade can be explained by differences in relative productivities.
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Future research building on my thesis might explore the following issues:
First, to what extent are the findings that a shift in the origin of imports, if
exogenously driven, can affect productivity robust to a wider sample of countries
and greater disaggregation of industries? Identifying exogenous shifts in the origin
of imports may prove to be difficult, hence the focus of the analysis solely on UK
services imports, where the exogeneity of the shift was identifiable.
Second, how would the response of less productive non-trading firms vary in
models in which the assumptions of trade balance in every period and zero
unemployment were relaxed? Given the persistent trade deficits observed for many
countries, and the significant interactions between the responses of unemployment
and productivity to macroeconomic shocks this is an important topic for future
research.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 3
A.1 Unit Root Tests
The regression equation for the ADF test is as follows:
∆Xt = β0 + β1t+ β2Xt−1 +
n∑
i=1
φi∆Xt−1 + t, (A.1.1)
where t is the regression error, which by assumption is stationary with zero
mean and constant variance. Both the ADF and Phillips-Perron tests perform a
significance test on the coefficient of Xt−1. The Phillips-Perron test is based on the
regression equation above, except that the lagged difference terms (
∑n
i=1 φi∆Xt−1)
are excluded, in order to first test the significance of the coefficient of Xt−1 without
the assumptions for the degrees of serial correlation between the lagged difference
terms. To increase the robustness of our checks, the ADF test is run, with a number
of lagged differences included, according to the optimal lag length given by the
Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC). Given that the optimal lag length according to
the SIC was 0, the two tests are identical. Both tests were first performed with a
constant only, and then with a constant and trend.
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Table A1: Unit Root Test Results
Variable ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
Constant Trend and Constant Trend and
Constant Constant
Levels:
PROD TS -2.525[0] 0.1893[0] -2.252 0.1893
IS S -1.747[0] -1.584[0] -1.747 -1.584
IM S -2.265[0] -0.6583[0] -2.265 -0.6583
First Difference:
∆PROD TS -2.997*[0] -4.006*[0] -2.997* -4.006*
∆IS S -5.250**[0] -5.215**[0] -5.250** -5.215**
∆IM S -4.505**[0] -6.088**[0] -4.505** -6.088**
Notes: The figures in brackets denote the optimal lag length, determined
using the Schwarz Information Criteria. Significant at or below ** 1% and * 5%
significance.
A.2 Johansen (1991) Maximum Eigenvalue and
Trace Tests
The Johansen (1991) test identifies the number of cointegrating relationships using
two likelihood ratio tests: the maximum eigenvalue test (λmax) and trace test
(λtrace).
Table A2: Johansen (1991) Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace Test
Results
Sector Variables H0: Rank= r r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2
Services PROD TS, IS S, IM S
Eigenvalue 0.61245 0.38849 0.13447
λmax 22.749* 11.804 3.466
5% Critical Values 21.132 14.265 3.841
λtrace 38.019** 15.269 3.466
5% Critical Values 29.797 15.495 3.841
Note: Significant at or below ** 1% and * 5% significance.
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A.3 Schwartz Information Criteria and
Hannan-Quinn Criteria Optimal Lag Length
Table A3: Schwartz Information Criteria and Hannan-Quinn Criteria
Optimal Lag Length
Variables Lag Length SIC HQC
PROD TS, IS S, IM S
1 -14.281* -14.492*
2 -13.968 -14.328
3 -13.533 -14.051
4 -13.004 -13.686
Note:* Denotes optimal lag length chosen by SIC/HQC.
A.4 Tradable Goods - Tests Results
Table A4: Unit Root Test Results
Variable ADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
Constant Trend and Constant Trend and
Constant Constant
Levels:
PROD TG -2.973[0] -0.9855[0] -2.973 -0.9855
IS G -1.894[0] -3.475[5] -1.950 -1.985
IM G -1.094[0] -2.450[0] -1.094 -2.450
First Difference:
∆PROD TG -3.176*[0] -4.322*[0] -3.176* -4.322*
∆IS G -3.895**[5] -3.759*[5] -4.566** -4.488**
∆IM G -5.464**[0] -5.587**[0] -5.464** -5.587**
Notes: The figures in brackets denote the optimal lag length, determined
using the Schwarz Information Criteria. Significant at or below ** 1% and * 5%
significance.
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Table A5: Johansen (1991) Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace Test
Results
Sector Variables H0: Rank= r r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2
Services PROD TG, IS G, IM G
Eigenvalue 0.54683 0.314797 1.01 ×10−6
λmax 18.996* 9.073 2.43×10−5
5% Critical Values 17.797 11.224 4.129
λtrace 28.068** 9.073 2.43×10−5
5% Critical Values 24.276 12.321 4.129
Note: Significant at or below ** 1% and * 5% significance.
Table A6: Schwartz Information Criteria and Hannan-Quinn Criteria
Optimal Lag Length
Variables Lag Length SIC HQC
PROD TG, IS G, IM G
1 -14.466* -14.678*
2 -13.881 -14.241
3 -13.297 -13.814
4 -13.287 -13.969
Note:* Denotes optimal lag length chosen by SIC/HQC.
Long Run Relationship Estimation:
PROD TGt =4.6927+
(1.792)∗∗
2.4397IS Gt+
(0.9492)∗∗
1.6266IM Gt+
(0.1542)∗∗∗
θGt.
(A.4.2)
Rearranging, we obtain the estimated residual equation:
θ̂Gt = PROD TGt − 4.6927− 2.4397IS Gt − 1.6266.IM Gt (A.4.3)
Table A7: CADF and Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Results
Variable CADF Test Phillips-Perron Test
θ̂St−1 -2.731** [0] -2.731**
Notes: The figures in brackets denote the optimal lag length, determined using the
Schwarz Information Criteria. Significant at or below ** 1% and * 5% significance.
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Estimated VECM Equations:
∆PROD TGt = µ1+α11θ̂Gt−1+α21∆PROD TGt−1+α31∆IS Gt−1+α41∆IM Gt−1+4t,
(A.4.4)
∆IS Gt = µ2 +α12θ̂Gt−1 +α22∆PROD TGt−1 +α32∆IS Gt−1 +α42∆IM Gt−1 +5t,
(A.4.5)
∆IM Gt = µ3+α13θ̂Gt−1+α23∆PROD TGt−1+α33∆IS Gt−1+α43∆IM Gt−1+6t.
(A.4.6)
Table A8: Goods VECM Results
Equation Dependent θ̂St−1 ∆PROD TSt−1 ∆IS St−1 ∆IM St−1 F1 F2 Constant
Variable
(A.4.4) ∆PROD TGt -0.008375 0.5305*** -0.2489 -0.6210*** 0.14778 4.1248** 0.01613**
(0.1090) (0.1862) (0.4739) (0.2169) (0.006385)
(A.4.5) ∆IS Gt -0.02134 -0.05662 -0.01084 -0.01149 0.30930 0.0066525 4.963×10−3
(0.05928) (0.1012) (0.2577) (0.1180) (0.003472)
(A.4.6) ∆IM Gt -0.2282** 0.1450 -0.08132 -0.2427 3.5990** 3.0404* 0.01231*
(0.1040) (0.1777) (0.4522) (0.2070) (0.006093)
Notes: The figures in brackets are the standard errors. Significant at or
below *** 1%, ** 5% and *10% significance.
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Table B1: Equations of the Model
Equation Name Equation
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Equation Name Equation
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Table B2: Parameter Values Used in the Model Calibration
Parameter Value Description
β 0.99 Household discount factor
γ 2 Risk aversion
δ 0.0235 Probability of firm death
θ 3.8 Elasticity of substitution
k 3.4 Firm-level productivity dispersion
ρ 0.9 Aggregate persistence
zhmin 1 Minimum firm productivity in country h
zimin 1 Minimum firm productivity in country i
zjmin 1 Minimum firm productivity in country j
fhE 1 Firm sunk entry cost in country h
f iE 1 Firm sunk entry cost in country i
f jE 1 Firm sunk entry cost in country j
fhD 0.0090 Per period fixed cost of producing for the domestic market in country h
f iD 0.0104 Per period fixed cost of producing for the domestic market in country i
f jD 0.0184 Per period fixed cost of producing for the domestic market in country j
τhi 1.316 Per unit iceberg cost of exporting from country h to country i
τhj 1.450 Per unit iceberg cost of exporting from country h to country j
τ ih 1.326 Per unit iceberg cost of exporting from country i to country h
τ ij 1.450 Per unit iceberg cost of exporting from country i to country j
τ jh 1.459 Per unit iceberg cost of exporting from country j to country h
τ ji 1.459 Per unit iceberg cost of exporting from country j to country i
fhXi 0.09 Per period fixed cost of producing for the country i export market in country h
fhXj 0.082 Per period fixed cost of producing for the country j export market in country h
f iXh 0.083 Per period fixed cost of producing for the country h export market in country i
f iXj 0.135 Per period fixed cost of producing for the country j export market in country i
f jXh 0.136 Per period fixed cost of producing for the country h export market in country j
f jXi 0.136 Per period fixed cost of producing for the country i export market in country j
Lh 1 Size of country h
Li 5.93 Size of country i
Lj 19.59 Size of country j
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Table C1: Baseline Regression Country List
Acronym Country EU Member 2017 IMF Global GDP Rank
AUS Australia No 13
AUT Austria Yes 28
BEL Belgium Yes 25
BGR Bulgaria Yes 78
BRA Brazil No 8
CAN Canada No 10
CHE Switzerland No (Bilateral Agreements) 20
CHN China, People’s Republic of No 2
CYP Cyprus Yes 110
CZE Czech Republic Yes 49
DEU Germany Yes 4
DNK Denmark Yes 36
ESP Spain Yes 14
EST Estonia Yes 103
FIN Finland Yes 44
FRA France Yes 7
GBR United Kingdom Yes 5
GRC Greece Yes 53
HRV Croatia Yes 79
HUN Hungary Yes 58
IDN Indonesia No 16
IND India No 6
IRL Ireland Yes 35
ITA Italy Yes 9
JPN Japan No 3
KOR Republic of Korea No 11
LTU Lithuania Yes 86
LUX Luxembourg Yes 73
LVA Latvia Yes 99
MEX Mexico No 15
MLT Malta Yes 129
NLD Netherlands Yes 18
NOR Norway No (EEA) 29
POL Poland Yes 24
PRT Portugal Yes 47
ROU Romania Yes 50
RUS Russian Federation No 12
SVK Slovakia Yes 65
SVN Slovenia Yes 84
SWE Sweden Yes 23
TUR Turkey No 17
TWN Taiwan No 22
USA United States of America No 1
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Table C2: Sub-Sample Industry List
ISIC Code Industry 5% Tradeable 10% Tradeable 10% Goods Costinot et al. (2012) Manufacturing Services 5% Services 10% Services
01 Crop and Animal Yes No No No No No No No
02 Forestry Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
03 Fishing Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
B Mining Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
10-12 Food Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
13-15 Textile Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
16 Wood Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
17 Paper Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
18 Printing Yes No No No Yes No No No
19 Petroleum Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
20 Chemical Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
21 Pharmaceuticals Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No
22 Rubber Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
23 Non-Metallic Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
24 Basic Metal Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
25 Fabricated Metals Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No
26 Computer Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No
27 Electrical Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
28 Machinery Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
29 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
30 Transport Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No
31-32 Furniture Manufacturing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
33 Repair and Installation Yes No No No No No No No
D Electricity and Gas Supply No No No No No No No No
36 Water Treatment and Supply No No No No No Yes No No
37-39 Waste Management Services Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
F Construction No No No No No Yes No No
45 Motor Vehicle Trade No No No No No Yes No No
46 Wholesale Trade (Non-Motor) Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
47 Retail Trade (Non-Motor) No No No No No Yes No No
49 Land Transport Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
50 Water Transport Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
51 Air Transport Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
52 Warehousing Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
53 Postal and Couriers Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
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ISIC Code Industry 5% Tradeable 10% Tradeable 10% Goods Costinot et al. (2012) Manufacturing Services 5% Services 10% Services
I Accommodation and Food Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
58 Publishing Activities Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
59-60 Multimedia Activities Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
61 Telecommunications No No No No No Yes No No
62-63 Computer Services Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
64 Financial Services Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
65 Insurance Services Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
66 Auxiliary Services Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
L Real Estate Activities No No No No No Yes No No
69-70 Legal and Accounting Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
71 Engineering Services Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
72 Research and Development Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
73 Advertising Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
74-75 Other Scientific Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No
N Administrative Services Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
O Public Administration No No No No No Yes No No
P Education No No No No No Yes No No
Q Health Services No No No No No Yes No No
R-S Other Services No No No No No Yes No No
T Household Activities No No No No No Yes No No
U Extraterritorial No No No No No Yes No No
Appendix C. Appendices to Chapter 5 177
Table C3: Sub-Sample Country List
Acronym Country Costinot et al. (2012) Single Market EU Non-EU Top 20 by GDP
AUS Australia Yes No No Yes Yes
AUT Austria No Yes Yes No No
BEL Belgium Yes Yes Yes No No
BGR Bulgaria No Yes Yes No No
BRA Brazil No No No Yes Yes
CAN Canada No No No Yes Yes
CHE Switzerland No Yes No No Yes
CHN China No No No Yes Yes
CYP Cyprus No Yes Yes No No
CZE Czech Republic Yes Yes Yes No No
DEU Germany Yes Yes Yes No Yes
DNK Denmark Yes Yes Yes No No
ESP Spain Yes Yes Yes No Yes
EST Estonia No Yes Yes No No
FIN Finland Yes Yes Yes No No
FRA France Yes Yes Yes No Yes
GBR United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes No Yes
GRC Greece Yes Yes Yes No No
HRV Croatia No Yes Yes No No
HUN Hungary Yes Yes Yes No No
IDN Indonesia No No No Yes Yes
IND India No No No Yes Yes
IRL Ireland Yes Yes Yes No No
ITA Italy Yes Yes Yes No Yes
JPN Japan Yes No No Yes Yes
KOR Republic of Korea Yes No No Yes Yes
LTU Lithuania No Yes Yes No No
LUX Luxembourg No Yes Yes No No
LVA Latvia No Yes Yes No No
MEX Mexico Yes No No Yes Yes
MLT Malta No Yes Yes No No
NLD Netherlands Yes Yes Yes No Yes
NOR Norway No Yes No No No
POL Poland Yes Yes Yes No No
PRT Portugal Yes Yes Yes No No
ROU Romania No Yes Yes No No
RUS Russian Federation No No No Yes Yes
SVK Slovakia Yes Yes Yes No No
SVN Slovenia No Yes Yes No No
SWE Sweden Yes Yes Yes No No
TUR Turkey No No No Yes Yes
TWN Taiwan No No No Yes No
USA United States of America No No No Yes Yes
